

Measuring Political Violence

Opinions on political violence -
CAPI and CAWI research



POLITICAL CAPITAL
POLICY RESEARCH & CONSULTING INSTITUTE





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October, 2015



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PREFACE, SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT

Our study is part of a research project, which focused on political violence and was co-funded by the European Commission's programme 'Prevention of and Fight against Crime' (ISEC) and Open Society Institute. The project, entitled 'Developing innovative methods for comparative researches on violent radicalisation among the youth to help prevention', was carried out by Political Capital. DEMOS UK - as our international partner in this project - conducted certain aspects of the research.

With two different types of surveys we examined the willingness to violence, the acceptance of violent acts and, in general, the opinions on and attitudes towards violence in Hungary and the UK in 2014.

With the help of two different types of surveys we examined the willingness to commit violent acts, the acceptance of those acts and, in general, the opinions on and attitudes towards violence in Hungary and the UK in 2014.

One of the methods used was a personal survey (from now on referred to as CAPI), which was conducted by Ipsos in Hungary and by Ipsos Mori in the UK as part of their regular omnibus survey.

The other method applied was an online survey developed by Demos UK (from now on referred to as CAWI). Respondents were recruited via Facebook ads asking for filling in the questionnaire. The ads were displayed on the Facebook pages of users who are members of the target groups defined during the preparation phase.

The aims of the research were twofold. On the one hand, using both traditional and innovative research methods applied during our research, we wanted to clear the following questions. Which social groups accept and apply violence (driven mainly by political conviction) the most? What demographic and social characteristics and attitudes lie behind the acceptance and use of political violence? On the other hand, we made every effort to make the surveys conducted in Hungary and the UK methodologically as similar as possible so that the results can be compared.

In the following, we present the results of the research in detail as well as the lessons we learned through the multivariable statistical analyses of the sample of the Hungarian CAPI survey.

All errors and omissions are our own.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Traditional survey results (CAPI) in Hungary

- in Hungary, one quarter of the respondents believe that democracy and political violence are compatible, one fifth believe that in some cases 'the end justifies the means', and twelve per cent believe that under certain circumstances, terrorism is acceptable. Voters of the far-right Jobbik party were more supportive towards violence.
- We tried to identify the ideological objectives¹ that make violence justifiable, as well as the social groups² against which respondents find violence acceptable. One-third of the respondents believe that violence cannot be justified for any of the objectives stated, and an additional 12 per cent believe that it can be justified in one case only. But generally, we found surprisingly high figures for justification of violence for some ideological goals and against some groups.
- The majority considers the protection of one's family as a sufficient reason for violence. More abstract objectives, such as the protection of the Hungarian nation and action to protect personal freedoms, enjoy relatively strong support (39 and 35 per cent, respectively). The number of supporters even for the least approved cases (social inequality becomes unbearable; natural resources and the prospects of future generations come under threat) is 29 per cent, although in these scenarios 35-36 per cent of respondents refuse the use of violence, which exceeds the ratio of supporters.
- Terrorists and criminals are clearly those against which a considerable part of the Hungarian respondents believe violence can be justified (63 and 47 per cent, respectively). This is not surprising though, given that these are the groups against which states usually apply legitimate tools of violence via law enforcement.
- 40 per cent of the respondents believe that violence is acceptable against traitors and enemies of the nation. In this context, there are no differences of opinion on the radical right or left. An even more shocking figure is that close to one third (29 per cent) of the respondents consider using violence against the Roma acceptable, and 35 per cent said so for drug addicts. In the case of authoritarian leaders threatening democracy (26 per cent), banks (25 per cent) and politicians (23 per cent), around one-third of respondents think violence can be justified. This figure is 18 per cent for multinational companies.

1 If the respondent's family faced dangers; if the Hungarian nation faced a threat; if there was an attempt to limit the respondent's personal freedom; if the government oppressed its citizens; if the respondent's livelihood was threatened; if social inequality become unbearable; if environmental resources or the future of the next generation were threatened.

2 Terrorists; Criminals; Traitors and enemies of the nation; Drug addicts; Those destroying nature; Radical left-wing groups; Radical right-wing groups; Gypsies; Authoritarians undermining democracy; Banks; Politicians; Multinational companies; Jews; Homosexuals.

- Against Jews 16 per cent and against homosexuals 14 per cent of the respondents said violence is justifiable. These are considerably higher figures than found in Great Britain, but relatively low in the group of subjects in Hungary. Furthermore, as we know from existing research, homosexuals and Jews, often conceptualised as powerful enemies having strong lobbies, are often targets of verbal aggression. They seem not to be important as well-identifiable members of certain minority groups, instead, they have a rather symbolic role in the public discourse. They are often perceived as influential players with special characteristics who conspire against people and who should be hated and feared at the same time.
- We examined some specific situations in the Hungarian sample as well. 13 per cent of the Hungarian respondents said for example that beating up an amoral politician is acceptable under some circumstances, while 79 per cent said it is never acceptable.
- The effects of demographic variables behind attitudes towards violence were generally very weak or non-existent. Party preference (preference of Jobbik in particular), was found to be an important determining factor behind the justification of violence. People showing more activism and interest in politics, holding stronger anti-Semitic and anti-Roma attitudes, and those characterized by robust authoritarian attitudes (right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation) were more open to justifying different forms of political violence. With all that, genuine discoveries were offered by an examination of the combined effects of variables. What we found is that attitudes are the real causes that transmit the effects of all of the variables: anti-Roma attitudes, anti-Semitism and, in particular, right-wing authoritarianism, as well as social dominance orientation. It seems as though that party preference is rather a 'symptom'; in fact, the acceptance of violence is a function of the respondent's extremist, authoritarian and prejudicial attitudes.

Traditional survey (CAPI) results in the United Kingdom

- Surveys conducted in the United Kingdom – similarly to the Hungarian results – showed violence to be the most acceptable when the 'family faced dangers'. 63 per cent of Britons thought that violence, in this case, was acceptable to a certain extent. The approval for violence was convincing in case 'The British Nation faced a threat' as well, although not as strongly as in the previous situation: close to half of all respondents think violence can be justified in this situation. The least supported scenario was the use of violence if 'social inequality become unbearable'. 23 per cent of Britons think violence is acceptable in this case but at the same time 39 per cent think it is not. The comparison of data from Hungary and the United Kingdom shows that the British think violence is more agreeable if the 'family faced dangers' or if 'The British Nation faced a threat' but significantly less in other cases.

- In the United Kingdom the majority thinks the use of violence can be justified against terrorists and 'traitors and enemies of the nation'. Against the former group the use of force has particularly strong support (58 per cent). With regards to different ethnic minorities or religious groups: violence against Jews, Gypsies, Muslims and immigrants is barely supported – only 3-6 per cent of respondents would accept violence against these groups. While using violence to reach specific objectives is widely accepted in the UK as well, in the Hungarian sample we found much more widespread acceptance of the use of violence against specific groups – especially minority groups such as drug addicts, Gypsies and Jews.

Online-survey (CAWI) results

- The online survey, for which participants were recruited through Facebook, showed that younger people in the sample accepted terrorism in greater proportion. The refusal of immigration was, interestingly, not correlated with the support of violence, however, lack of confidence in the police seemed to be an important factor. There is a fairly strong correlation between different kinds of political activism and the support of violent acts.
- In the online survey in Hungary, younger people, men, and citizens living in mid- to small-sized towns were rather supportive towards violence. In terms of party preferences, a high proportion of those accepting violence were supporters of Jobbik – but generally, we could find high support rates in politically "hyperactive" groups.

Hungary

About the survey in Hungary

The research was conducted in June 2014 by Ipsos Zrt., where interviewers conducted personal interviews in the homes of respondents. The sample was 1,000 individuals and represents the Hungarian adult population over the age of 18, taking into account gender, age, schooling and type of domicile. While the study has a statistical error of 3.1 per cent and in cases where the questions, instead of the entire sample, involved just a specific group of respondents, the margin of error is higher.

A more extensive set of questions applied in the Hungarian CAPI research allowed for a deeper analysis of the acceptance of political violence. Below, we shall look at the level of tolerance for violence in general and then take a closer look to see in what situations, to what extent and against which social groups people believe that the use of violence can be justified. Then we present factors explaining the acceptance of political violence. We take stock of various socio-demographic variables, political interests and activities, general views about democracy and party preferences. Subsequently, we look at various personality traits. We analyze the effects of specific prejudice types, such as anti-Roma sentiments, anti-Semitism, homophobia and xenophobia. Moreover, we give a close examination of the correlation between right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and the acceptance of political violence – categories widely used in professional literature.

Political violence – general perceptions


We measured general perceptions of political violence through three questions. In all cases we listed two propositions and asked respondents to indicate which of the two is closer to their opinion. The propositions are as follows:³

- Democracy and political violence.
 - Proposition 1: 'Regardless of the objective, in a democracy the use of violence is unacceptable.'
 - Proposition 2: 'If needed to reach important objectives, even the use of violence is acceptable.'
- The end justifies the means.
 - Proposition 1: 'The use of violence is not justified by any objective.'
 - Proposition 2: 'When it comes to objectives considered important by you, even violence can be used.'

³ In the questionnaire questions did not follow the same order as to avoid automatic responses.

- Support for terrorism as an extreme form of political violence.
- Proposition 1: ‘Terrorism is to be condemned under all conditions, regardless of its justification.’
- Proposition 2: ‘Under some conditions terrorism is the only means to express one’s political opinion.’

23 per cent of the respondents believe that to achieve important objectives the use of violence is acceptable even in a democracy. 20 per cent say that violence can be used for objectives they consider important. Views on terrorism are less tolerant: 12 per cent of the respondents believe that under some circumstances terrorism is acceptable.



In respect to all three questions it was found that men are more likely to support violence. From the point of age, only attitudes to terrorism show a difference: young people, perhaps more prone to radicalism, consider it slightly more acceptable. The level of education is important only when it comes to views on the relationship between democracy and political violence: those with less education are much more likely to find the two compatible. The same can be said of urban residents, who also have a more favorable view on terrorism. Regional differences also presented interesting results: compared to the entire sample, more residents of the Northern Plain believe that in a democracy even violence can be used to achieve an important objective. However, when it comes to terrorism, people living in central Hungary express more tolerant views.

While 30 per cent of the sample lives in this region of Hungary, within the group supporting terrorism they account for 46 per cent. It is important to note that this is not due to residents making up the majority of those living in the region for they are less likely to be accepting of terrorism. Considering all free variables, clearly Jobbik sympathizers are the most likely to support violence. While 18 per cent of those with a party preference are Jobbik voters, within the sample the number of these voters saying that violence is compatible with democracy comes to 28 per cent, those agreeing that violence is justified to achieve certain ends 25 per cent, and those accepting terrorism 30 per cent. Fidesz voters, with the exception of terrorism, the assessment of which is average within their ranks, are markedly against the use of violence in the other two cases. Voters with other party preferences think that terrorism is unacceptable under any circumstances.

Acceptance of political violence by party preference
(in per cent)


	Fidesz sympathizers (n = 362)	Jobbik sympathizers (n = 123)	Sympathizers of the other parties (n = 202)	Whole sample (n = 1000)
Regardless of the objective, in a democracy the use of violence is unacceptable	73	50	68	69
If needed to reach important objectives, even the use of violence is acceptable	22	39	23	23
missing data (does not know, did not answer)	5	11	9	8
The use of violence is not justified by any objective	77	57	67	72
When it comes to objectives considered important by you, even violence can be used	19	32	24	20
missing data (does not know, did not answer)	4	11	9	8
Terrorism is to be condemned under all conditions, regardless of its justification	84	72	87	82
Under some conditions terrorism is the only means to express one's political opinion	13	22	8	12
missing data (does not know, did not answer)	3	6	5	6

'Justifiable' ends

Here we asked respondents to what extent they believe that violence is acceptable to achieve specific objectives. In the list of potential situations, where one's family is threatened stands out: in this case close to half the respondents (47 per cent) say that violence is justified and only 24 per cent reject that option unequivocally. When it comes to the other objective related to personal life, when the respondent's livelihood is threatened, the rate of those for and against violence is 31 and 36 per cent, respectively. In case of more abstract political objectives, support for violence committed in defense of the nation and personal freedom is exceedingly high. In the first case 39 per cent support and 29 per cent oppose violence, while in the latter case these figures stand at 35 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively. The use of violence receives the least support when it comes to inequality reaching unacceptable levels in society and the threat of natural resources, although it must be noted that even here the rate of support comes to 29 per cent.

The justification of violence in different situations

(% and average on a 1–5 scale, n = 1 000)



In short, there are many who believe there are situations where violence is justified. One third in the sample (32 per cent) believes that violence is unacceptable in all the above situations and an additional 12 per cent would support violence only in one case. Of course, while acceptance is not the same as action, it can be assumed that those supporting violence in some situations are more liable to commit violence, or in the case of violence are more likely to offer moral excuses for themselves and others.

The position taken on the above situations is less dependent on the respondent's socio-demographic background.⁴ In all cases the conclusion is that men are more likely to justify violence than women. With the exception of the Hungarian nation and the environment, this is also the case for younger people. Those living in larger settlements hold similar views, except when one's livelihood is threatened and citizens are repressed.⁵ On the whole,⁶ men, young people, those with fewer financial means⁷ and residents living in areas with higher population are more likely to believe that in order to reach certain ends violence can be justified.

Hostile groups

We also examined which social groups respondents felt that the use of violence is acceptable against. Opinions on this subject are significantly more diversified than what we have seen in reactions to other cases. An exceptionally large percentage of the people believe that the use of violence is justifiable when it comes to terrorists (63 per cent) and criminals (47 per cent). Above we have seen that support for violence was exceptionally high when the Hungarian nation was perceived to be in danger.

4 We studied correlations through linear regression, taking into account the respondent's gender, age, education, financial position and place of residence. While the models are relevant in all cases, the percentile explained by independent variables nowhere reaches 5%.

5 In the listed cases age and settlement type have no significant effect.


6 The composite index based on these variables has been created primarily through principal-component analysis. The index emerging as a result of weighted totals derived from variables in the course of the principal-component analysis retains the largest possible amount of information content, not to mention that the information loss can be quantified. The method has the further advantage that with the help of communality attached to variables one can examine what percentage of the variable spread is retained by the main component, i.e., whether the specific variable belongs to the measured dimension. We have applied the widely accepted rule of thumb: communalities must come to a minimum of 0.25, and the retained information content to at least 33%. In our case, the minimum communality was 0.618 and the retained information content 72.9%. Subsequently, with the help of weights established with main components we created an index whose size equaled that of variables measured on the original, five-grade Likert-scale.

7 Respondents' financial position was measured with the help of an index based on durable goods in the household (e.g., personal computer/laptop, car and digital camera). This was made necessary by the high incidence of refused answers concerning variables measuring income, as well as problems related to the reliability and validity of these variables. We created the index with the help of the so-called z-Score model that, instead of simply adding up the number of durable goods in one's possession, also weights it with a number of durable goods at one's disposal. As a result, common consumer goods have a lower weight and smaller and rare ones a higher weight in the financial index.

This is reflected in the fact that 40 per cent of the respondents would support violence against traitors and enemies of the nation. The same number of respondents feels that violence is justified against radical left- and right-wing groups (28 per cent).

The justification of violence against certain groups

(% and average on a 1–5 scale, n = 1000)



Hungarian society's strong anti-Roma attitude is demonstrated by the 29 per cent acceptance of violence against this group. Respondents were more likely to justify violence against drug users than against homosexuals (35 and 14 per cent, respectively). In light of other research which suggests a high degree of homophobia in Hungary, the latter figure is intriguing and may suggest that while respondents condemn homosexuality, in this case they consider the use of violence inappropriate. We found similar attitudes towards authoritarian leaders threatening democracy (26 per cent), banks (25 per cent) and politicians (23 per cent), as well as towards multinational companies (18 per cent) and Jews (16 per cent).⁸

Essentially, support for potential violence against various groups does not depend on the respondent's socio-demographic characteristic: in most cases none of these applied variables account for respondent attitudes.^{9 10}

Violent action

In the political activity block in the questionnaire, to be discussed in more detail below, some of our questions related to particularly violent actions, so we include them here. It holds for all of these that only a negligible number of respondents (1 per cent) committed such acts, and the vast majority, four-fifths in all cases, would never consider committing such acts at any time.

It can be stated that on the whole¹¹ men are more likely to accept violent action. We also studied the attitudes of those who find the use of violence justifiable against certain objectives or groups. While each variable on its own has an effect on the studied attitude, the first variable contains the second variable's explanatory power.¹²

8 Later, during an examination of correlation between variables, we saw that this is not a coincidence.

9 Attitudes to homosexuals have been the most dependent on the respondent's socio-demographic background; however, even here the rate explained by the model came to only 4%. Such attitudes were more acceptable by men, those in a dire financial situation and residents of small settlements.


10 To help later analyses we established a composite index to measure to what extent the respondent considers the use of violence acceptable against specific groups. Here as well, we primarily applied the main-component analysis. We left out questions related to criminals, terrorists and homosexuals because, even though their communality exceeded 0.25, the fact that it consistently fell short of that of other variables (0.461; 0.344 and 0.44, respectively) clearly suggested that it does not constitute part of the given dimension. In the case of the main component created with the remaining variables the smallest communality came to 0.513, and the retained information amount 64%. Subsequently, with the help of weights established through main components we created an index whose size equaled that of variables measured for the original, 5-grade Likert-scale.

11 To measure violent civil political activity we established a composite index. The Cronbach alpha value came to 0.878. In establishing the measure we weighted differently the respondent's answer to the question: 'can you imagine participating or have you already participated in violent action?'. Activities supported by fewer respondents were given more weight. Due to a high frequency, this had little relevance here, although later we used the same method when we asked about general political activity.

12 We studied the correlation of variables through a linear-regression analysis. We included the following variables in the model: the respondent's gender, age, education, financial position and type

Violent civil political action on the part of respondents

(per cent, n = 1 000)



We also asked to what extent the respondent accepts these attitudes from others. Respondents were found to be more accepting when it involved the majority. This is especially true when someone turns to violence when his or her livelihood is at stake: 3 per cent of the respondents find this acceptable in all cases and an additional 15 per cent under certain circumstances.

On the whole¹³ the acceptance of violent action is more common among those believing that violent action for certain objectives and against certain groups is justifiable, and both variables have their specific effect.¹⁴


of residence, the acceptance of the use of violence under some conditions and against specific groups. The percentile explained by the model is 6.9%.

13 To measure violent civil political activity we established a composite index. The Cronbach alpha value came to 0.921. In establishing the measure we gave a different weight to respondents' answers to the question: 'can you imagine participating or have you already participated in violent action?'. Activities supported by fewer respondents were given more weight.

14 We studied the correlation of variables through a linear-regression analysis. In the model we included the following variables: the respondent's gender, age, education, financial position and place of residence, the acceptance of the use of violence under some conditions and against specific groups. The percentile explained by the model is 7.7%.

Tolerance for violent civil political action

(per cent, n = 1 000)



At this point of our study we turned to the analysis of background variables that in our assumption may have an effect on the acceptance of political violence, and thus may help us in drawing the profile of individuals highly susceptible to supporting violence.

Political attitudes

Political interests, civil political activity

Slightly fewer than one third of the respondents showed interest in politics: 27 per cent showed some interest and 4 per cent showed a great deal of interest.


Respondents' demographic characteristics have little influence on political interest. Generally speaking, men, the elderly, residents of larger settlements, those with higher level of education and the financially better off show more interest in politics.¹⁵ Those more tolerant of violence in certain situations or against specific groups are characterized by stronger political interests.¹⁶

¹⁵ We studied the correlation of demographic variables through a linear-regression analysis. The included variables accounted for 9% of the heterogeneity in the political interest variable.

¹⁶ In respect to the acceptance of violence in some situations, the value of the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.125, and in respect to the acceptance of violence against specific groups 0.104.

Political interest

(n = 999)




The questionnaire contained a number of questions trying to find out respondents' attitudes to various forms of civil political activity.

It is clear that a small percentage of respondents have already participated in one of the listed activities. The largest number (8 per cent) are those who have already collected or signed petitions, while in respect to the other activities actual participation fluctuates between 1-3 per cent. The number of those who, while not having engaged in such activities in the past, do not rule out that possibility in the future shows significant variations. It is important to note that participants believe it is important whether a strike or demonstration is unlawful. In the latter case the percentage of those who had actually participated in such events has dropped by one half or one third, while those contemplating such action has halved. In this set of questions there are two items that come close to the definition of political violence: first, the vilification of a corrupt politician, even in his/her presence and, even more directly, pelting or hitting a corrupt politician. Tolerance for these actions is also extremely low.

On the whole it can be stated that¹⁷ the question of one's political activism is fundamentally determined by one's political interest: those more interested in politics are significantly more active.

¹⁷ To measure violent civil political activity we established a composite index. The Cronbach alpha value came to 0.922. In establishing the measure we gave a different weight to respondents' answers to the question: 'can you imagine participating or have you already participated in violent action?'. Activities supported by fewer respondents were given more weight. Variable distribution shows strong accumulation hubs. The most important one is that 54% of the sample has never been engaged and has no plans to engage in such activities.

In addition, we also found that men, young people, residents of larger settlements, those with more education and those in a better financial position are more likely to have engaged or plan to participate in such activities. However, in respect to gender, place of residence and schooling this outcome is more directly mediated by financial position and political interest, i.e. men, residents of larger settlements and people with more education are typically better off and show more interest in politics, in effect making them more active.¹⁸ Those more accepting of violence in certain situations and against specific groups are politically more active.¹⁹




18 We measured the effects of the included variables with the help of correlation, partial correlation and linear regression. Variables included in the regression model accounted for 14% of the heterogeneity of the civil political activity variable.

19 In respect to the acceptance of violence in some situations, the value of the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.233, and in respect to the acceptance of violence against specific groups 0.159.

In respect to the above set of questions we also asked respondents to what extent they find others' attitudes acceptable.

Relative to activism measured at the individual level, it is evident that the order of level of acceptance and political activity is very similar. In respect to issues the respondents find socially more acceptable, they are most likely to have engaged in and would not rule out participating in such activities in the future. At the same time, levels of acceptance and activity are significantly different from each other. Essentially it can be concluded that the discrepancy is the most frequent at the individual level, fluctuating between 14–17 per cent. In the case of less frequent occurrences the difference is 5–7 per cent (unauthorized strikes and roadblocks represent some exception, where the discrepancy is somewhat larger).

Acceptance of civil political activity (per cent, n = 1 000)



Looking at social acceptance in its entirety²⁰ we found that political interest is the most relevant factor: the politically more active also consider various political activities more acceptable. The other variables affect attitudes to civil activity quite similarly to those above, with two differences: first, there is no differentiation between men and women in this regard. Second, the effect of the type of settlement one lives in on the attitudes to civic activity is significant in this case. It is also understandable that those living in larger settlements are more likely to think that, regardless of all their other demographic features, others consider these forms of activities more acceptable. Here as well, the effect of schooling is reflected in one's financial position, i.e. those with more education consider these activities more acceptable because they are in a better financial position.²¹ Those more tolerant of violence in certain situations or against specific groups are more likely to think that others are politically more active.²² This variable correlates somewhat better than the variable measuring one's own political activity.

Concept of democracy

On the whole, respondents consider it important to live in a country ruled by democracy (a 1–10 scale average of 7.75). At the same time, the majority tends to see the current state of the country in a negative light and many think that its current governance cannot be described as fully democratic (6.15), and human rights are not adequately respected (6.03). Essentially, general opinion on the state of democracy in Hungary is barely affected by respondents' demographic features. The only notable exception is that those living in larger towns or cities are stronger in their conviction that living in a democracy is important.²³ However, there is a correlation between the acceptance of the use of violence and opinion on the current state of democracy in Hungary. Those who believe that Hungary is less democratic and perceive that human rights are curbed find violence more acceptable.²⁴

20 To measure violent civil political activity we established a composite index, again giving a different weight to respondents' answers to the question: 'to what extent do you support the specific activity?'. Activities supported by fewer respondents were given more weight. Variable distribution shows strong accumulation hubs here as well, 43% of the sample would not accept any such activity. In this case, the Cronbach alpha index was 0.947.

21 We measured the effects of the included variables with the help of correlation, partial correlation and linear regression. Variables included in the regression model accounted for 14% of the heterogeneity of the civil political activity variable.

22 In respect to the acceptance of violence in some situations, the value of the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.264, and in respect to the acceptance of violence against specific groups 0.186.

23 The correlation is relatively strong, the value of the standardized regression coefficient (beta) is 0.19, and its significance is 0.000.

24 The value of the Pearson correlation coefficient is -0.169 when it comes to views on the state of democracy relative to the acceptance of violence in some situations, and -0.099 relative to the acceptance of violence against specific groups. In respect to the enforcement of human rights it is -0.143 and -0.133 , respectively.

Elections and party preferences


Two-thirds of the respondents believe that voting is a basic requirement to be exercised in all cases. This rate is somewhat higher than the 62 per cent that went to the polls in the 2014 parliamentary election. The perception of the importance of voting is fundamentally a function of education: those with higher education are much more likely to say that the right must be exercised. While 62 per cent of those with the lowest education agree, when it comes to those with a high school diploma or a degree the rate climbs to 76 and 91 per cent, respectively.

68 per cent of the respondents named a party they would vote for if elections were held this Sunday. An additional 5 per cent, while expecting to go to the polls, do not know which party they would vote for. 17 per cent would not go to the polls and one in ten respondents declined to answer the question.

37 per cent of the respondents would vote for Fidesz (54 per cent of those with a clear party preference), 12 per cent for Jobbik (18 per cent), 8 per cent for MSZP (Hungarian Socialists Party, 12 per cent), 3 per cent for DK (Democratic Coalition, 5 per cent), 3 per cent for LMP (Politics Can Be Different, 4 per cent) and 2 per cent for Együtt-PM (Together – Dialogue for Hungary, 4 per cent).

Party preferences

(százalék, $n = 1,000$)



Compared to the average, among Fidesz voters there are more women, those with less education, those financially worse off, and people living in small villages.

Among Jobbik supporters men, young people and those with vocational training are overrepresented. Interestingly, it cannot be concluded that they are in a dire financial situation, leading to the observation that the party can convince a lot of voters with vocational education, specifically those who are better off within this class. Jobbik supporters are more evenly distributed by territory. Our data also reflects tendencies seen at the elections, namely that Jobbik is no longer popular only in the most deprived regions of the country where there are large Roma populations. Essentially, the feature of other parties²⁵ is shaped by the features of MSZP voters, the largest group in the category. These voters come mainly from the elderly living in Budapest and those with high school diplomas.

An examination of the attitudinal background shows that the real difference lies between Jobbik and other party voters. The exception is represented by a perception of the state of democracy in the country and the enforcement of human rights, and the fault line clearly runs between pro-government and opposition voters. On the other hand, Jobbik sympathizers show more interest in politics, are significantly more active in political life and express more tolerance for political violence.²⁶

Prejudice

Anti-Roma attitudes


In our research we measured anti-Roma attitudes applying a strong proposition. We asked respondents to what extent they agreed with the statement that Gypsies are born criminals. Over half the respondents (58 per cent) agree with that statement to some extent. 11 per cent did not respond.

25 In correlation analysis, due to low item numbers, aside from Fidesz and Jobbik voters, we were forced to aggregate the supporters of other parties.

26 They are more accepting of civil political action on the part of others, but only because they are also more deeply involved in such activities.

Criminality is in the blood of Gypsies

(per cent, $n = 1\,000$)



On a four-grade scale the average index of anti-Roma attitude is 2.77. Overall, men and those with vocational training tend to be more anti-Roma. In terms of territorial distribution, we found that anti-Roma attitudes are more common among residents of medium-sized cities, as well as those living in the Northern Plain and Central and Western-Transdanubia regions. This – a relatively new phenomenon – has been clearly demonstrated at the 2014 parliamentary elections in Jobbik's performance, the party whose supporters are significantly more anti-Roma than the average population.

Anti-Semitism

We gauged the level of anti-Semitism using seven items.²⁷ Of these, six measured to what extent the respondent believed in Jewish world conspiracy.²⁸ The propositions were as follows:

- Jews tend to extend their influence on the global economy;
- Jews often operate in secret, behind the scenes;
- Jews sometimes meet secretly to discuss issues important to them;
- Jews aim to dominate the world;
- Jews want to have a decisive voice in international financial institutions;
- Jews achieve their group goals by plotting secret agreements.

²⁷ The seven-component anti-Semitism index was created primarily using the main-component analysis. The lowest communality was 0.607, and the retained information amount was 78.6%. Subsequently, with the help of weights established with main components we created an index whose size equaled that of variables measured on the original, five-grade Likert-scale.

²⁸ The item set was also used in studying anti-Semitism in Poland (Bilewicz et al. 2013).

The application of these items in measuring political violence is justified if one considers that belief in these statements generates enemies directly who – the respondent may believe – must be fought with the use of violence, and such an attitude is also a good predictor of other personality traits (Bilewicz et al. 2013).

The seventh item measures Jewish isolation, asking respondents to what extent they agree with the statement, 'Jews remain strangers in Hungarian society – they keep their old cultural values and standards, and do not adjust to Hungarian customs'.


The average of the composite anti-Semitism index relative to the entire sample is 2.89.²⁹ In this context, differences among respondents with different demographic backgrounds are significantly smaller than what we found in respect to anti-Roma attitudes. Jobbik supporters are clearly more intolerant (3.34). From the territorial point we found additional differences: residents of Budapest and mid-size towns are more anti-Semitic, and the same can be said about those living in central Hungary (especially Budapest), northern Hungary and the Northern Plain.³⁰

29 It is important to note that in respect to these questions the rejection rate was exceptionally high, fluctuating between 19% and 30%. In part this is explained by a relatively high latency in respect to anti-Jewish sentiments.

30 Men are more likely to be anti-Semitic and while the correlation is significant, the difference between the two genders is all but negligible.

Anti-Semitic stereotypes

(Agreement / disagreement with the statements, %)




Homophobia

We showed respondents two statements and asked them to choose one that they agree with more. The first statement was as follows: 'Homosexuals are just like other people with the same rights to a full and free life'. The second statement: 'As homosexuality is unnatural such relationships should not be allowed'. 53 per cent of the respondents chose the first and 35 per cent the second option. 12 per cent declined to respond to the question. Men, those with little education and thus worse off financially, and residents of rural towns are more likely to condemn homosexuality. At the regional level, Northern Plain residents fall in that category. It is interesting to note that Jobbik voters are not more homophobic than the average, while it is significantly more characteristic of Fidesz voters.

Opinions on homosexuals

(per cent, $n = 1000$)




Xenophobia

Attitudes towards migrants coming from within the European Union are somewhat more favorable than towards those coming from countries outside. In respect of the first group 31 per cent believe that the number of migrants is acceptable and 36 per cent that it is too high. Regarding the latter group the corresponding figures are 25 per cent and 47 per cent, respectively. At the same time, one quarter of the respondents have no opinion on the level of immigration.

Opinions on immigration


(per cent, $n = 1\,000$)



Looking at xenophobia, we measured roughly the same indicators as in the case of anti-Roma attitudes. We asked respondents to what extent they agree with the statement that the majority of immigrants are criminals. Close to one fifth of the respondents (18 per cent) refused to answer the question, although in this case we assumed that instead of hiding their opinion, the majority of respondents simply have no personal experience with migrants. The majority of respondents (54 per cent) do not agree with the statement, while one-fifth (21%) shares that opinion to some degree.

To what extent do you agree with the statement that the majority of migrants are criminals?

(százalék, $n = 1000$)



For the entire sample, on a four-grade scale the average index of xenophobia is 2.25. This rate is less dependent on the respondent's socio-demographic background, although the attitude is more prevalent than the average among those with less education and those living in county capitals. There is no difference among those holding different party preferences.

Prejudice and political violence

There is a connection between prejudices against various groups, although the strength of the correlation shows that here we are dealing with different, clearly distinguishable sentiments. Attitudes to the Roma and migrants are strongly related, although there is the danger that the actual relationship is strengthened by the similar wording of the two propositions.³¹ Anti-Semitism is clearly separate from these attitudes.³² There is a moderate relationship between homophobia on the one hand, and anti-Roma and anti-Jewish attitudes.³³

With the exception of homophobia, justification for the use of political violence in various situations and against specific groups is explained by all prejudice indicators. However, in the case of political violence tied to various situations the explanatory force of anti-Roma and anti-migrant attitudes overlaps with anti-Jewish sentiments.³⁴ When it comes to the acceptance of violence against specific groups, xenophobia proves to be redundant.³⁵

Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation

In our research we also looked at right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). In the first case, to measure attitudes we analyzed respondents' response to the following five statements:

- A true patriot must take action against those condemned by the country's leaders.
- Immoral relationships are due to parents and teachers who forget that physical punishment is still the best method of education.
- Traditional religious values should be less emphasized; instead everyone should decide for him/herself what is and what is not ethical.

31 'Gypsies are genetically predisposed to crime' and 'the majority of immigrants are criminals'. The correlation value between the two variables is 0.537.

32 Its connection to anti-Roma attitudes can be characterized by a 0.277 correlation value, and hostility to immigrants by a 0.228 correlation value.

33 In respect to anti-Roma attitudes and anti-Semitism the beta value is 0.135 and 0.176, respectively.

34 The relationship between the acceptance of violence in some situations and anti-Roma attitudes, and hostility to immigrants may be characterized by a correlation coefficient of 0.162 and 0.124, respectively. However, looking at partial correlations and keeping anti-Jewish sentiment under control, statistically the correlations drop to zero.

35 The correlation between the acceptance of violence against specific groups and hostility to immigrants is 0.218. However, by keeping anti-Roma sentiment and anti-Semitism under control, statistically the correlation drops to zero.

- Most social problems would be solved if we got rid of immoral and degenerate individuals.

For the entire sample, the composite RWA average index is 2.48.³⁶ Authoritarianism is more characteristic of people with less education and residents of smaller rural towns, northern Hungary and the Northern Plain. This trait is particularly prevalent among Jobbik voters.

Social dominance orientation (SDO) was gauged based on responses to the following two statements:

- There are times when violence is needed to put other groups in their proper place.
- To get ahead in life, in some cases other groups must be suppressed.

For the entire sample, the composite SDO average index is 2.18.³⁷ Social dominance orientation is more characteristic of men, young people, those with vocational training and residents of rural towns. In regional terms, it is more prevalent among those living in central Hungary and the Southern Plain. Here as well, relative to the sample average, Jobbik supporters are overrepresented.

The acceptance of political violence both in certain situations and towards specific groups is primarily explained by personality traits.³⁸ Social dominance orientation has a significant effect on the first and a slightly stronger effect on the second.

Key factors in the acceptance of political violence in a multi-dimensional space

In this chapter of the study we summarize the effects of variables presented above on the acceptance of violence potentially used in certain situations and against specific groups. Explanatory variables will be included in the model in groups and in successive stages. The assignment of variables to specific groups was determined on the basis of earlier analyses.

36 The RWA index made up of the above items was created primarily using the main-component analysis. Here we had to leave out the proposition on traditional religious values because, while the communality exceeded 0.25, it was significantly lower for the others (0.394) suggesting that it does not constitute a part of that given dimension. In the case of the emerging main component the lowest communality was 0.579, the retained information amount 60.9%. Subsequently, with the help of weights established with main components we created an index whose size equaled that of variables measured on the original, five-grade Likert-scale.

37 In the case of SDO we created an index with an averaging of items, whose size equaled that of variables measured on the original, five-grade Likert-scale. In respect of two items, in linear terms the resulting main component does not differ from the sum of the two components. The correlation between the variables is 0.701.

38 Earlier studies have shown that while right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are both suitable for predicting different positions, specifically concerning prejudice, they carry distinct psychological content (Heaven and Bucci 2001) and thus in our model we decided to use the two variables separately.

First is the group of socio-demographic variables and party preference. As a second step, we included the respondent's civil political activity. As a third step, we included two prejudice-indicators, anti-Roma sentiments and anti-Semitism.^{39,40} Finally, right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation were also included in the model.

People facing financial difficulties, the politically more active and those holding anti-Semitic views and characterized by right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are more likely to find violence used in certain situations justifiable.⁴¹

However, it is interesting to analyze how the inclusion of control groups changes the explanatory power of specific variables. Following the inclusion of the first group it became immediately evident that the effect of age and settlement type is transmitted through party preference, in this case voting for Jobbik.⁴²

In the course of building a model, the effect of opting for Jobbik is slowly eroded: first it drops significantly when anti-Roma sentiments and anti-Semitism are included in the model, and is removed entirely with the introduction of RWA and SDO as by that time the effect of the variable is no longer significant. This clearly shows that choosing Jobbik is but a 'symptom'; in fact, the acceptance of violence is a function of the respondent's extremist, authoritarian and prejudicial attitudes. The results of this research project show that examining the willingness present in society is just as important as doing so with the political supply side's actors who build on that.

It is also interesting to note the 'course' of anti-Roma attitudes that, when included, carry a significant explanatory power and lose their relevance with the introduction of RWA and SDO indicators.

The politically more active, those holding anti-Roma and anti-Semitic views and with high RWA and SDO scores tend to be more accepting of the potential use of violence against various social groups.⁴³

A change in the effect of the variable measuring the choice for Jobbik is very similar to that seen in the previous model. One might assume that the fact that the variable measuring anti-gypsy attitudes stayed in the model can be attributed to the presence of Gypsies within the group, but the effect of the variable is significant even if this group is temporarily removed from the index.

39 As a third step, first we operated with variables measuring the state of Hungarian democracy, although these were not significant for any violence category and their interference effect was also negligible.

40 The effect of homophobia and xenophobia has always been weak, and we realized that these items are transmitted by anti-Roma sentiments and anti-Semitism, which explains our decision to drop them.

41 This is the result of the final regression model, i.e. we see the effect of a single variable while all the other variables included in the model are under control. The model offers an explanation rate of 32.6%.

42 In our study's '*Justifiable*' ends chapter we said that this attitude is affected by the respondent's age and the type of settlement. Now that we have included 'party preference' in the model we realize that these effects are no longer significant.

43 This is the outcome of the final regression model. The model offers an explanation rate of 35.1%.

Measuring political violence – recommendations on methodology

Based on the findings of the present study, in this section we are going to discuss variables that, in our opinion, should be kept or rejected, including variables whose continued relevance should be reconsidered. We must call attention to a fundamental methodological problem. Since there has been no systematic measurement of social violence to date, we must rely on the findings of the present study as we develop our recommendations. It is important to note that the questionnaire is based on theories of prejudice and hate-crime, and randomly used questions posed in other relevant studies, i.e., the development of the questionnaire had been preceded by a long process of conceptualization and operationalization. With all that, the adequacy of our recommendations will have to be tested in future studies. Subsequent findings in this chapter shall be interpreted in that light.

Public perceptions of political violence

To measure the public perception of political violence we used three pairs of propositions. The variables used for measurement do not constitute a composite index.⁴⁴ However, the responses are scaled, i.e., if someone supports violence in the case of a “tougher” proposition, he would do the same in respect to “softer” indicators as well. In our case this means that the person who does not reject the use of terrorism is likely to believe that ends close to his heart justify violence, and that democracy and political violence are reconcilable.⁴⁵

Ends and groups

As we have seen earlier, we approached the issue of political violence specifically from two angles. We wished to find out for what ends and against which people respondents believe that violence can be justified. In this chapter of our study we try to identify variables that we believe can be dropped in future surveys.

Deletion may be justified in two cases. Either the variable in question is not related to or has but a weak connection to the dimension to be measured. Or it is redundant, i.e., compared to the other involved items it does not carry additional information, making its measurement in the presence of the other variables irrelevant.

44 As it involves dichotomous variables, we measured the consistency of the index based on variables using the so-called Kuder-Richardson 20 (KR-20) formula. In studying index values, we used the maximum values accepted for Cronbach alpha. In the case of the three variables – KR-20 = 0.455. The item looking at the relationship between democracy and political violence has the weakest link to the rest, although the value of KR-20 is only 0.519 even after the removal of this item.

45 We measured the scale structure with the reproducibility coefficient. This shows the percentage of the original responses that can be reproduced based on scale scores created with the help of variables. According to the accepted rule of thumb, the index must have a minimum value of 0.9. In our case this came to 0.94, which means that based on the scale scores 94% of the responses can be reproduced.

In both cases we apply two methods: an internal consistency study with the help of the Cronbach alpha calculator and a principal-component analysis. While the results are closely related⁴⁶, we believe that their simultaneous study may lend our recommendations more substance. In all cases we have also studied correlation coefficients⁴⁷, although it is important to note that their analysis alone would not have yielded results because this only describes the paired relationship of the variables.

Variables unrelated to dimensions

In the course of testing we took into account the followings:

Cronbach alpha

Corrected Item-Total Correlation: the value belonging to one variable shows the correlation between the given item and the index from other items based on aggregation. In this case we considered a value of 0.2 as clearly, and between 0.21-0.3 as slightly problematic.

Cronbach's Alpha if Item deleted index: for all variables it shows the value of Cronbach alpha if the variable in question were deleted. In this case we try to find out whether there is a variable whose removal would increase the Cronbach alpha value.

Principal-component analysis

We looked at communalities. Communalities under 0.25 were taken as a clear sign of non-dimensionality. Moreover, we found it intriguing when the communality of one variable fell short of that of other variables. We also looked at by how much the information content increases with their removal.

In the case of ends, based on the Cronbach alpha index we found no variable we would recommend for deletion without hesitation. However, when it comes to the analysis of communalities, in the case of the variables „When the Hungarian nation comes under threat“ and „If your family is threatened“ the values we found were lower than those for other variables⁴⁸. Fundamentally, these two variables proved to be more difficult to define because in this case the rate of those sharing the same opinion is high, i.e., presumably even those who on the whole reject violence would agree with these statements. Based on the aggregate data one may draw the conclusion that in themselves these variables would be absolutely unsuitable to measure the acceptance of political violence for various ends, although used together with the others they clearly belong to the dimension to be measured.

⁴⁶ However, it is an important difference that while the principal-component analysis serves for the creation of weight-cumulated indices, the Cronbach alpha calculates with an index created through the aggregation of the variable with specific weight.

⁴⁷ This is all the more logical because both Cronbach alpha and the principal-component analysis are based on that.

⁴⁸ 73% of the information preserved by the main component that includes all variables. With the removal of the first variable mentioned it increases by 3, with that of the second by 2 and with the simultaneous removal of both by 5 percentage points.

However, if we have to get rid of one of the items (e.g., to shorten the questionnaire), we definitely recommend their deletion. With all that, in international surveys we would rather recommend the removal of the item related to the family because the positions taken on the other one may be more subject to the given country's value system.

In the case of groups, based on Cronbach alpha analysis we cannot recommend the deletion of a single variable.⁴⁹ Based on the principal-component analysis, the communalities of questions related to criminals, terrorists and homosexuals fall far short of that of other variables, although all exceed 0.25.⁵⁰

Redundant variables

When testing these, we considered the followings:

Cronbach alpha

Corrected Item-Total Correlation: we considered variables characterized by a value of over 0.8 to be redundant, those with a value of over 0.85 as highly redundant.⁵¹

Principal-component analysis

We looked at communalities. Exceptionally high communalities were seen as a sign of redundancy. We also investigated by how much the information content increases with their removal.

In the case of justifiable ends, based on Cronbach alpha values the following items are considered redundant⁵²:

"When inequalities become unbearable within society."

"If someone wants to limit your personal freedom."

"If the government oppresses its citizens."

49 Incidentally, in respect to ends and here as well the reason is that these variables are closely related to each other.

50 59% of the information is preserved by the main component that includes all variables. The three items referred to here were left out in the development of the composit index created and analyzed earlier. With the removal of the item related to criminals the information content preserved in the main component increased by 1, with the removal of the item related to terrorists by 2 and with that related to homosexuals by 1 percentage points. The simultaneous removal of all three variables resulted in a 5 percentage point increase.

51 Professional literature urges reflection already at values over 0.75.

52 The proposition "If natural resources and the future of the next generation are threatened" is at the borderline.

The principal-component analysis also shows that their communality stands out.⁵³ In the case of ends we don't necessarily believe that due to redundancy the variables should be dropped, although if it becomes necessary, we recommend the ones referred to above.⁵⁴ In the case of an international survey, a selection among these variables may also be determined by prevailing conditions in the country under review.

In the case of groups the Cronbach alpha analysis does not show significant redundancy and looking at communalities we didn't find high peaks either. Earlier we had also seen that in this set of variables the amount of information preserved by the main component was also much smaller. The question is raised whether the position of these groups differs from each other, in other words whether there are sets of groups whose positions are more related to each other than that of other groups. The answer is, yes, there are.⁵⁵ The strongest correspondence has been seen when it comes to the acceptance of violence against extremist rightists and leftist groups.⁵⁶ The link between these variables is much stronger than to any other variable.⁵⁷ The next significant nodal point is constituted by variables measuring the acceptance of violence against the following groups: politicians, banks, Jews and multinational companies.⁵⁸ It is also strongly related to the perception of politicians and authoritarian leaders⁵⁹, although the link is much weaker with the other three variables. The perception of criminals and terrorists also shows a relatively strong relation.⁶⁰

It is safe to say that variables showing strong correlation measure similar things⁶¹, although these connections also greatly depend on the political situation and climate prevailing in the given country, and thus their removal carries definite risks.

53 Based on multiple correlation coefficients characterizing variables, the variable measuring the first recommended item is explained by the other variables by 72%, the second by 70% and the third by 75%.

54 The decrease of the reserved information amount doesn't reach even 1% if these are deleted one by one or together.

55 We performed the analysis with an examination of the correlation coefficient. With the help of Maximum Likelihood factor analysis we also examined whether there is a latent structure behind the positions of various group types, although the fit of the factor model and its interpretability were not adequate.

56 The value of the correlation coefficient between the variables is 0.862. Incidentally, this is the highest value of them all.

57 Interestingly, if we look at them together it is related to variables measuring the acceptance of violence against criminals and drug addicts. Radical leftist groups are also linked to the perception of authoritarian leaders threatening democracy. While this may be attributed to historical reasons, it is interesting to note that the perception of the radical right is much less related to this. (All high-lighted correlations are above 0.5.)

58 In this instance, the paired correlations to each other exceed 0.7 in all cases. The perception of a link between Jews and multinational companies is exceptionally strong: in this case the correlation is 0.814.

59 The correlation coefficient is 0.717.

60 The correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.793.

61 With all that, the social background of the perception of right and left radical groups may differ from each other.

Moreover, we recommend that if closely related items are featured together in a survey, they should be placed at a distance from each other in the questionnaire. If the analysis of various situations becomes important, an effort could be made to find a more accurate definition of these nodal points in a future study as well.

If the question to be answered is whether a survey of situations or groups is more relevant, we would opt for the former. Analyses appear to suggest that the explanatory power of the latter is already subsumed in the former, i.e., when the two were featured simultaneously in models and the former was kept under control, the effect of the latter was insignificant.

In respect to the commitment of violent acts we found it may be irrelevant to query about this because the percentage of those who had already acted and even of those who would contemplate to commit such acts in the future is negligible.

This has been demonstrated even in the case of questions related to political activism bordering on political violence⁶².

Factors predisposing one to accept political violence

Earlier studies clearly show that the acceptance of political violence is fundamentally motivated by divergent personal traits, such as right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and prejudice. In the latter category in Hungary anti-Roma attitudes and anti-Semitism proved to be major explanatory variables. The weak explanatory power of anti-migrant sentiment may be attributed in part to the similarity of the variable's wording with that of the anti-Roma variable. However, it is even more notable that, compared to countries characterized by strong anti-migrant sentiment and where the ideology of far-right parties is also dominated by that attitude, there are few immigrants in Hungary. This also means that in an international study the anti-migrant variable or set of variables should not be ignored by any means.

Since in the current survey, when looking at anti-Semitism, we essentially measured belief in Jewish world conspiracy we cannot say to what extent other dimensions of anti-Semitism would have affected attitudes toward political violence. However, based on earlier and already mentioned studies and recent findings, we assume that a reduction has been the right decision. Earlier we have said that when developing the composite index we had to leave out one of the items⁶³ measuring Jews' outsider status and, in our opinion, the removal of the other item⁶⁴ would render the index even more consistent.

62 The vilification and defamation of a corrupt politician, even in his presence, and more directly, throwing things at or hitting a corrupt politician.

63 "Jews don't have their own culture, they try to appropriate important things in their country of residence."

64 Jews have remained foreigners in Hungarian society – they preserved their old culture and norms, and refuse to adopt a Hungarian lifestyle." The variable's commonality is 0.607, while that of all other variables is over 0.805. With the removal of the variable the information content of the principal component increased by 5 percentage points.

When measuring RWA we mentioned that we had to leave out the statement related to traditional religious values, although the remaining variables sufficiently captured this personality trait. Since based on the models the SDO proved to be extremely important, we recommend the inclusion of additional items for its measurement.

In short, it is important to see that the effects of the respondent's demographic features, party preference and political activism follow from his personality traits that, in turn, are closely related to these variables. If the need arises for a more detailed study of the associative space of political violence, we should look for other standardized tests identifying personality and showing a correlation with a propensity for the acceptance of violence. The application of such standardized tests is all the more practical because they can be used to great effect in international studies as well.

United Kingdom

About the survey in the United Kingdom

The research was conducted in November 2014 by Ipsos Mori. The sample had a size of 1003 individuals. The sample represents the UK adult population over the age of 16 and takes into account gender, age, schooling and type of settlement. While the study has a statistical error of 3.1% and in cases where the questions, instead of the entire sample, involved only a specific group of respondents, the margin of error is higher.

As there are large differences between survey prices in Hungary and the UK, our scope of research was limited in the United Kingdom. We put those two item-groups on the questionnaire which seemed to be the most relevant ones – based on preliminary findings from the Hungarian survey.

First, respondents were asked the extent to which they thought violence was justifiable to achieve certain objectives.⁶⁵ They were given six scenarios to answer:

- The British nation faced a threat; the government oppressed its citizens; there was an attempt to limit your personal freedom; social inequality become unbearable; your livelihood was threatened and your family faced dangers.

Second, respondents were asked whether they thought that violence was justifiable against certain groups.⁶⁶ They were given 14 different groups:

- Terrorists; Radical right wing groups; Radical left wing groups; Traitors and enemies of the nation; Gypsies; Politicians; Banks; Jews; Drug addicts; Homosexuals; Authoritarian leaders undermining democracy; the Homeless; Muslims and Immigrants.

For both sets of questions, the data were then broken down according to gender, age, social grade, working status, ethnicity, government office region (meaning where in the UK they are from), whether there are children in the household, and income level.

The key findings and themes from each set of questions are presented below. Data are presented in both mean score format and percentages of those who thought violence was justifiable or unjustifiable.

65 Using a scale of 1 – 5, where 1 means '*I consider it completely unjustifiable*'; and 5 means '*I consider it completely justifiable*'.

66 Using a scale of 1 – 5, where 1 means '*I consider it completely unjustifiable*'; and 5 means '*I consider it completely justifiable*'.


Using violence to reach specific objectives

Overall, respondents felt that violence was most justifiable if 'their family faced danger' (63 per cent thought it was justifiable and 18 per cent unjustifiable, with a mean score of 3.88 / 5); while respondents felt that violence was least justifiable if 'social inequality became unbearable' (only 23 per cent of people thought it was justifiable and 44 per cent unjustifiable, with a mean score of 2.53). The only other scenario that scored a mean of over 3 (suggesting overall justifiable) was if the British nation faced a threat.

It is to be noted, however, that for all questions, at least 10 per cent of respondents could not decide, and a significant proportion responded that they thought it was neither justifiable nor unjustifiable (i.e. responding with 3 on the Likert scale).

The justification of violence in different situations

(% and average on a 1–5 scale, n = 1 003)



These results mask significant differences visible in each question across different socio-demographic groups. These are broken down according to each scenario, with key differences pulled out (where differences are not mentioned, this is because they were deemed too insignificant to warrant elaboration in this paper).

If the British nation faced a threat

Overall, 48 per cent of people felt that violence was justifiable if the British nation was facing a threat and 18 per cent that it was not justifiable (19 per cent of people thought it was neither justifiable nor unjustifiable and 14 per cent couldn't decide). This question had a mean score of 3.60.

Men were more likely to think violence was justifiable (52 per cent) than women (44 per cent). Older people were more likely than younger people to think it was justifiable: 39 per cent of those aged 15-24 thought violence was justifiable; compared to 59 per cent of those aged 55-64, and 53 per cent of those aged 65 or older.

Social grade (broken down by AB / C1 / C2 / DE)⁶⁷ does not appear to be particularly significant in respect of correlations. While 53 per cent of AB respondents felt violence was justifiable (the highest proportion), so did 45 per cent of C2 respondents (the lowest proportion). Similarly, 47 per cent of employed people thought violence was justifiable, compared with 49 per cent of those not working. However, those in high-income groups (earning £25k per year or more) were more likely to think violence was justified (57 per cent) than those earning up to £11,499 (42 per cent).

If the government oppressed its citizens

Overall, only 24 per cent of respondents consider violence justifiable if the government oppressed its citizens, compared to 40 per cent who thought it was unjustifiable; with a mean score of 2.63

As above, men were more likely to consider it justifiable (28 per cent) than women (21 per cent). In terms of age categories, there were no obvious correlations in age among those who thought it was justifiable (26 per cent of 15-24 thought it was justifiable; the same proportion as 45-54 year olds). However, on the whole older people were more likely to think violence was unjustifiable (the difference being accounted for by fewer who answer 'neither' or 'cannot decide'). Thirty-one per cent of 15-24 year olds thought it unjustifiable, compared to 49 per cent of 45-54 year olds.

Based on the mean scores, those of a higher social grade were more likely to think violence unjustifiable (AB scored 2.53) than those of a lower social grade (DE scored 2.75); while those who were not working (2.52) were more likely to think it unjustifiable than those who were (2.71). Those with a middle income (£11,500-24,999) were more likely to think violence was not justifiable (mean score: 2.56) than either low (2.76) or high (2.70) income.

67 AB is higher and intermediate managerial, administrative, professional occupations (22.17% of UK adults); C1 is supervisory, clerical and junior managerial, administrative, professional occupations (30.84%); C2 is skilled manual occupations (20.94%); DE is semi-skilled and unskilled manual occupations, unemployed and lowest grade occupations (26.05%).

Respondents from London were the least likely to think violence was justified (15 per cent); while those from the North were the most likely (31 per cent). However, those from the North were more likely than those from London to think it was unjustifiable too (37 per cent versus 28 per cent) – since 30 per cent of people from London could not decide. In terms of mean scores, those from Wales were the most likely to think violence was unjustifiable (2.38), while those from the North the least (2.82).

If there is an attempt to limit your personal freedom

Overall, 28 per cent of respondents felt it was justifiable for violence to be used if there was an attempt to limit their personal freedom; and 40 per cent thought it unjustifiable (20 per cent thought it was neither; and 12 per cent could not decide). This gave a mean score of 2.74.

Men were more likely than women (mean score of 2.95 versus 2.55) to think violence was justifiable. There was no clear correlation with age: 30 per cent of those under 24 thought it justifiable; compared with 28 per cent of those over 65. While 15-24 year olds' mean score was slightly more favourable to violence (2.94 compared to 2.65 for those over 65), other age groups scored very similar.

Interestingly, the lower the social grade, the more likely respondents thought violence was justified. Based on mean scores, AB scored 2.48; C1 scored 2.70; C2 scored 2.88 and DE scored 2.95. Similarly, those on lower income groups were more likely to think violence was justified (mean score of 2.92 for those earning under £11,499) than those on higher income (2.67 for those earning £25k and over).

Ethnic minorities were less likely than White British to think violence was justifiable under these circumstances (2.60 versus 2.80). Similarly to other questions, those in London were the least likely to think violence was justified (18 per cent) but this is partly accounted for by the high numbers who were not sure. In terms of regional mean scores, the North (2.98) and the South (2.96) were the most likely to think violence was justifiable.

If social inequality became unacceptable

Overall, 23 per cent of respondents felt it was justifiable for violence to be used if social inequality becomes unacceptable; and 44 per cent thought it unjustifiable (20 per cent thought it was neither; and 12 per cent could not decide). This gave a mean score of 2.53. This was the lowest mean score.

As for all the responses, men were more likely than women to think violence was justifiable (mean score of 2.69 versus 2.38). In this instance, younger people were slightly more likely to think violence was justifiable than older people. Twenty-eight per cent of those aged 15-24 thought it justifiable, compared to 20 per cent of those over 64 (mean scores were 2.71 versus 2.48).

Those of lower social grade were more likely (2.66 mean score for DE) than those of high social grade (2.47 for AB) to think violence justifiable – although employment status made very little difference to responses.

Income, however, did: 41 per cent of those earning under £11,499 thought violence was unjustifiable, compared to 29 per cent of those earning over £25k. Ethnicity, unlike in the other questions, was also not correlated with attitudes.

If your livelihood was threatened

Overall, 31 per cent of respondents felt it was justifiable for violence to be used if their livelihood was threatened; and 42 per cent thought it unjustifiable (15 per cent thought it was neither; 11 per cent could not decide and 1 per cent refused to answer). This gave a mean score of 2.74.

As above, men were more likely than women to think violence justifiable (a mean score of 3 versus 2.5). Generally speaking, young people were more likely to think that violence is justifiable than older people – although this was not a uniform pattern: under 24s scored a mean of 3.03, the highest of all groups: while those aged 45-54 were the lowest at 2.41.

In terms of social grade, the lower the social grade, the higher the response that violence was justifiable (AB: 2.53; C1: 2.58; C2: 2.81; DE: 3.10).

Unlike other responses, non-Whites were more likely to think violence was justified than Whites (based on both mean scores and percentages). In terms of regions, people living in the North were the most likely to think violence justified, those from Scotland the least, and the highest income group was less likely than low and middle income groups to think violence justified.

If your family faced dangers

Overall, 63 per cent of respondents felt it was justifiable for violence to be used if their family faced dangers; and 17 per cent thought it unjustifiable (11 per cent thought it was neither; 19 per cent could not decide and 1 per cent refused to answer). This gave a mean score of 3.88. This was the highest mean score.

Men (mean score of 4.02) were more likely than women (3.72) to think violence was justifiable; and older people were more likely than younger people – although this is not a uniform pattern. The mean scores based on ages were as follows: 15-24 scored 3.69; 25-34 scored 3.57; 35-44 scored 4.07; 45-54 scored 3.77; 55-64 scored 4.19 and 65+ scored 4.02. Unlike other questions, social grade did not appear to make a significant difference (at least not in a uniform way). Income, however, did – as those in the highest income groups were more likely than those in the lowest income groups to think violence was justifiable (4.05 versus 3.84).

In terms of region, respondents from London were the least likely to think violence was justifiable (mean score of 3.16) and those from the North the most likely (mean score of 4.21). White respondents thought violence was more justifiable than non-Whites (3.95 versus 3.36).

Correlations within particular groups

Looking at the results as a whole, there are some discernable patterns that emerge. That said, looking at the data set as a whole, the only socio-demographic factor that was consistently correlated with thinking violence was justifiable across every scenario was gender. Men were always more likely than women to think violence was justifiable. (Although still, on the whole, often had a mean score of less than 3, meaning they thought violence was unjustifiable for several scenarios).

While it might have been expected that age would be broadly correlated with attitudes to violence, this appears to be dependent on the question. For example, while young people are broadly more likely to think violence is justifiable if governments oppress their people; or if social inequality reaches an unacceptable level, older people think it more justifiable if the British state is in danger or if their family is under threat. It is not clear what thematic pattern this suggests.

Similarly, social grade, income level and employment status – all socio-economic demographic factors – appear to have various correlations depending on the question (and not always the same). Overall, low social grade is more likely to result in higher levels of justifying violence – although not across every question. High income groups are more likely to support violence if the state is in danger, or their family is at risk – but less likely than low income groups if personal freedom is limited, if social inequality becomes unacceptable or their livelihood's threatened. It is, perhaps, unsurprising that low social grades and income groups are more likely to consider violence acceptable if social inequality becomes unacceptable and their livelihood threatened, since they are the most likely to suffer personally from those consequences.

In terms of ethnicity, most scenarios find that White respondents were more likely to think violence justifiable than non-Whites. However, ethnicity made little difference in respect of whether people felt that violence was justifiable if social inequality becomes unacceptable. If someone's livelihood is at threat, ethnic minority groups were more likely than White people to think violence is justifiable. The extent to which these are driven by economic, cultural, or other considerations is not clear.

The region of the country where violence is most likely to be considered justifiable tends to be the North of the UK, although again, this varies considerably. London, by contrast is typically the region with the lowest levels of support for violence in terms of percentage of people who think it is justifiable – although not always in terms of mean scores. This may be partly driven by the very high proportion of ethnic minorities living in London. Whether there are children in the household, and whether someone is employed or not does not appear to make a major difference.

Using violence against specific groups

Overall, respondents felt that violence was most justifiable against terrorists (58 per cent thought it was justifiable, 17 per cent unjustifiable, with a mean score of 3.8). This was by some margin the group with the highest score.

Following terrorists, radical political groups – both left wing, right wing and ‘traitors and enemies of the nation’ – scored the next highest level of acceptability of violence. The mean score for whether violence was justifiable against traitors and enemies of the nation was 3.07; for radical right wing groups 2.68 and for radical left wing groups 2.60. ‘Authoritarian leaders undermining democracy’ was the only other group that scored a mean of over 2 (2.32).

In terms of ethnic minority or religious groups, there was low levels of support for violence (at least, in comparison to the other groups listed): Jews, Gypsies, Muslims and immigrants all scored low levels of justified targets for violence, with between 3 – 6 per cent of people thinking violence was justifiable.


Interestingly, banks and politicians scored more highly than these groups – with 10 per cent of respondents thinking violence was justified against politicians, and 9 per cent against banks.

In terms of other groups, 10 per cent of people thought violence was justified against drug addicts – and only 3 per cent against the homeless. (In terms of mean score and percentage that think that violence is justified, homeless people and Jews are the least likely to elicit support for violent action).

As for question 1, however, there was a significant number of people who either responded that that they thought violence was neither justified or not justified (between 5 – 22 per cent depending on the question); or could not decide (between 9 – 17 per cent, depending on the question).

The justification of violence against certain groups

(% and average on a 1–5 scale, n = 1003)



We have broken down the results for further analysis based on the following categories for ease of reference: 'extremist groups'; 'political groups'; 'ethnic / religious groups' and 'other groups'.

Extremist groups

Terrorists are the group that by far elicits the highest level of support for violence. (Extremists in general elicit high levels of support for violence for reasons that are discussed below). Older people are slightly more likely to justify violence (the mean score for 15-24 year olds is 3.63; for those over 64 it is 4.05). Social grade, working status, and income do not appear to be correlated in any linear or patterned way. People living in the North are more likely to justify violence; and those in London the least.

The same pattern emerges with left and right wing radical groups and traitors and enemies of the nation – albeit all at a lower level of support for violence compared to terrorists. Men are more likely than women to justify violence; older people are slightly more likely to justify violence than younger people, although it does not increase steadily with age; and people living in the North are more likely to justify violence than those living elsewhere. While there are small differences elsewhere, they are not very large.

Authoritarian leaders undermining democracy was the group which elicits the most uniform set of results. Leaving gender aside – in which men are always more likely to justify violence than women – there were no very obvious patterns based on socio-demographic background.

Political groups

In respect of politicians, men are more likely than women to justify violence. Age is more complex: while 15-24 year olds are the most likely to justify violence (both in terms of mean score – 2.18 – and percentage which justifies it – 16 per cent) it does not decrease in a uniform way with age. In terms of social grade, the lower the social grade the higher the support for violence against politicians (in terms of a mean score, DE scores 2.23 while AB scores 1.57). Interestingly, employment status does not appear to make a difference: but income does. Those earning above £25k are less likely to consider violence justified than those in middle income groups, who are less likely in turn than those in low income groups (1.57 versus 1.95 versus 2.02). Ethnic minorities are more likely (mean score 2.33) to justify violence than Whites (mean score 1.80). Unlike in other questions, those living in London are more likely to consider violence justifiable (2.26) compared to other regions.

An almost identical pattern emerges in respect of banks – with younger people the most likely to justify violence; along with low income groups, low social grade groups, ethnic minorities, and those living in London.

Ethnic / religious groups

The most striking thing about these results is how low levels of support for violence was for all groups based on ethnicity or religion. Because they were all so low it is difficult to pull out any clear patterns. However, there were a small number of insights available.

For every group listed above, support for violence tends to decrease as age increases. With the exception of Gypsies (and only then by a tiny margin) the age category 15-24 is the most likely to support violent acts against these groups. While the trend is generally that older people are less likely to disagree with violence, there are some exceptions. For example, those over 64 are more likely to support violent action against immigrants and Muslims than those aged 45-54 or 55-64.

Moreover, for every group listed above, support for violence increases as social grade decreases. Irrespective of the group, AB is the least likely to justify violence, followed by C1, followed by C2, followed by DE. (Based on mean scores). It also increases informally as income decreases irrespective of the group (with one small exception, which is that middle income respondents are more supportive of violence than low income respondents in regard to Gypsies).

Interestingly, support for violence against these groups is always higher among non-Whites than Whites (albeit at a low overall level for both). Similarly, unlike the answers from question 1, respondents from London are always the most likely to support violence, irrespective of the group.

Other groups (drug addicts, homosexuals, homeless people)

Irrespective of the group – and similar to the results for ethnic and religious groups – younger age groups tend to be more likely to justify violence than older (although it is not a uniform pattern, and there are exceptions). Nevertheless, for drug addicts, homosexuals and the homeless, the 15-24 age category is the most likely to justify violence (mean score of 1.81, 1.58 and 1.48 respectively.) In each case the group least likely to justify violence is the 55-64 year old age group (mean score of 1.56, 1.24 and 1.19 respectively). Broadly speaking, support for violence decreases with each age category increase, until 64+, for which it increases slightly.

There is also a similar and uniform increase in the support for violence as social grade decreases. For all three groups, the support for violence is lowest in social grade AB, then increases for C1, increases further for C2 and reaches its peak with DE. In the same way as the responses for ethnic and religious groups, support for violence decreases with increases in income (with one small exception, middle income groups are more supportive of violence than low income groups in respect of drug addicts).

Similarly to the results about religious and ethnic groups, ethnic minorities are more supportive of violence than Whites in respect of every group listed. For example, 24 per cent of ethnic minorities consider that violence is justified against drug addicts, compared with 8 per cent of Whites; while 13 per cent of ethnic minorities consider violence against homosexuals justified compared to 4 per cent of Whites.

Again, similar to the results above, in every case people from London are the most likely to justify violence against these three groups, by some margin. For example, 24 per cent of people from London consider violent action against drug addicts justifiable compared to 5 per cent from Wales; 12 per cent consider violence against homosexuals justifiable compared to 3 per cent from Scotland; and 5 per cent consider violence against homeless people justifiable compared to 2 per cent from the North. However, it is to be borne in mind that London has a significantly higher proportion of ethnic minorities than the other regions, which is likely to account for some of the variation.

General correlations

As with question 1, men are more likely than women to justify violence, irrespective of the group in question.

Terrorists are by far the group that elicits the highest level of support for violence. This may be because the terrorists are the only group that has an assumed activity that is violent. This general rule also holds for the other groups that elicit high levels of support for violence (radical right wing; radical left wing; traitors and enemies of the state). Of all those included in the survey, these groups have some implicit moral position, whereas the other groups listed do not.

It is of note that ‘political groups’ – politicians, authoritarians, banks – were significantly more likely to elicit responses that justify violence than groups based on ethnicity or religion. Moreover, the types of respondents that justify violence against these groups are quite different from those who justify violence against the political extremists (and justify violence as an abstract principle in question 1).

While ethnic minorities were less likely to support violence against political extremists – and to justify violence in the question 1 scenarios – they were more likely to support it against politicians, bankers, ethnic and religious groups and ‘other’ groups. Similarly, a decrease in social grade is very clearly and consistently correlated with an increase in support for violence against all groups – except the political extremists, where the relationship is not uniform.

A very similar relationship emerged in respect of age. In respect of political extremists – terrorists, radical right / left groups or traitors – the 55-64 and over 64 age groups were consistently the most likely to support violence (based on mean scores). However, in respect of individual groups – whether religious or ethnic groups, politicians, bankers, homosexuals, drug addicts or the homeless – it was always the youngest age group (15-24) that scored the highest levels of support for violent acts.

Comparison of the Hungarian and British results

During the two public surveys, data was collected using the same methodology both with regards to the questions asked and the approach used to ask the questions, resulting in a clear chance to compare the two question blocks’ results in Hungary and the United Kingdom.


Use of violence in a variety of situations

In both countries the respondents saw the use of violence validated the most when the life of their families was in danger. Sixty-three percent of Britons thought that the use of force was corroborated to some extent in that situation, while forty-seven percent of Hungarians thought the same. The difference in terms of scale averages (on a scale of 1-5, where the higher value means the stronger validation of the use of force) is present as well. In the Hungarian sample the value is 3,41 while in the British it is 3,88.

The same dissimilarity between the two samples is visible in connection to the second most preferred option, where the nation was in danger. Thirty-nine percent of Hungarians and forty-eight of Britons believed that use of force is adequate when it comes to this situation. Similarly to the previous situation, the support for the use of force is higher among the British.

The other four situations, on the other hand, show different tendencies, as Hungarian results show a higher support for aggression. The last item in the order of preferences concerns a scenario where „social inequality become unbearable” for both countries. The order of the remainder of the scenarios is different in the two sample but this does not constitute a significant difference.

The justification of violence in different situations, in Hungary and in the UK
(average on a 1–5 scale)




Use of force against a variety of groups

Contrary to the support for the use of violence in certain situations, Hungarians tolerated the use of violence against groups more than those questioned in the United Kingdom. The slightest difference between the two countries is apparent in connection with the most preferred option. Both Hungarians and Britons accept the use of force against terrorists most widely. The scale averages calculated for this option are leaps and bounds ahead of those for other groups. Both nationalities put 'traitors and enemies of the nation' in second place. In this case, scale averages differed relatively minimally (0.17). The use of violence against radical groups (both left and right-wing) was the other category in which the British sample was only slightly different from the Hungarian one.

The justification of violence against certain groups, in Hungary and in the UK

(average on a 1–5 scale)



Acceptance of the use of force against certain groups of society was markedly higher for Hungarians than it was among Britons who were asked. This discrepancy was especially visible with regards to drug users and gypsies. The Hungarian average was higher by 1.3 points in the former and by 1.15 points in the latter case on the 1-5 scale, constituting a remarkable difference. Homosexuals and Jewish people as minority groups were the ones against whom the use of violence was the least accepted both among Hungarians and Britons. However, the survey's result shows an average of 1.41 and 1.36 in England, while the Hungarian averages are notably higher (2.23 and 2.31).

About the research

Demos has been collecting survey data from Facebook supporters of various political parties in the UK and Hungary.

Facebook allows third parties to design adverts which are shown to Facebook users who can be targeted based on the preferences or data they have shared on the site. We designed a series of adverts which ask users to complete a survey. Users who click on the survey are then redirected to a survey page where they are presented with a consent page; and then asked to complete the survey. We asked a series of questions relating to basic demographic data, social and political attitudes data and a series of questions relating to attitudes toward violence.

Data collection involved a survey recruitment design pioneered by Demos that uses Facebook to target people who 'Like' specific pages. Using the same techniques as in the *New Face of Digital Populism* and *New Political Actors in Europe* series (Demos, 2011 and 2012-13), surveys were conducted via Facebook. Facebook was selected because it is the most widespread and popular social media site in Europe, and political parties have a sizeable presence on the platform (particularly in respect of young people). Facebook allows for adverts to be targeted at users based on their political preferences, although this is not always as precise as we would like (for example, it allows advertising directed at people who like categories such as a specific political party, but this tends to also include those who like similar parties too).

Targeted individuals were shown an advert on Facebook inviting them to click on a link to complete a survey. On clicking the advert, participants were redirected to a digital survey page hosted by the website Survey Monkey, setting out the details and purpose of the surveys along with an invitation to take part. There was no monetary compensation for partaking in the surveys.

Data Collection Caveats

This recruitment technique allows collection of a sizeable dataset from a largely unexplored group of individuals who are hard to recruit via traditional recruitment approaches. However, there are caveats to keep in mind.⁶⁸

First, the population is self-selected. It is thus hard to control for what groups partaking individuals affiliate with and how many individuals from a given group partake. While the survey is advertised to a broad population of individuals that affiliate with political groups on Facebook, there is no control over what individuals ultimately complete the survey. In this particular study, this left us with somewhat different data sets for the UK and Hungary, and in places gained disproportionate numbers of responses from supporters of different parties.

68 For an in-depth discussion of the method's strength and weaknesses, see Bartlett et al. (2012), *The New Face of Digital Populism*.

Second, this study targets individuals who follow political parties on Facebook, and not political actors or activists themselves. Therefore, one ought to be careful about drawing generalisations about the parties and groups in question, as survey participants do not necessarily represent the groups in their entirety.

Third, Facebook's advertisement options do not allow the targeting of specific groups, but rather a collection of *similar* groups. Therefore, it is not possible to disaggregate respondents according to which Facebook advert reached them. Respondents are thus asked which political groups or movements they most closely affiliated with and categorized accordingly.

This sample is not a perfectly representative sample of the population, nor is it a representative sample of Facebook users. This is a self-selecting survey, which means only those who chose to respond do so. Although the research team targeted adverts at users in a way to create a sample that was broadly similar to Facebook users in the UK and in Hungary as a whole (based on gender, age, and political affiliation) because of the way Facebook targeted advertising functions, it is not possible to create a perfect sample. Self-selection also creates a potentially significant (and unknown) bias in the survey responses. It is with these caveats that the results should be read.

Research in the United Kingdom

In order to recruit respondents, we targeted the Facebook supporters of six British political parties and movements (Liberal Democrats, Conservatives, Labour, UK Independence Party, EDL and British National Party).

We ran six separate campaigns for each party, targeting various age and gender categories in order to reach as representative a cross section of the supporters of these groups as possible.

Adverts and surveys were administered in English. In total, this yielded 2,128 completed survey responses. We kept all surveys where at least three quarters of the survey was completed. We include the percentage of non-response for each question.

Demographics

The majority of respondents (75 per cent) were male, and 20 per cent were female. Four per cent responded that they preferred not to answer (one per cent did not answer).

Age categories were broken down into six categories. The largest age category is 16-25 (35 per cent of respondents). The rest is as follows: 26-35 is 7 per cent; 36-45 is 10 per cent; 46-55 is 21 per cent; 56-65 is 15 per cent; and 65+ is 11 per cent. One per cent did not answer.


In terms of where respondents live, 45 per cent come from a town or small city; 15 per cent from a big city; 16 per cent are from a country village and 17 per cent from the suburbs or outskirts of a big city. Three per cent are from a farm or home in the countryside. The remainder either did not respond or said they did not know.

Overall, 40 per cent of our sample were in paid work; 22 per cent were students. In terms of education levels, 46 per cent say their highest level of education is higher education, 38 per cent say secondary school, and 6 per cent say vocational school.

In respect of political views, we asked respondents whom they voted for in the 2010 election. 17 per cent said the Conservative Party; 16 per cent said the Labour party, 14 per cent said UKIP, 8 per cent said the Green Party; 13 per cent said the BNP. (The remained either replied ‘other’, ‘don’t know’, ‘I did not vote’ or did not answer).

Political activism

Respondents were asked a series of questions relating to their political activity: whether they have taken part in various actions. Respondents were asked if they ‘have done’, ‘might do’, ‘would never do’ to participating in a boycott, a lawful demonstration, unofficial strikes, occupation of buildings, signing a petition, or using personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators or the police.



The results show that a relatively high proportion of respondents have taken part in peaceful and lawful demonstration: 37 per cent have joined a boycott, and 78 per cent have joined a strike.

A relatively small proportion have been involved in more serious and violent activism: just 4 per cent have used violence like fighting with police or other demonstrators (although 11 per cent say they 'might' do). There is a relatively high proportion of people who say they might take part in potentially unlawful activity – 32 per cent say they 'might' join an unofficial strike, while 25 per cent say they 'might' occupy buildings.

When cross-tabulated against where people place themselves on the political spectrum and age categories, further insight is available. (We asked respondents where they place themselves on the political spectrum, where 1 means left and 5 means right.)

Joined a boycott

Of those who answered '1' on the political spectrum (meaning far left, n=289 in total, or 14 per cent of the total sample) 91 per cent said they 'have' or 'might' join a boycott. Sixty eight per cent said they 'had' joined a boycott in the past – the highest proportion by some margin. By contrast, 47 per cent of those who answered '2' on the political spectrum said they have joined a boycott; and 41 per cent of those who answered '5' had joined a boycott. The lowest was '4' on the political spectrum, where only 28 per cent of people had joined a boycott. However, a large proportion across the political spectrum said they either had or might take part.

In terms of the effect of age, 28 per cent of those 16-35 said they have joined a boycott; compared to 44 per cent of those aged 36 and over. (This might be explained simply by the age difference: since 41 per cent of those aged under 35 said they might join a boycott; compared with 33 per cent of those aged over 35).

Joined a lawful demonstration

There were similar results when respondents were asked if they had taken part in a lawful demonstration. Again, the highest proportion of people who answered '1' on the political spectrum said they had (69 per cent) and the lowest proportion was those who answered '4' (20 per cent). Similarly to the question above, a high proportion of all groups said they either 'had' or 'might' join a lawful demonstration. A similar result was found in respect of the effect of age: with those over 35 being more likely than those under 35 to have taken part in a lawful demonstration (38 versus 26 per cent); but less likely to say they 'might' do in future (36 versus 47 per cent).

Join unofficial strikes

Again, those who consider themselves to be far left were most likely to either have (27 per cent) or might (49 per cent) take part in unofficial strikes – followed by those who answered '2' on the political spectrum question; with the centre right ('4' on the spectrum) being the least likely to get involved in this type of activity (4 per cent said they had, and 25 per cent said they might). Overall, far fewer people are involved in this type of activity: only 6 per cent of those under 35 had, and 13 per cent of those over 35.

Occupy buildings

Once more, a similar result obtains: as a proportion, those answering '1' on the political spectrum question were more likely than other groups to either have already (18 per cent) or might (47 per cent) take part in occupying buildings. Only 19 per cent of this group said they would 'never' be involved in this type of activity, compared with 39 per cent of those who answered '2'; 57 per cent who answered '3'; 69 per cent who answered '4' and 56 per cent who answered '5'. For this activity, younger people were more likely to say they either had or might take part (35 per cent in total) compared to older people (29 per cent).

Sign a petition

A very high proportion of people in every category had or might sign a petition; similarly with the age categories.

Used personal violence like fighting with the police or other demonstrators


Interestingly, this is the only question where far left respondents were not the most likely to have taken part in an activity: 6 per cent of those who answered '1' had taken part in the above; compared to 8 per cent of those who answered '5'. For this activity, 60 per cent of those who answered '1' said they would 'never' use personal violence, compared with 77 per cent of those who answered '2'; 77 per cent of those who answered '3'; 77 per cent of those who answered '4' and 60 per cent of those who answered '5'. This suggests, unsurprisingly, that this activity is mainly the preserve of the more radical fringes. Younger people are marginally more likely than older to say they had or might take part in this activity. 18 per cent of those aged 16-35 said they 'had' or 'might' take part, compared with 12 per cent of those aged over 35.

Political and social attitudes

We asked respondents a series of questions about their attitudes toward democracy, free expression, immigration, and how happy they would be having friends from different ethnic or religious groups.

We asked participants the following question: 'on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the United Kingdom?'

Satisfaction with democracy




This suggests that, on balance, respondents are not satisfied with the way democracy works in the UK: 62 per cent of people are either not very or not at all satisfied.

Interestingly, when broken down according to where they sit on the political spectrum, we found that there was little difference between those who were far left, far right, or centre. (19 per cent of those on the far left were either 'very' or 'fairly' satisfied; for those who answered '3', the corresponding percentage is 23 – a fairly minor difference. Those under 36 were slightly more satisfied (25 per cent were either fairly or very satisfied) compared to those aged 36 and over (17 per cent).

We asked respondents their views on free expression. The question was asking whether or not people agreed with one of the following two statements. First: 'everyone should be free to express their political views openly, even if they are extreme'. Second: 'those who hold extreme political views should be prevented from expressing them openly'.

Opinions on free expression




(18 per cent of people did not respond to the question). There are not any significant differences based on respondents' position on the political spectrum; or whether they were under 36 or aged 36 and over.

We asked respondents a question about their views on immigration.

When broken down according to position on the political spectrum, unsurprisingly those on the left of the spectrum are more likely to 'allow many' or 'allow some' compared to those on the right of the spectrum. Young people are more likely to either allow 'many' or 'some' (45 per cent in total) compared to those aged 36 and over (31 per cent in total).

To what extent do you think the UK should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most British people to come and live in the UK?




We asked respondents about their views on gay men and lesbians: 'to what extent do you agree with the following statement: gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life'. Overall 69 per cent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed; 8 per cent disagreed. Two per cent said they didn't know – and 20 per cent did not fill in the question.

We asked respondents questions about whether they would feel happy with their children being friends with people from different religious and ethnic groups (1 meaning they would feel 'totally uncomfortable' and 5 meaning they would feel 'totally comfortable').

On the whole, regardless of the specific group in question, those on the left of the political spectrum were more likely to be comfortable with the children being friends with people from different religious and ethnic groups than those on the right; and those under 36 were more likely to be comfortable with this than those aged 36 and over.

Attitudes about children being friends with people from different ethnic or religious groups




Trust in institutions

We asked respondents a series of questions related to whether they tended to trust or tended not to trust various political institutions out of 5. (1 meaning ‘do not trust at all’, 5 meaning ‘have complete trust’).

These results show that, unsurprisingly and in line with other statistics on the subject, the legal system and the police enjoy the highest levels of trust among the UK public; while politicians, the government and the European Parliament enjoy very low levels of trust (although no institutions enjoy high levels of trust in absolute terms).

Examining these results in respect of political persuasion and age, the general trend is that people aged 36 and over are less trusting of every single institution than those under 36. This suggests that trust in political and legal institutions is not the result of hundreds of aggregated (but separate) direct experiences of institutions, but rather a generalised attitude toward trusting people in power or institutions that govern their lives.

Trust in institutions



Attitudes to violence

We asked respondents four questions about their attitudes toward violence. (It is to be noted that this part only offered answers to chose from, there were no open questions). We ran a series of cross-tabulations against these responses in order to determine whether there were any correlations between different answers. Those which returned interesting results are included below.

How strongly do you agree with the following: using violence to pursue political goals is never justified.

Agree and strongly agree	60%
Disagree and strongly disagree	24%
DK/NA	16%

Those who place themselves at the centre of the political spectrum are more likely to agree with the statement (74 per cent) than those on the right (66 per cent) or on the left (57 per cent).

Those who trust the legal system more are also more likely to agree that violence to pursue political goals is never justified. Seventy-five per cent of people who trust the legal system agree with the above statement, compared to 63 per cent who do not trust the legal system. (A similar score obtains in respect of trust in the British government). Younger people are also slightly less likely to agree with the statement: 51 per cent of those aged 16-35 agree or strongly agree, compared with 66 per cent of those aged 36 and over.

How justifiable is fighting with the police?

Justifiable	21%
Neither justifiable nor unjustifiable	18%
Unjustifiable	30%
DK/NA	31%

Unlike the previous question, age appears to matter less for this answer. Only 20 per cent of those aged 36 and over think it justified, compared with 22 per cent of those aged 16-35. There is a small correlation – as expected – between trust levels in the police and whether or not fighting with the police is justifiable. Twenty eight per cent of people who do not trust the police consider violence is justifiable, compared with 22 per cent of people who do trust it.

How strongly do you agree with the following: I wouldn't feel bad about hitting someone if they really deserved it.

Agree and strongly agree	43%
Disagree and strongly disagree	35%
Didn't answer / don't know	21%

When cross-tabulated against age, there is very little difference between those under 36 (42 per cent agree / strongly agree) and those over 36 (44 per cent agree / strongly agree). A small difference is visible in respect of life satisfaction. Eleven per cent of people who are not satisfied with their lives agree that they wouldn't feel bad hitting someone; compared to 6 per cent of people who are satisfied with their lives.

Terrorism is everyday news. In principle everyone is against it, but there is still room for differences of opinion. Which statement do you most agree with?

Terrorism for whatever motive must always be condemned	65%
There may be certain circumstances where terrorism is justified	14%
Didn't answer / don't know	21%

There is a fairly large difference between age groups. Seventy-three per cent of those over 35 believe terrorism must always be condemned, compared to only 54 per cent of those aged between 16-35. Interestingly, satisfaction with democracy – often considered to be a significant factor in attitudes toward violent action – makes no difference to the answer to this question. Surprisingly, attitudes toward immigration does appear to make a difference. Forty eight per cent of people who believe that the UK should allow ‘many’ immigrants think terrorism should always be condemned: but this increases to 90 per cent of those who think the UK should allow ‘a few’. Unsurprisingly, there is a strong affinity between those who believe that ‘using violence to pursue political goals is justified’ and those who think that ‘terrorism may be justified under certain circumstances’. Thirty per cent of those who think violence to pursue political goals can be justified think terrorism may be permissible under certain circumstances, compared to 10 per cent of those who do not.

Factors correlated with support for violence

However, these cross-tabulations are less rigorous than a full regression analysis, which allows for other variables to be held constant. Nevertheless, we isolated respondents who had supported violence across all four scenario questions (agreement with the following statements: ‘using violence to pursue political goals is never justified’; ‘how justifiable is fighting with the police?’; ‘I wouldn’t feel bad about hitting someone if they really deserved it’; and ‘terrorism for whatever motive must always be condemned’).

In order to provide more comparable data, for this section, we have removed the non-response data from each question.

In total, there were 135 respondents from the UK that agree with violence (or said they did not know) for all of the above questions. This allowed us to examine more closely what other attributes or responses correlated with support for violence.

In terms of age, 44 per cent were aged 16-25, which was by some margin the largest age category (the next largest was 46-55 at 16 per cent). Interestingly, the smallest age category was 76-85 (2 people) and then 26-35 (6 people, or 4 per cent).

Unsurprisingly it tended to be men who agreed with violence – 98 men, compared to 18 women (and 18 who said they would rather not answer; and 1 who did not answer).

In terms of location, those who were from a town or small city were the most likely to agree with violence: 55 people (or 41 per cent). However, this is simply in line with the overall survey demographics.

The most likely category to agree with violence in terms of employment and education was those in paid employment (47 people, or 35 per cent) and those for whom university was their highest level of education (58 people, or 43 per cent).

In terms of voting preference, 23 per cent of those who agreed with violence said they voted in the 2010 general election for ‘other’ – meaning not one of the mainstream parties listed. A further 15 per cent said they did not vote, and 14 per cent said they didn’t know. By contrast only 5 per cent had voted for the British National Party.

This is very different from the sample as whole (where 18 per cent said the Conservative Party; 18 per cent said the Labour party; 15 per cent said UKIP; 5 per cent said the Green Party and 1 per cent said the BNP. The remainder either replied 'other', 'don't know', 'I did not vote' or did not answer).

This suggests that it is those most disengaged from the political process that agree with violence. However, the European election results are slightly different: 30 per cent of respondents said they had voted for UKIP; and 19 per cent the Green Party (16 per cent said 'other'). Interestingly, in the overall sample 54 per cent said they voted UKIP, 12 per cent said the Green party, and 9 per cent said 'other'.

In terms of the left-right split, those who self-defined as far left (placing themselves as '1' on a 1 to 5 political spectrum) were the most likely to agree (33 people, or 28 per cent). In the sample as a whole the far left comprise just 15 per cent.

In terms of political activities, those who agree with violence are significantly more likely than the overall sample to say they have or might engage in various actions. For example, 61 per cent have joined a boycott; compared to only 42 per cent for the sample as whole. Similarly, 78 per cent of the violent sub sample either have or might join an unofficial strike, compared to only 48 per cent of the overall sample; and 68 per cent either have or might occupy a building, compared to only 37 per cent of the sample overall.

In terms of satisfaction with democracy, 78 per cent of those who agreed with violence also said they were either 'not at all' or 'not very' satisfied with democracy. However, this is not significantly different from the survey as a whole where 74 per cent were either not at all or not very satisfied with democracy.

Similarly, 77 per cent of those who agreed with violence said everyone should be free to express their views openly, even if they are extreme. However, this is not significantly different from the survey as a whole where 68 per cent said the same.

Of those who agreed with violence, 39 per cent thought the UK should allow 'many' people of a different race or ethnic group to come to the UK (compared to only 16 per cent who thought the UK should allow 'none'). In the sample as a whole, however, only 20 per cent thought the UK should allow 'many', and 17 per cent thought the UK should allow 'none'.

In respect of whether gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives, of those who agree with violence, 87 per cent either agreed or strongly agreed. (In the survey overall 86 per cent of respondents per cent either agreed or strongly agreed).

In terms of how those who agree with violence felt about their children being friends with children from different religions or races, in each category, the most common response was that they would feel 'totally comfortable'. (However, it is to be noted that 22 per cent of respondents did not complete this question in the total sample).

Attitudes about children being friends with people from different ethnic or religious groups

(% that feel 'totally comfortable')

	African	Jewish	Muslim	Roma
Those who agreed with violence	33	42	27	28
In the whole sample (only valid answers)	32	43	22	21
In the whole sample	25	34	17	17

In terms of trust in institutions, the highest proportion of those who agreed with violence tended not to trust institutions at all, in every category. However, as above, this also reflects the overall proportions of those who completed all the surveys.

Trust in political institutions

(% of answers 'do not trust at all')

	British govt	British parliament	European parliament	Legal system	Police	Political parties	Politicians
Those who agreed with violence	48	43	44	25	28	47	55
In the whole sample (only valid answers)	46	41	62	24	19	42	53
In the whole sample	37	33	50	19	16	34	43

Interestingly, these results show that it is particularly a lack of trust in the police that distinguishes the violent sub sample from the overall sample.

Overall

- Young people are more likely to support terrorism in principle.
- Those who do not trust the legal system are more likely to support violence.
- Anti-immigration sentiment is correlated with not supporting terrorism.
- A suggestion that disengagement from mainstream political parties is correlated with support for violence; although a lack of trust in the police also appears to be a factor.
- There is also a relatively strong correlation between various types of political activity and support for violent activity.

Research in Hungary

In order to recruit respondents, we targeted the Facebook supporters of eleven Hungarian political parties. We ran separate campaigns for each party, targeting various age and gender categories in order to reach as representative a cross section of the supporters of these groups as possible.

Adverts and surveys were administered in Hungarian. In total, this yielded 4,991 completed survey responses. We kept all surveys where at least three quarters of the survey was completed. We include the percentage of non-response for each question.

Demographics

The majority of respondents (53 per cent) were male, and 39 per cent were female. Two per cent responded that they preferred not to answer (six per cent did not answer).

Age categories were broken down into six categories. The largest age category is 56-65 (32 per cent of respondents). The rest is as follows: 16-25 is 12 per cent; 26-35 is 7 per cent; 36-45 is 6 per cent; 46-55 is 18 per cent; 66-75 is 20 per cent; and over 76 is 4 per cent. One per cent did not answer.

In terms of where respondents live, 34 per cent come from a big city, 33 per cent from a town or small city and 20 per cent from a country village. The remainder were from the suburbs of a big city (8 per cent) and a farm (1 per cent). Five per cent did not respond.

Overall, 35 per cent of our sample were in paid work; 36 per cent were retired, six per cent were students, only 4 per cent were unemployed. (Five per cent did not answer). Thirty six per cent had higher education level, the same proportion said their highest level of education was secondary school, and 18 per cent said vocational school.

In respect of political views, we asked respondents whom they voted for in the last parliamentary elections. Fifty-one per cent said MSZP / Együtt / DK / PM / MLP. Eighteen per cent said Fidesz / KDNP; thirteen per cent said they voted for Jobbik; five per cent said they did not vote; and 9 per cent did not answer. This suggests a marginally more left-wing sample than the population at large.

This sample is not a perfectly representative sample of the Hungarian population, nor is it a representative sample of Facebook users. The same caveats apply in this research as for the UK study.

We also asked respondents who they voted for in the May 2014 European election. Forty-two per cent said they voted for DK, 16 per cent said Fidesz, 12 per cent said Jobbik and 4 per cent said MSZP.


We also asked respondents where they sat on a political spectrum. In total, 34 per cent of people responded with '1' (meaning far left); 13 per cent '2' (centre left), 13 per cent '3' (centre), 11 per cent '4' (centre right), and 22 per cent '5' (far right). Seven per cent said they do not know. (All non-responses are removed for this answer).

Political and social attitudes

We asked respondents a series of questions about their attitudes toward democracy, free expression, immigration, and how happy they would be having friends from different ethnic or religious groups.

First, we asked participants the following question: 'on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the Hungary?'

Satisfaction with democracy




This suggests that, on balance, respondents are not satisfied with the way democracy works in the Hungary: only 14 per cent said they were either very or fairly satisfied.

Interestingly, when broken down according to where they sit on the political spectrum, we found that there was a very significant difference in the way they answered the question. Of those who said they were 'far left' (answering '1' on the survey), only 1 per cent were satisfied with democracy. By contrast, of those who said they were far right (answering '5' on the survey) 18 per cent were satisfied. Those who answered '1' or '2' (far left and centre left) were more likely to be dissatisfied than those who answered '4' or '5' (centre right and far right).

Those under 35 were less satisfied than those aged 36 and over (although this could be driven by a third variable, such as political views). 58 per cent of those 36 and over were 'not at all satisfied' compared to 38 per cent of those under 36.

We asked respondents about their views on free expression. The question was asking whether or not people agreed with one of the following two statements. First: 'everyone should be free to express their political views openly, even if they are extreme'. Second: 'those who hold extreme political views should be prevented from expressing them openly'.

Opinions on free expression




(19 per cent of people did not respond to the question, and 6 per cent said they did not know). This is different to the results in the UK, where there is a higher proportion that agree everyone should be free to express their political views openly.

As above, there was a significant difference depending on where the respondent sat on the political spectrum. Those on the far left were more likely (57 per cent) to think people should be prevented from expressing their views openly than those on the far right (24 per cent). Similarly age also appeared to make a difference: 49 per cent of those under 36 thought everyone should be free to express their views openly, compared to 36 per cent of those aged 36 and over. (And similarly only 14 per cent of those under 36 thought extreme views should be prevented, compared to 41 per cent of those aged 36 and over).

We also asked respondents a question about their views on immigration.

Unlike other questions, when broken down according to position on the political spectrum, there is relatively little difference across the groups. For example, 17 per cent of those on the far left say Hungary should allow many; compared to 20 per cent of those on the far right. Equally, age does not appear to make a major difference either: 15 per cent of those under 36 say Hungary should allow many immigrants, compared to 17 per cent of those aged 36 and over.

To what extent do you think Hungary should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from Hungarian people to come and live in Hungary.




We asked respondents about their views on gay men and lesbians: ‘to what extent do you agree with the following statement: gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives’. Overall 54 per cent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed; 22 per cent disagreed. Three per cent said they didn’t know and 22 per cent did not answer the question.

We asked respondents questions about whether they would feel happy with their children being friends with people from different religious and ethnic groups (1 meaning they would feel ‘totally uncomfortable’ and 5 meaning they would feel ‘totally comfortable’).

On the whole, regardless of the specific group in question, those on the left of the political spectrum were more likely to be comfortable with their children being friends with people from different religious and ethnic groups than those on the right; and those under 36 were more likely to be comfortable with this than those aged 36 and over.

Attitudes about children being friends with people from different ethnic or religious groups.



Trust in institutions


We asked respondents a series of questions related to whether they tended to trust or tended not to trust various political institutions out of 5. (1 meaning ‘do not trust at all’, 5 meaning ‘have complete trust’).

These results show that, unsurprisingly, and in line with other statistics on the subject, no institutions enjoy particularly high levels of complete trust.

The low level of trust in the legal system and the police is notable (although this depends in part on how you measure it). This does not vary greatly with age.

Unlike the UK, the European Parliament is more trusted than the national government. Interestingly, people under 36 appear slightly less likely to trust the European Parliament than those aged 36 and over. Those to the left had far higher levels of trust than those to the right.

Trust in institutions



There is quite a significant difference depending on where people sit on the spectrum. Those who say they are left or far left are far less likely to trust the Hungarian government than those on the right or far right (this is likely to be because the current government is right wing).

Attitudes to violence

We asked respondents four questions about their attitudes toward violence. We ran a series of cross-tabulations against these responses in order to determine whether there were any correlations between different answers. Those which returned interesting results are included below.

How strongly do you agree with the following: using violence to pursue political goals is never justified.

Agree and strongly agree	67%
Disagree and strongly disagree	14%
Didn't answer / don't know	19%

There is general agreement that using violence to pursue political goals is never justified.

Those who place themselves at the centre of the political spectrum are slightly more likely to agree with the statement (78 per cent) than those on the right (74 per cent) and slightly less likely than those on the left (79 per cent). These are very minor differences.

Those aged 36 and over are slightly more likely to agree with the statement (71 per cent) compared to those under 36 (52 per cent) (although some of this difference is also down to the higher proportion of people under 36 who said they 'don't know'). Sixteen per cent of those under 36 and 13 per cent of those aged 36 and over disagreed.

Those who trust the legal system more are also more likely to agree that violence to pursue political goals is never justified. Eighty-four per cent of people who trust the legal system agree with the above statement, compared to 78 per cent who do not trust the legal system.

How justifiable is fighting with the police?

Justifiable	50%
Neither justifiable nor unjustifiable	17%
Unjustifiable	6%
Didn't answer / don't know	27%

For this question, age has a small effect: 53 per cent of those aged 36 and over think fighting with the police is justifiable, compared to 38 per cent of those under 36. There is a small correlation – as expected – between trust levels in the police and whether or not fighting with the police is justifiable: 22 per cent of those have no trust in the police think violence against them is justified; compared with only 9 per cent of those who trust them.

How strongly do you agree with the following: I wouldn't feel bad about hitting someone if they really deserved it.

Agree and strongly agree	36%
Disagree and strongly disagree	40%
Didn't answer / don't know	24%

For this question, these are very similar answers to those observed in the UK survey.

When cross-tabulated against age, there is a difference between those under 36 (44 per cent agree / strongly agree) and those aged 36 and over (34 per cent agree / strongly agree).

A small difference is visible in respect of life satisfaction. Thirty nine per cent of people who are satisfied with their lives would not feel bad about hitting someone if they deserved it; compared to 55 per cent of people who are not satisfied with their lives.

Terrorism is everyday news. In principle everyone is against it, but there is still room for differences of opinion. Which statement do you most agree with?

Terrorism for whatever motive must always be condemned	70%
There may be certain circumstances where terrorism is justified	8%
Didn't answer / don't know	22%

There is a fairly large difference between age groups. Twenty-three per cent of those under 36 think that terrorism can be justified in certain circumstances, compared to only 7 per cent of those aged 36 and over. Unsurprisingly, there is a strong affinity between those who believe that 'using violence to pursue political goals is justified' and those who think that 'terrorism may be justified under certain circumstances'. Eighteen per cent of those who think violence to pursue political goals can be justified think terrorism may be permissible under certain circumstances, compared to 8 per cent of those who do not.

Factors correlated with support for violence

However, as noted above, these cross-tabulations are less rigorous than a full regression analysis, which allows for other variables to be held constant. Similarly to the UK study we isolated respondents who had supported violence across all four scenario questions. In order to provide more comparable data, for this section, we have removed the non-response data from each question.

In total, there were 108 respondents from Hungary that agreed with violence (or said they did not know) for all of the above questions. This allowed us to examine more closely certain demographics and attitudinal results correlated with support for violence.

In terms of age, 32 per cent were aged 16-25, which was by some margin the largest age category (the next largest was 46-55 at 19 per cent). The smallest age category was 76-85 (1 person) and then 36-45 (6 people, or 6 per cent).

Unsurprisingly it tended to be men who agreed with violence – 69 men (67 per cent), compared to 26 women (25 per cent) (and 8 who said they would rather not answer).

In terms of location, those who were from a town or small city were the most likely to agree with violence: 47 people (or 44 per cent). This is despite the fact that only 33 per cent of respondents were from a town or small city.

The most likely category to agree with violence in terms of employment and education was those in paid employment (39 people, or 36 per cent) and those for whom secondary school was their highest educational achievement (41 people, or 38 per cent). This is broadly in line with the percentages found in the survey overall.

In terms of voting preference, 41 (39 per cent) of those who agreed with violence said they voted in the last parliamentary election for Jobbik; and 24 per cent said they voted for MSZP / Együtt / DK / PM / MLP. A further 13 per cent said they did not vote. Similarly the European election results find that 49 per cent of respondents who agreed with violence voted for Jobbik; and 15 per cent for DK.

This is very different from the sample as whole, where only 14 per cent said they voted for Jobbik in the last parliamentary elections and six per cent said they did not know. (In the May 2014 European election, 50 per cent said they voted for DK, and only 14 per cent said Jobbik.)

In terms of the left-right split, those who self-defined as far right (placing themselves as '5' on a 1 to 5 political spectrum) were the most likely to agree (42 people, or 40 per cent). In the sample as a whole, however, only 22 per cent of people were from the far right, compared to 34 per cent from the far left.

In terms of satisfaction with democracy, 79 per cent of those who agreed with violence also said they were either 'not at all' or 'not very' satisfied with democracy. However, this is not significantly different from the survey as a whole, where the figure is 80 per cent.

Similarly, 75 per cent of those who agreed with violence said everyone should be free to express their views openly, even if they are extreme. This is markedly different from the survey as a whole, where only 48 per cent of respondents agreed with the same statement.

Of those who agreed with violence, 46 per cent thought Hungary should allow 'a few' people of a different race or ethnic group to come to Hungary (compared to only 8 per cent who thought Hungary should allow 'some'; and 9 per cent who thought 'many'). In the sample as a whole 36 per cent thought Hungary should allow a few; 24 per cent thought 'some' and 21 per cent 'many'.

In respect of whether gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives, of those who agree with violence, 44 per cent either agreed or strongly agreed. (Overall 68 per cent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed.)

In terms of how those who agree with violence felt about their children being friends with children from different religions or races, in each category, the most common response was that they would feel 'totally uncomfortable'; and this was in marked difference to the survey overall – in each case the violence sub sample was markedly more likely to feel uncomfortable – especially in respect of Roma.

Attitudes about children being friends with people from different ethnic or religious groups

(% that feel 'totally uncomfortable')

	African	Jewish	Muslim	Roma
Those who agreed with violence	22	28	17	51
In the whole sample (only valid answers)	11	12	13	26
In the whole sample	8	9	10	20

In respect of trust in institutions, the major difference between the violent sub sample and the sample overall was that the latter was markedly more likely to distrust the legal system and the European Parliament. (This is notably different from the UK results).

Trust in political institutions

(% of answers 'do not trust at all')

	Hun-garian govt	Hun-garian parliament	Euro-pean Parlia-ment	Legal sys-tem	Police	Polit-ical parties	Politi-cians
Those who agreed with violence	63	49	44	51	31	28	44
In the whole sample (only valid answers)	64	53	19	39	28	27	41
In the whole sample	49	41	14	30	21	20	31

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