

---

# Measuring Political Violence

---



**POLITICAL CAPITAL**  
POLICY RESEARCH & CONSULTING INSTITUTE





Co-funded by the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union.

This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the author, and the European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

---



This project has been supported by the Foundation Open Society Institute.

---

# MEASURING POLITICAL VIOLENCE

---

*October, 2015*



**POLITICAL CAPITAL**  
POLICY RESEARCH & CONSULTING INSTITUTE

## CONTENTS

<b>Preface, Summary of the project</b>	<b>4</b>
Hate crime – statistics and legal situation	4
Available datasets on political violence	4
Opinions on political violence – CAPI and CAWI research	4
Social media mapping – Facebook and Twitter research	5
<b>Executive summary</b>	<b>6</b>
Hate crime – statistics and legal situation	6
Available datasets on political violence	6
Opinions on political violence – our own CAPI and CAWI research	7
Social media mapping – Facebook and Twitter research	10
<b>Recommendations</b>	<b>11</b>
More politics, less policy	11
Continuous tracking of the threat	11
Community programs and prevention	12
<b>Hate crime - statistics and legal situation</b>	<b>13</b>
Introduction	13
Definitions – European hate-crime models	14
Findings and recommendations	28
<b>Available datasets on political violence</b>	<b>31</b>
The measurement of political violence	36
Conclusions	41
<b>Opinions on political violence - CAPI and CAWI research</b>	<b>42</b>
Personal interviewing research	42
Online interviewing research	84
<b>Social Media mapping</b>	<b>106</b>
Why is the role of social media important in spreading extremist ideas	106
Methodology	106
United Kingdom Results	108
Hungarian Results	114
Strengths and weaknesses of these methodologies	121
Future uses	123
<b>References</b>	<b>126</b>

## PREFACE, SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT

This study summarizes the results of a two-years-long research project, which focused on the attitudes towards political violence in online and offline context. The project, entitled 'Developing innovative methods for comparative researches on violent radicalization among the youth to help prevention', was carried out by Political Capital. DEMOS UK – our British partner in this project – conducted certain aspects of the research. The project was supported by the European Commission programme 'Prevention of and Fight against Crime' (ISEC) and Open Society Foundations.

We launched our project based on the experience that, while good comparative data would be the necessary (but not sufficient) precondition of any good policy strategies and decisions to prevent political violence, exact datasets are often missing for comparing the different countries and communities from the perspective of the potential for the use of violence they have. The goals of our pilot project was to develop and pilot good traditional and new comparative research methods in order to assess the threat of violent radicalization by identifying the vulnerable groups in given EU member states where the justification and glorification of violence poses a danger. We hope this project helps us to gain a clear picture of violent extremism and its social-attitudinal background, increasing the effectiveness of prevention programmes in the future.

The research consisted of various activities, summarized below.

### Hate crime – statistics and legal situation

First of all, we gathered and summarized hate crime statistics, hate crime models and the legal situation on the basis of international hate crime reports. This part of the study enumerates the main definitions of hate crime, international statistical data available on the phenomenon and their use in research or policy-making with an outlook on theoretical explanations. The weaknesses of such datasets are discussed.

### Available datasets on political violence

Second, we studied the relevant literature on hate crime, violent extremism, violent attitudes, and different approaches to measure it. This section of the study gives an overview of the relevant bibliography from various fields of social sciences dealing with political violence, hate crime, and hate speech. The theoretical summary is followed by empirical analyses of two different databases that include data on violent behaviour with the aim to reveal determining factors of political violence. While the empirical results correlate with some findings of the theoretical models, the limits of empirical research are also highlighted in this section of the study.

### Opinions on political violence – CAPI and CAWI research

Based on the lessons of available data and literature on hate crime, we conducted our own empirical research to develop a new approach to measure the justification and glorification of political violence. With the help of two different types of surveys we examined



attitudes towards violence in general and violent acts in particular, the acceptance of those acts and, in general, opinions on and attitudes towards violence in Hungary and the UK in 2014. One of the methods used was a personal survey (from now on referred to as 'CAPI'), which was conducted by Ipsos in Hungary and by Ipsos Mori in the UK as part of their regular omnibus survey. The other method applied was an online survey (from now on referred to as CAWI) developed by Demos UK. Respondents were recruited via Facebook ads asking for filling in the questionnaire. The ads were displayed on the Facebook pages of users who fall within the target groups defined during the preparation phase.

The aims of the research were twofold. On the one hand, using both traditional and innovative research methods applied during our research, we wanted to answer the following questions: 1) Which social groups accept and justify violence (driven mainly by political conviction and ideology) the most? 2) What demographic and social characteristics and attitudes lie behind the acceptance of political violence? We made every effort to make the surveys conducted in Hungary and the UK methodologically as similar as possible to help us get comparable results. We present the results of the research in detail as well as the lessons we learned through the multivariable statistical analyses of the sample of the Hungarian CAPI survey.

## Social media mapping – Facebook and Twitter research

The study also presents an analysis of a selection of populist and extremist right wing Facebook pages and Twitter accounts in Hungary and the UK. Our aim with this research was to shed some light on the practical way these groups use social media. Although it is increasingly recognized that these groups actively use social media, there is a lack of research on precisely how they use it. Our research was a tentative pilot research, since there are no firmly established 'best practice' methods to collect and analyse data of this nature.

The authors of the study would like to thank the colleagues at the European Commission (DG Home) and Open Society Foundations for their support and insightful comments.

All errors and omissions are our own.

*Csaba Molnár*

*Ildikó Barna*

*Jamie Bartlett*

*Lóránt Győri*

*Attila Juhász*

*Péter Krekó*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Hate crime – statistics and legal situation

- While the definition and measurement of various indicators of discrimination is a priority for both the EU and the UN, authorities have failed to develop a standard hate crime definition at the international and national levels alike at a time when, in the wake of the economic crisis, a variety of social groups are becoming victims in Europe. Moreover, the EU's diverse judicial regulations and practices reflect some form of "victim hierarchy" where some groups receive extraordinary protection and recognition while other groups are left without protection.
- The accessibility, use, and international comparison of data available on hate crimes are made difficult by a great deal of latency (under-reporting and under-recording) both on the part of victims and authorities. The success of data collection greatly depends on whether the state collects data on national/ethnic minorities, whether criminal law sanctions race-motivated offenses and whether member states recognize racist violence as a social problem. Another problem is the different international organizations' varying methods of collecting and categorizing data, which is unable to produce a comprehensive data set ready for cross-country examination and comparison.
- The distribution of official and NGO data on hate crime is extremely uneven in the Union. While in East-South-Eastern Europe there is a dearth of information, in some states of North and Western Europe, for instance in France or Germany, there is an abundance of information on hate-crimes.
- The fundamental conclusion of a report on this issue (the RAXEN-report) and of most subsequent reports is that perpetrators of hate crimes are typically young men, members of extremist political organizations, as well as individuals not affiliated with any organizations of that kind.
- Major theoretical explanations for racist violence are the following: (1) competition for limited resources, (2) the rising numbers of minorities, (3) the existence of far-right groups and their impact on young people, and finally (4) country-specific racist subcultures. Micro-level explanations are based on perpetrators' personality traits, but often face serious challenges in explaining the phenomenon.

### Available datasets on political violence

Researches with established statistical methods correspond with theoretical findings that "vulnerable groups" prone to violence consist of young, socially or economically underprivileged men. These findings are, however, severely limited by the lack of mezzo- or macro-level data to really predict the likelihood of actual violent behaviour occurring.

- Theoretically, there are two distinct ways of identifying a vulnerable group: the individual-psychological and social/societal approach. Individual-psychological models make an attempt to identify psychological reasons behind the commitment of

crime. The psychological model explains these acts with extreme prejudice traced to affective disorders. Socio-psychological explanations build on small-group dynamics, while sociological approaches use a modernization theory which associate the aggression of young populations with unfavourable social changes.

- The analysis of the 2008 European Values Study (EVS) allows us to identify a group more ready to accept terrorism. This group is less opposed to a strong leader, rule by a technocratic government or the army, and have significantly less confidence in democratic institutions. The EVS database proved that huge differences between specific countries persist.
- The empirical findings bear inherent limits since classification is based on answers given to a single item, and that does not automatically justify labelling some respondents as people inclined to accept violence.
- Data from empirical analysis appear to reinforce earlier explanatory models and research findings on perpetrators of hate crime. In line with psychological, sociological, and economic models, groups of those more prone to violence primarily include young people, people with economic and social handicap and men. Authoritarian attitudes also play an important role.
- The main conclusion of the empirical analysis is that the acceptance of political violence, the measurement of related attitudes, and identification based on these findings does not mean that someone would actually commit such acts. Therefore, the definition of vulnerable groups and screening for predictive factors is possible only by considering additional social contexts.

## Opinions on political violence – our own CAPI and CAWI research

### *Traditional survey results (CAPI) in Hungary*

- in Hungary, one quarter of the respondents believe that democracy and political violence are compatible, one fifth believe that in some cases ‘the end justifies the means’, and twelve per cent believe that under certain circumstances, terrorism is acceptable. Voters of the far-right Jobbik party were more supportive towards violence.
- We tried to identify the ideological objectives<sup>1</sup> that make violence justifiable, as well as the social groups<sup>2</sup> against which respondents find violence acceptable. One-third of the respondents believe that violence cannot be justified for any of

---

1 If the respondent's family faced dangers; if the Hungarian nation faced a threat; if there was an attempt to limit the respondent's personal freedom; if the government oppressed its citizens; if the respondent's livelihood was threatened; if social inequality become unbearable; if environmental resources or the future of the next generation were threatened.

2 Terrorists; Criminals; Traitors and enemies of the nation; Drug addicts; Those destroying nature; Radical left-wing groups; Radical right-wing groups; Gypsies; Authoritarians undermining democracy; Banks; Politicians; Multinational companies; Jews; Homosexuals.



the objectives stated, and an additional 12 per cent believe that it can be justified in one case only. But generally, we found surprisingly high figures for justification of violence for some ideological goals and against some groups.

- The majority considers the protection of one's family as a sufficient reason for violence. More abstract objectives, such as the protection of the Hungarian nation and action to protect personal freedoms, enjoy relatively strong support (39 and 35 per cent, respectively). The number of supporters even for the least approved cases (social inequality becomes unbearable; natural resources and the prospects of future generations come under threat) is 29 per cent, although in these scenarios 35-36 per cent of respondents refuse the use of violence, which exceeds the ratio of supporters.
- Terrorists and criminals are clearly those against which a considerable part of the Hungarian respondents believe violence can be justified (63 and 47 per cent, respectively). This is not surprising though, given that these are the groups against which states usually apply legitimate tools of violence via law enforcement.
- 40 per cent of the respondents believe that violence is acceptable against traitors and enemies of the nation. In this context, there are no differences of opinion on the radical right or left. An even more shocking figure is that close to one third (29 per cent) of the respondents consider using violence against the Roma acceptable, and 35 per cent said so for drug addicts. In the case of authoritarian leaders threatening democracy (26 per cent), banks (25 per cent) and politicians (23 per cent), around one-third of respondents think violence can be justified. This figure is 18 per cent for multinational companies.
- Against Jews 16 per cent and against homosexuals 14 per cent of the respondents said violence is justifiable. These are considerably higher figures than found in Great Britain, but relatively low in the group of subjects in Hungary. Furthermore, as we know from existing research, homosexuals and Jews, often conceptualised as powerful enemies having strong lobbies, are often targets of verbal aggression. They seem not to be important as well-identifiable members of certain minority groups, instead, they have a rather symbolic role in the public discourse. They are often perceived as influential players with special characteristics who conspire against people and who should be hated and feared at the same time.
- We examined some specific situations in the Hungarian sample as well. 13 per cent of the Hungarian respondents said for example that beating up an amoral politician is acceptable under some circumstances, while 79 per cent said it is never acceptable.
- The effects of demographic variables behind attitudes towards violence were generally very weak or non-existent. Party preference (preference of Jobbik in particular), was found to be an important determining factor behind the justification of violence. People showing more activism and interest in politics, holding stronger anti-Semitic and anti-Roma attitudes, and those characterized by robust authoritarian attitudes (right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation) were

more open to justifying different forms of political violence. With all that, genuine discoveries were offered by an examination of the combined effects of variables. What we found is that attitudes are the real causes that transmit the effects of all of the variables: anti-Roma attitudes, anti-Semitism and, in particular, right-wing authoritarianism, as well as social dominance orientation. It seems as though that party preference is rather a 'symptom'; in fact, the acceptance of violence is a function of the respondent's extremist, authoritarian and prejudicial attitudes.

### *Traditional survey (CAPI) results in the United Kingdom*

- Surveys conducted in the United Kingdom – similarly to the Hungarian results – showed violence to be the most acceptable when the 'family faced dangers'. 63 per cent of Britons thought that violence, in this case, was acceptable to a certain extent. The approval for violence was convincing in case 'The British Nation faced a threat' as well, although not as strongly as in the previous situation: close to half of all respondents think violence can be justified in this situation. The least supported scenario was the use of violence if 'social inequality become unbearable'. 23 per cent of Britons think violence is acceptable in this case but at the same time 39 per cent think it is not. The comparison of data from Hungary and the United Kingdom shows that the British think violence is more agreeable if the 'family faced dangers' or if 'The British Nation faced a threat' but significantly less in other cases.
- In the United Kingdom the majority thinks the use of violence can be justified against terrorists and 'traitors and enemies of the nation'. Against the former group the use of force has particularly strong support (58 per cent). With regards to different ethnic minorities or religious groups: violence against Jews, Gypsies, Muslims and immigrants is barely supported – only 3-6 per cent of respondents would accept violence against these groups. While using violence to reach specific objectives is widely accepted in the UK as well, in the Hungarian sample we found much more widespread acceptance of the use of violence against specific groups – especially minority groups such as drug addicts, Gypsies and Jews.

### *Online-survey (CAWI) results*

- The online survey, for which participants were recruited through Facebook, showed that younger people in the sample accepted terrorism in greater proportion. The refusal of immigration was, interestingly, not correlated with the support of violence, however, lack of confidence in the police seemed to be an important factor. There is a fairly strong correlation between different kinds of political activism and the support of violent acts.
- In the online survey in Hungary, younger people, men, and citizens living in mid- to small-sized towns were rather supportive towards violence. In terms of party preferences, a high proportion of those accepting violence were supporters of Jobbik – but generally, we could find high support rates in politically "hyperactive" groups.

## Social media mapping – Facebook and Twitter research

Social media has made it easier to publish and spread extreme or offensive views. Radical right wing parties and movements are well established to be early and active users of social media, both as a way of producing cheap and rapid propaganda; creating a coherent group identity, and organizing events and activities. This research has found that:

- Social media has become an important and active venue for a wide variety of populist right-wing activity.
- However, although the network appears to be large, it is often led by a relatively small number of dedicated and active users.
- Nevertheless, these pieces of content can reach relatively large audiences outside of their own network of users.
- They use both Facebook and Twitter extensively to discuss and share information about both mainstream and very niche political issues. It is common for these groups to share 'mainstream' information in order to reach a wider audience.
- While we are hesitant to draw general conclusions based on these data sets about the offline composition of these groups, Social Media Mapping seems to be a perfect tool for tracking the potential for violence and its development over time in the Social Media networks of radical and extremist groups.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### More politics, less policy

- The results in Hungary and the UK suggest that a higher level of political interest and engagement might increase the acceptance of violence. The reason might be that in certain issues political discourses radicalise rather than calm public opinion, and only shift it in the direction of justifying “harsh measures”, including the use of violence. Therefore, the risk of violence might be decreased by depoliticizing certain sensitive questions (e.g. the immigration and refugee issue, minority questions, terrorism). Keeping these issues out of the scope of party politics, and at the same time amplifying the policy debates (giving more room to expert and NGO discussions) around them could help this depoliticisation.

### Continuous tracking of the threat

- As certain survey questions seem to be a useful tool for quantifying the violent potential in certain Member States, we would recommend pollsters to do regular international surveys on acceptance, justification and glorification of certain forms of political violence including terrorism. The best way to draw a map on the “potential for violence” in Europe would be to put a block of questions to a Eurobarometer survey and regularly repeat the measures. Beside having a clear picture on dynamics of violent attitudes, such measures would even help to identify the most problematic regions in the EU, helping to make good decisions when allocating funds for prevention and deradicalisation programmes.
- Similarly, regular researches in Member States on the acceptance of violence would help to identify the social groups that need the most attention, and probably targeted interventions. Our researches in Hungary and the UK indicate that young men living in cities, with authoritarian and prejudiced views and a negative attitude towards the police seem to be the most problematic group. .
- Besides regular polling of the violent attitudes in the Member States, continuous tracking and mapping of the most important radical and extremist Social Media channels seems to be crucial. New methods can help in assessing the impact of certain events in the Social Media sphere practically real time, , helping a lot not only in retrospective tracking, but in prospective prediction of the violent threats.

## Community programs and prevention

- Targeted education and community programs are needed in the groups that are most supportive towards political violence in order to reduce the violent threat.
- Ideology seems to be an extremely powerful tool in justifying and even glorifying violence. Changing perspectives and giving historical examples to show that even violence against the ingroups are often justified and glorified ideologically, might help to break some circles of reciprocal radicalisation.
- Using the credible voices of victims of hate crimes and terrorism and also the former extremists in the education programs can be a powerful tool in prevention of radicalisation. As the Radicalisation Awareness Network's PREVENT Working Group's Education Manifesto<sup>3</sup> says: *"victims and survivors of terrorism, but also former extremists, can be of great value when they engage with classes (...). Their testimonials, both online and offline, can have a big impact on the students and can also be a good opportunity to open the dialogue"*.

---

<sup>3</sup> Manifesto for Education – Empowering Educators and Schools [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/docs/manifesto-for-education-empowering-educators-and-schools\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/docs/manifesto-for-education-empowering-educators-and-schools_en.pdf)

The Radicalisation Awareness Network's most Working Groups emphasize the importance of such tools. See more for details: [http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation\\_awareness\\_network/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/index_en.htm)

## HATE CRIME – STATISTICS AND LEGAL SITUATION

### Introduction

The study of hate-crimes and politically extremist behavior is a rather complex subject, a problem fueled by current political developments and a stream of policy regulations, as well as crime research, law enforcement and legal issues. The phenomenon acquired political and legal relevance closely tied to civil-rights and minority-rights movements in the United States in the 1960s, and later in Europe out of a need to understand and control extremist political organizations following World War II. Although hate crime was given its first legal and legislative definition in the state, federal and even global context in the USA, the American legal system that devotes special attention to the freedom of the press and opinion does not look at hate speech as an issue requiring special regulation.

In contrast, following World War II in Europe the limits of hate speech were drawn with legal provisions regulating and banning specific symbols and statements, whereas the general regulation of hate crimes was introduced only towards the end of the 20th century based on the American model, regulations that starting from the 2000s gradually became the cornerstones of an International system promoted by Europe and the European Union.

While in the United States political extremism threatening society and political stability starts with the commitment of specific (political) acts, in Europe the public expression of a political opinion already carries a risk for society. The phenomenon deserves special attention because at the level of definition and practical law enforcement hate crime and hate speech essentially represent the two sides of the same coin, with far-reaching consequences in today's rapidly changing info-communication environment. For the legal definition of hate crime is established through the demonstration of the related motivation of common criminal acts and the violation of the human rights of individuals or groups, a motivation that in most cases<sup>4</sup> means the demonstration of some form of prejudiced language. In other words, in the two legal systems referred to above prejudice expressed through language and its potential motivating force leading to the commitment of an act are seen to have a different correlation.

In the American system the sanctioning of hate speech is based on the assumption that it follows and is motivated by an already committed act, while in Europe hate speech is interpreted as an expression of an intent leading to a future act and this constitutes its danger, well demonstrated by its legal definition as incitement to hate. European speech-regulation not only serves the protection of minority rights but also (and similar to the English and American political tradition) the political stability of the democratic system, which explains the remaining differences between the Anglo-Saxon and continental legal systems pointing beyond their distinct historic roots. However, there is no difference between the two philosophies when it comes to an understanding of the threat posed by extreme groups to constitutional rule and the need for their regulation.

---

<sup>4</sup> Implicit conduct may also serve as evidence, although in most cases even that has a linguistic origin as a corollary.



Everywhere, extremist views and actions are closely watched and sanctioned under criminal law, using the legal concept of organized crime and terrorism, whenever applicable. What draws the two philosophies together is the transparency of the Internet and the use of info-communication infrastructure extending to more and more areas of life. At the level of definition hate speech and crime will become increasingly difficult to distinguish and, in practical terms, the widespread documentation of racist opinions will result in a situation where the pronouncement of an “innocent” opinion may provide, at the individual or group level alike, ground for the legal classification of an incident occurring in time and space removed from the original statement. From the point of social research all this will complicate the study of events leading up to the commitment of hate crimes and the reconstruction of their socio-psychological and social “risk factors” that cause or facilitate the development of prejudices, create motivational force and the coordination of action that may eventually lead to physical violence.

In the present study we wish to present (1) international policy- and scientific definitions of hate crime and extremist violence; (2) international organizations’ data collection and data management practices and difficulties related to the study of hate crime; (3) the potential causal explanatory models of hate crime; and finally (4) the need to separate policies, politics and the problems facing social science research facilitating the operationalization of “vulnerable groups”.

## Definitions – European hate-crime models

The definition of hate crimes and extremist violence takes place in a steadily shifting regulatory environment, posing a challenge for international policy-institutions and scientific research as they attempt to gain a firm grasp of their subject. Our analysis of definitions is based on the 2012 FRA (European Agency For Fundamental Rights)<sup>5</sup> report, the RAXEN6 (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005) report and the OSCE7 (OSCE Annual Report, 2011) report and, to supplement the above, the Hate Crime-report8 (Making hate crime visible, 2012) also sponsored by FRA. In addition, the Council of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights play a central role in the criminalization and definition, registration and presentation of hate crimes. While in the early 2000s the term ‘hate crime’ was one of many tools for grasping racist and discriminative acts, by 2012 it became the central concept for the criminalization of racism.

In 2005 the Raxen-report still took a position supporting the separation of “racist violence” and more specifically “hate crimes” arguing that the term “hate” homogenizes the disparate experiences of victim groups, and diverts attention from routine and everyday race crime that cannot be adequately described in terms of “hate”. The report considered hate crime applicable primarily to far-right extremist groups, as opposed to “ordinary” young racist criminals where hate tends to be a less significant motivation in the

---

5 Annual Report 2012, Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 2012

6 Racist Violence 15 EU Member States, ‘A Comparative Overview of Findings’ from the RAXEN National Focal Points Reports 2001-2004, April 2005

7 Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region: Incidents and Responses, Annual Report for 2011

8 Making hate crime visible in the European Union: acknowledging victims’ rights, 2012

commitment of a violent act. The report accepted the use of “hate crime” as a powerful and general term in the jurisprudence of European states to criminalize a variety of race-based crimes and violence. At the same time, aside from the surveillance and regulation of far-right movements in a more limited sense and the legislation of anti-discrimination civil and criminal law provisions serving to protect minorities, it established the term as the third anti-racist pillar in the European legal arsenal used for the legal sanctioning of racist violence and crime based on race, ethnicity, religious affiliation, gender, disability or sexual orientation (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005:45).

For the first time, the OSCE used the term ‘hate crime’ in 2003 at a meeting of ministers in Maastricht. Today, the OSCE-report covering a number of countries is no longer concerned with issues of terminology. However, from the point of the American-Anglo-Saxon model the report defines hate crime, used as the highest and only category, as consisting of two component parts: a case of ordinary criminal act and the perpetrator’s deliberate biased motivation (OSCE Annual Report, 2011:13). The report makes a distinction between ‘hate crime’ and ‘hate incident’, where, the motivation notwithstanding, the latter either doesn’t reach the tolerance threshold of criminal law or in the given state the action does not qualify as a criminal law case (OSCE Annual Report, 2011:14). In respect to motivation and based on member state reports, the OSCE-report makes a distinction between prejudice based on ethnicity/origin/minority, religion, race/skin, sexual orientation, citizenship, gender, language, disability, trans sexuality and other prejudice categories (OSCE Annual Report, 2011:17). FRA’s Hate Crime-report clearly defines hate crime as a key category, simultaneously positioning it squarely in the European hate crime model and distinguishing it from the Anglo-Saxon model.

Essentially, in FRA’s definition ‘hate crime’ is part of the human rights concept resting in part on the legal interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights and in part on Council of the European Union’s Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. The ECHR case study rests on Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulating that rights defined in the Convention shall be guaranteed without discrimination as to sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. In addition, the Court sees a guarantee for protecting sexual orientation based on provisions in Article 14.36 (Making hate crime visible, 2012:16, 18). Based on the Court’s rulings, the report defines the concept of hate crime as an act motivated by prejudice where the term ‘hate’ simultaneously stands for discrimination and humiliation, and due to its special biased motivation ‘discrimination’ differs from a simple and often justified act of “differentiation” (Making hate crime visible, 2012:19). Moreover, hate crime as a phenomenon points beyond a singular perpetrator-victim relation, or extremist and marginalized social groups, and affects the rights of specific people on three levels: at the individual, group and global social level. First, these acts violate the human dignity of individuals, second they define perpetrator or victim categories and, third, as structural relations they fundamentally violate the principles of the rule of law, and the foundations of a pluralistic and democratic social system (Making hate crime visible, 2012:19, 24). The Court’s precedent rulings

stipulate that in the case of violent incidents state authorities have the duty to unmask any racist motive, placing the burden of proof on public prosecutors (Making hate crime visible, 2012:17).

Based on the Council's decision two categories of offender behavior must be distinguished. Pursuant to sections 1(a) and 1(b) of the decision publicly inciting to violence or hatred directed against a group of persons or a member of such a group qualifies as a crime. This definition assumes deliberate intent on the part of the perpetrator. In respect to other actions motivated by prejudice or hatred, the framework decision offers two options for member states: racist motivation may be considered an aggravating circumstance or result in a more severe sentence (Making hate crime visible, 2012:25) although in these forms of criminal actions deliberate intent cannot always be proven, i.e., these must be seen as borderline hate crimes. While the decision only mentions discrimination based on race, color, religion, descent or national or ethnic origin, a number of member states criminalized additional racist motivations, such as anti-Semitism and disability-based discrimination, etc. At the same time, the report notes that lumping a wide range of discrimination cases into a comprehensive and abstract category may not be useful because target groups may have different requirements regarding protection. The report identifies incitement to hatred as the "core" of all hate crimes (Making hate crime visible, 2012:26) thus shaping the European regulatory model for hate crime. In short, the European model differs from the American one by emphasizing a single key hate speech case and from there it criminalizes a wide range of physical and non-physical acts. The American model identifies several common criminal cases as standard hate crime categories and then, recognizing motivation based on language, it criminalizes a wide scope of hate speech as part of previously identified hate crimes. One of the distinguishing features of the European model is the limited 'visibility' of hate crime in the eyes of the public or the justice system. According to the report, when criminalizing basic crimes the majority of European countries, instead of changing penalties clearly demonstrated in statistics, assign racist motivation to specific cases as an aggravating circumstance. However, official crime statistics primarily register leading crime categories and sentences and not the aggravating circumstances, not to mention that police reports and court procedures are liable to pay less attention to racism reduced to a mere "circumstance" (Making hate crime visible, 2012:27).

In their 2012 study, *Divided by a common concept? Assessing the implications of different conceptualizations of hate crime in the European Union*, Jon Garland and Neil Chakraborti point out that the authorities have failed to develop a standard hate crime definition at the international and the national level alike, at a time when in the wake of the economic crisis a variety of social groups are becoming victims in Europe. The authors attribute this in part (despite the efforts and definitions by international organizations) to the absence of a universal definition of hate crime, and in part to the definition of hate crimes through a policy of specific/select group identities. The Union's diverse judicial regulations and practices reflect some form of "victim hierarchy" where some groups receive extraordinary protection and recognition while other groups with less social capital are left without protection. Crime research has also actively contributed to the maintenance of this divisive and hierarchic definition by associating hate crimes to specific victim

groups and motivation types through the construct of sharply-defined identities (Garland-Chakraborti, 2012:38). Therefore, the authors recommend a new conceptualization of hate crimes in terms of “targeted victimization” along “vulnerability” and “difference” (Garland-Chakraborti, 2012:40). “Targeted victimization” allows for the protection of the identity of any individual, moving the hate crime debate from group-identities to the individual victim. While the “difference” of a person doesn’t automatically lead to his becoming a victim of harassment or abuse, it points to a “vulnerable condition” that carries the increased risk of becoming a victim. According to the authors, a reconceptualization of hate crime would allow the protection of individuals and groups, e.g., alcoholics and those suffering from mental illness, etc., typically not considered to be potential hate crime victims or who are victims affected simultaneously in their multiple identities. Perhaps more importantly, with the help of the concept of “targeted victimization” we will be able to conceptualize the general impact and dynamic of transnational regulation on the judicature of member states. The increasing range of hate crimes represents a shift from typical extremist groups and traditional victim groups to isolated incidents and victims. The inclusion of a wider range of motivations, i.e., attitudes lending themselves to discrimination, in the definition also opens the road before the protection of the “majority community”.

The definition-shift may be illustrated along the protected feature/identity – group-affiliation coordinate:



From the point of hate crime research, definitions are an important starting point as the various data types expanded with changing definitions in each country afford explanations of varying complexity.

An explanation of the aggression aimed at any member of society, including old people, those living with disability and Muslims, requires different conceptual and empirical tools than those describing the behavior of far-right groups threatening traditional minorities. It is also evident that international policy-trends require an increasingly complex understanding of society, also raising the question whether this is the responsibility of policy-makers or in this form that of social sciences.

## *Problems related to data collection and measurements conducted by international organizations*

Below we are going to summarize the major findings of the 2005 Raxen-report, the 2011 OSCE-report and the 2012 TE-SAT-report (EU Terrorism Situation, 2012).

While the Raxen-report still focused on racist violence, the OSCE-report already collected official, semi-unofficial and NGO data on hate crime in a number of European countries<sup>9</sup> (15 and 26), offering a description of national regulations and data-collection methods, as well as future policy-change proposals regarding the above areas and tailored to nation states. The reports' subject-specification also reflects the central role given to the expression and definition of 'hate crime' in the context of European anti-racist policies. The Raxen-report attempts to offer the widest possible frame of reference for the concept of racist violence, relevant data for the period between 2001 and 2004 and its regulatory environment. The report has three top priorities: the presentation of data and regulatory background by country, some form of country-specific and global interpretation of data, and recommendations for effective responses given to racist incidents by states and NGOs (including data collection). Data on 15 countries were collected through the RAcism and XEnophobia Network, renamed as European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the so-called National Focal Point, i.e., through specific, primarily NGO and national organizations. The extent and nature of racist violence is presented through official and non-official figures broken down by years and the given state's relevant crime classification. In addition, the report provides information on victims and perpetrators, where such data is available. Finally, country-chapters are closed with contextualized information on relevant political, judicial and policy changes.

The Raxen-report also provides a number of charts on European-wide indicators. Key comparative tables present official data for a given year, broken down by major offense categories corresponding to specific countries (e.g., Germany – extremist/extremist violent, xenophobe/xenophobe-violent and anti-Semitic/anti-Semitic-violent incidents). Another chart shows the annual trend-shift in racist violence by country. The rate of racist violence relative to the country's non-national (or minority) population is presented as an important achievement, although the low rate of this index is seen as the inefficiency of the applied data collection mechanism (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005:159). With this we have arrived at the difficulty of interpreting hate crime indicators and existing data. A special problem is posed by the diversity of methods used in national surveys, their changing (minority) subjects and different time frames (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005:64). The longitudinal comparison of official data within and between countries is hindered by a diversity in legal definitions, variations over time and changes in methodology (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005:58). Therefore, in respect to the presented data, the report comes to the major conclusion that official data sets published by specific countries cannot be compared, and claims that in way of compensation the use of victim-survey data, social science surveys and NGO-reports may be suitable (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005:59) (In light of the problems described above, its recommendation may be have questionable value.)

---

9 Members are not European countries.

The OSCE-report's main comparative data set presents data type (definition) on hate offenses by country, and the number of cases registered by the police, reaching prosecution or closed in a court ruling for the period stretching between 2009 and 2011 (OSCE Annual Report, 2011:23). The OSCE also refers to the constraint that due to the varying legal and criminal definitions applied by data-providing countries hate crimes cannot be adequately separated from other forms of intolerance, leaving no room for a comparative study of the available data (OSCE Annual Report, 2011:21). In a departure from the RAXEN-report and aside from referring to the same problem, the OSCE-report no longer deals in depth with the issue of incommensurability. The 2012 FRA report also refers to the incommensurability of country-specific data and, at the same time, it is satisfied with tracing the variance in data to differences between national data collection methods. Subsequently, the report summarizes official reports by member states on incidents motivated by racism/xenophobia, anti-Semitism and extremist crimes (Making hate crime visible, 2012:181). The FRA-report publishes four major data sets regarding the countries under review: on (1) racist crime, (2) anti-Semitic crime, (3) anti-Muslim crime and (4) far-right extremist crime trends by numbers and within countries for the period between 2006 and 2011 (Making hate crime visible, 2012:183,186,187). The report supplements this data with its own presentation national and international organizational (EU, ECHR, UN) institutional and legal regulation issues, as well as its data-collection methodologies (OSCE Annual Report, 2011:9-38).

According to the 2012 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, while between 2009 and 2011 terrorist incidents and the number of arrests have clearly decreased in EU member states, far right violence, the major contributor to radicalization, has reached a new level in Europe<sup>10</sup>. Cross-border cooperation between right-wing groups, often including violent acts, is on a steady rise, which is accompanied by the growing virtual presence of terrorist and extremist groups on the Internet (TE-SAT, 2012:6). In respect to the perpetrators of hate crimes, both the 2005 RAXEN report and the 2012 FRA report emphasize that the majority of racist crimes and violence cannot be tied to extremist groups (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005:xii, FRA Annual Report, 2012:189). Based on the Minorities as Victims of Crime report also published in 2012 and the 2008 *The European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey*<sup>11</sup>, FRA concludes that only 1-13% of those committing racist attacks or threats can be tied to far-right/racist gangs, the highest numbers being represented by Turkish and Roma victims (13 at 12%, respectively) (Minorities as Victims, 2012:13). In short, despite the prevalence of extremist (right-wing) ideologies, access to the Internet and group organization, based on the available (apparently reliable) data, the majority of race crime perpetrators are not affiliated either with extremist groups or committed to established ideologies and, instead, their motivation is typically fed by an ad hoc diffusion of hostile and racist components (FRA Annual Report, 2012:189). At the same time, one should not underestimate the appeal of extremist ideas spreading through the Internet, for the world wide web has become the primary means of communication for terrorist and extremist groups, equally suitable for the radicalization and recruitment of

---

10 The report includes indicators only for terrorist acts, while extremist groups are referred to only through case descriptions.

11 In face-to-face questionnaire interviews in all 27 European Union (EU) Member States, in 2008 EU-MIDIS surveyed 23,500 immigrants and people with an ethnic minority background.



individuals (TE-SAT, 2012:6). In fact, the lines between terrorists, extremist and organized crime networks are becoming increasingly blurred, making it more difficult to explain these phenomena. According to the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, there is no single factor providing an explanation for radicalization and also there is no consensus how violence by radicalized individuals can be predicted (TE-SAT, 2012:32).

In their major conclusions the RAXEN-report, the OSCE-report, the 2012 FRA report and the Hate Crime Report all agree that the lack of data does not mean that no such offenses are committed in a given state, or that the surfeit of data is due to a broader definition of a specific regulation, the more effective identification, registration and reporting of hate crimes and not the result of higher crime rates. The reports also agree that racist violence cannot be separated from a society's general racist and discriminative practices in all areas of life. In other words, racist violence/victimization/discrimination in any sphere of life can only be described and interpreted as part of a racist "continuum" (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005:62). The OSCE-report adds to this that racist incidents reaching public attention may have negative and positive influences on public perception. OSCE region countries have all experienced a number of shocking crimes triggering policy decisions (OSCE Annual Report, 2011: 38) while hate crimes committed by members of the majority community in "reaction" to crime committed by minority groups can easily result in a broader escalation of racist violence threatening minorities (OSCE Annual Report, 2011:39). Racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic ideologies and propaganda materials clearly contribute to the societal proliferation of hate crimes (OSCE Annual Report, 2011:40). Increasingly, certain components of extremist ideologies are becoming part and parcel of intolerant discourse and the overall mainstream discourse throughout Europe. At the same time, racist and xenophobic attitudes are based less and less on ideas of biological or "traditional" supremacy, and instead are replaced by a rejection of minority cultures and an emphasis on the inability of Roma and Muslim people to assimilate into the majority society or the threat they pose (FRA Annual Report, 2012:189).

### *Measurement problems related to international surveys*

The definition and measurement of various discrimination indicators is a priority for both the EU and the UN, although in practice this has only been implemented in some key areas (e.g., gender inequality) or regarding minorities (e.g., Roma). In respect to ethnic discrimination of major concern historic constitutional provisions hinder efficient data collection, although the Union authorizes indirect and anonymous data collection (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005:53). The accessibility, use and international comparison of data available on hate crimes are made difficult by a number of factors. Essentially, this data is characterized by a great deal of latency (under-reporting and under-recording) both on the part of victims and the authorities. The success of data collection greatly depends on whether the state collects data on national/ethnic minorities, whether criminal law sanctions race-motivated offenses and whether member states recognize racist violence as a social problem (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005:vii). Further obstacles in the way of data gathering are tied to the quality of official and non-official organizations' criminal justice and other monitoring instruments. While specific reports provide large amounts of data, aside from the number of reported cases or the country's data collection, management

and classification system, it is evident that at the international level the recording of racist hate crimes has reached an impasse. The data-problem is complex and extends to national and international levels.

In the international arena there is clear evidence for a highly comprehensive and intensive policy-improvement in time and space alike, involving general awareness of discrimination, as well as civil rights and criminal law, simultaneous to a reform of national and international legal regulations, institutions and (legal) practices. However, using the available data neither the effectiveness of policy-making nor the European proliferation/extent of the measured phenomena can be estimated, even as reports regularly rely on comparative charts based on incommensurable data, creating the impression of a “flood of data”. As informative as the reports may be, paradoxically from the point of countries’ policy-description the topic is “under-researched”. The distribution of official and NGO data on hate crime is extremely uneven in the Union. While in East-South-Eastern Europe there is a dearth of information, in some states of North and Western Europe, for instance in France or Germany, one finds analyses running thousands of pages on the topic of prejudices, xenophobia and racist violence. In these cases international reports resort to data compression. For instance, the French Ministère De L’Intérieur’s 400-page 2012 report on xenophobia, anti-racism and anti-Semitism, a publication analyzing different aspects of hate crimes, was truncated and condensed, with some exaggeration, to a single “case number”. In reality, the reports referred to the above did not sufficiently research the phenomenon in certain European regions and did not assess the huge volume of longitudinal data<sup>12</sup> and analyses in the proper context. From this point the problem is not incommensurability, but the fact that no one sees the potential in existing research at the European level,<sup>13</sup> making it all but impossible to claim that adequate and reliable data on hate crime is missing. The problem of data reduction also sheds light on the practical side of incommensurability. For the decade-long complaint over a lack of common bases does not in fact constitute a theoretical difficulty, but simply points to a de facto absence of functional comparison. All things considered, the database on hate crimes at the European level is at an impasse right now: (1) the data are invalid, aggregate data by country homogenize all cases and behavior, and we have no idea of the actual value of certain data sets; (2) the data cannot be compared from country to country; (3) as a consequence of all the above, no causality analysis can be performed in the international arena. From the point of causality explanation, the fundamental unreliability of data is at least as problematic as the lack of commensurability. For instance, it doesn’t help us if we know that in Austria the number of hate crimes declined in 2011 (OSCE Annual Report, 2011:183) when based on a case-by-case analysis it turns out that the incidence of hate speech or a number of offenses against migrants actually increases. In the first instance a media research, in the second an in-depth research focusing on the welfare system would have to be performed to identify the underlying causes. Based on the useless empirical

---

12 While latency may be high and case numbers relatively low in some countries, cases descriptions can be highly detailed and use multiple variables.

13 A systemic and comprehensive knowledge of core countries’ data files is simply missing – it would not require the consolidation of anything and, in fact, differences and similarities would be informative, although these efforts founder on international organizations’ own homogenizing and reductionist category systems.

data of the above reports it is difficult to say what new data would be required as we have no clear picture even of the existing data files; what items can be compared, where they differ and on that basis what new data is required to supplement and correct what we already have. Below, we shall review different attempts at explaining hate crimes.

### *The explanatory models of hate crimes*

The RAXEN report is the only one ready to undertake a comprehensive account of hate crimes, making a distinction between micro-mezzo- and macro level explanations. While the other documents cited take an in-depth look at the international, national policy and social context of such incidents, they make no real attempts to develop comprehensive explanations, perhaps due in part to the inadequateness of data for international comparison and statistical analysis. Before turning to the conclusions of the 2005 report, it may be worth summarizing various types of theoretical explanations relevant to the topic with the help of a study by Green et al. Hate Crime: An Emergent Research Agenda (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001) that later may also serve as a guide for interpreting the findings of supplementary empirical research presented below. Green makes a distinction between two fundamental types of causality analysis, the individual-psychological and social approach, emphasizing that the diverse definitions of hate crime provide a basis for different explanation types. Individual explanations focus essentially on identifying the psychological motivations behind the act, which can be described as an explicit psychological orientation or convictions activated by specific situations lurking in the background (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:484). In contrast, macro-sociological explanations aim to define a broader social, economic and political context leading to individual acts. As the longitudinal psychological observation of specific individuals – and as it turns out later, the establishment of causality based on attitude-surveys – involves significant difficulties, the majority of theoretical explanations attempt to grasp the causes of hate crimes at the community level. The authors distinguish six general categories used to explain such acts. (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:485).

Approaches based on psychological traits aim to identify psychological causes behind criminal acts because the dominant definitions of hate crime take the perpetrator's hostility towards the victim as a foregone conclusion. This school simultaneously associates and explains these acts with extreme forms of criminal acts in agreement with Allport's conclusions, who traced a wide scale of discriminative behavior to stereotype-based affective disorders (frustration, projection and paranoia, etc.). Various theories of the authoritarian personality try to establish perpetrators' standard personality profile, although based on attitude-research analyses individual traits are not sufficient for an explanation because only a small percentage of authoritarian individuals commit these kinds of crimes (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:485). Aside from the causes of individual prejudices, "social psychological explanations" also try to identify the underlying conditions of these violent acts. Some of the models trace individual acts to small-group dynamics where violent attitudes proliferate under group pressure or in response to group norms, acts becoming extreme or conformist – empirical studies have demonstrated the role of these dynamics primarily in connection to white racist groups. Other approaches, primarily European research, look at the interaction of psychological orientation and broader social factors, more specifically the causal effects of electronic and print media. Accord-

ingly, the media representation of various hate crimes may not simply result in a proliferation of criminal acts (obviously through example) but may also directly trigger such acts through the presentation, distribution and legitimization of stereotypes involving target groups. The media's secondary causal effect is seen in the dissemination and reinforcement of statements involving popular stereotypes and promoted by political forces and politicians (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:486). The "historic-cultural" school studies the impact of political discourse on commission, although in this case, due to the historic perspective, the deliberate, short-term manipulation of discourse cannot actually be considered. The explanation based on political discourse and culture posits hate crime in the light of long-term (*longue durée*), all but "immutable" cultural traditions and behavior patterns. While the authors believe that so far the culturalist approach has yet to offer convincing causal connections, it has proved to be useful in grasping the radically and consistently differing crime rates of societies with similar social structure (e.g., in comparing hate crime trends in the USA and Canada) (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:486). The sociological approach traces its origin to Durkheim's a modernization theory, associating crime with the criminal actions and aggression of young populations exposed to rapid social changes. One version of the sociological theory was tested specifically in post-communist countries where social organization is undergoing radical change, claiming that the perpetrators of crime are mostly modernization's collective or individual losers, i.e., socially unintegrated individuals and members of tight-knit communities "threatened" in their existence.<sup>14</sup> A broader explanation is offered by the "globalization model" focusing attention on marginalized, poorly educated and easily identifiable migrants emerging in different, primarily developed countries (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:487). "Economic theories" explain this social anomie not with the disintegration of social relations but with frustration-transference and group competition for resources generated by economic difficulties. According to the so-called 'realistic group conflict theory', hostile behavior can be traced to a gap in the economic power of diverse groups. The authors indicate that the theory is in need of empirical fine-tuning regarding the areas of competition (jobs, housing and education, etc.) and status that may potentially motivate these groups to commit crime. The question is whether a dominant group occupying a higher rung in the social hierarchy is more prone to launching a preemptive strike (defending territory) against a weaker group occupying a lower status, or whether it involves action on the part of a ruling elite on the verge of losing its dominant position. In this process one must already look at the role of political elites and articulate interest groups in the concentration and mobilization of structurally inherent frustrations<sup>15</sup> (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:488).

One finds a slightly broader exposition of the competitive group theory in the "dominant structures" model. In a modern society aspects of work, power, sexuality and culture coalesce into a formidable structure that automatically assign the individual's place in society, and hate crime simultaneously serves the perpetrator's norm-based identity and

---

14 The wave of xenophobic attacks against foreigners sweeping over former East Germany in the period following 1991 one is a recurring point of reference.

15 For instance, instead of instigating direct violence, extremist political movements may play a more important role in taking extremist views to the public and construing frustration as a legitimate public cause, as we have seen in Jobbik's Roma-communication.

the victim's departure from the norm (Roxell, 2011:202). While this formula may better fit in crime typology's ever-expanding definition framework, in and of itself the central role attributed to identity does not offer many novelties.

Finally, the "political theories" of hate crime study the mobilization of grievances, whatever their origin might be (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:488). According to political explanation relying on the theory of social movements, instead of the perpetrator's real or perceived grievances related to the victim, the determining factor is the "political opportunity structure" that eventually justifies the offense. This implies the existing of forums and means suitable for the expression of personal grievances (obviously also structured by society and groups), legitimizing the expression of prejudices in public and in political discourse and the (weak or strong) probability of hate crime prevention and criminalization. The "opportunity-structure" may lead to a number of mutually contradictory and empirically studied conclusions. In respect to political organizations, on the one hand the absence of organizations articulating extremist views in mainstream political discourse may lead to the escalation of violence, and on the other hand the presence of extremist politicians and organizations may focus passions and kindle violence<sup>16</sup>.

In respect to the opportunity-structure one should not forget about the feebleness of the institutional environment (police, prosecution, courts, etc.) its distant, indifferent and potentially conniving racist role, including the behavior of the political elite. At the same time the authors emphasize that while the opportunity-structure fundamentally has a "liberating" effect, support from the political elites is instrumental in reinforcing the phenomenon<sup>17</sup> (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:489).

The fundamental conclusion of the RAXEN-report and, on the whole, of all other subsequent reports is that perpetrators are typically young men, members of extremist political organizations, as well as individuals not affiliated with any organizations of that kind. On the one hand, the above statement is so general as to be irrelevant,<sup>18</sup> and, on the other hand, one wonders in what explanatory context it may acquire meaning. The role of extremist groups in committing hate crimes can be analyzed based on almost any explanatory model dealing with group structure. And "lonely perpetrators" can be associated with individual or communal anomie in modern societies caused by globalization or economic hardship, and the failure of traditional social integration and socialization mechanisms. At the same time, comprehending the situation is made more daunting by the fact that the adequate-identity political approach needed to understand group-level processes is difficult to square with another aspect of modern social "anomie", with large

---

16 In connection to the Roma murders in Hungary, one cannot ignore Jobbik's discourse and the effect of extremist organizations of the type of the Hungarian Guard that radicalized public life.

17 The relationship between the political-opportunity structure and the elites is complex, for the elite is simultaneously part and facilitator of the structure, at times the preventer of racist incidents materializing as an effect of the structure.

18 Young men are responsible for many incidents in a given society, and the identification of perpetrators belonging to or not associated with extremist groups covers the entire community.

action-coordinating systems mediated by impersonal media that through their political and economic regimes are capable of maintaining social order essentially without the use of violence<sup>19</sup>.

After that, explanations provided by the RAXEN-report can be easily fitted into one or the other approach categories referred to above. According to the report, some ethnic confrontations can be tied to so-called global conflicts, where an ethnic conflict occurring in one country resurfaces in the same communities of other countries, as we have seen in connection to the 9/11 terror attack or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict when Muslim and Jewish communities were attacked in a number of European Union member states. (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005:180). The explanatory logic of global conflict presupposes a similar relationship maintained by the affected country's victim group vis-à-vis the majority community and the demarcation of identity, i.e., some form of structural equivalence between countries, where a global information-flow creates a causal relationship between structures. The other phenomenon covered by the report has to do with the general fear of "outsiders" – based on Eurobarometer and ESS surveys cited by the report – the perceived level of crime associated with minorities and a general security deterioration felt by members of the majority community. The "crime perception" explanation attributes hostility to minorities in part to images communicated by the media, and in part to the lack of contact between minority and majority groups (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005:181). In other words, the logic of the perception theory explains "hostility" to victims by the psychological state of potential perpetrators (insecurity, proclivity for projecting), the media representation of minorities (and its personal interpretation) and the nature of interaction with minorities. In addition to the explanation of the previously mentioned specific phenomena (the two global conflicts and the findings of attitude surveys) the report makes a distinction between theoretical-explanatory models at three levels.

Major theoretical explanations look at meta-, i.e. racist violence (1) in terms of competition for limited resources, (2) the rising numbers of minorities (primarily migrants)<sup>20</sup>, (3) the existence of far-right groups and their overall effect on young people, and finally (4) country-specific racist subcultures (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005:183-185). The explanations based on the national or mezzo-level may examine locally (1) the specific cultural context (the support/rejection of aggression in the community, or the relevance of the exact time and place of violence) or (2) the criminological context (opportunities for committing crimes, criminalization, the vulnerability of victims) (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005:186-187). Meta-level explanation types have already been mentioned, and the mezzo-level can be somewhat synchronized with Green's "political opportunity-structure" classification. Micro-explanation is based on perpetrator's personal traits; more specifically, the majority of young perpetrators were typically characterized by unemployment or poorly paid work requiring few qualifications, low skills and criminal records (RAXEN Annual Report, 2005:189). When it comes to an analysis of individual perpetrator profiles,

---

19 In modern mass societies, compared to population size order is maintained by relatively few law enforcement agents, i.e., in itself, order cannot be explained by that state's power monopoly and, despite the atomization of individuals, the system works smoothly (which means that aggression also cannot be unequivocally reduced to general anomie).

20 The report questions the overall validity of the explanation in relation to offenses committed against small minorities.



the lack of context continues to pose a problem. In and of themselves they can be used to explain few or too many phenomena and acquire their causal and predictive function only in the causal mechanism of more detailed models.

As a supplement to the report findings, we refer to two and then four studies worth mentioning. The first ones provide additional information on explanatory models, the latter ones on groups at risk, showing the type of data applied in the analysis of crime data, their effectiveness and limitations.

Lyons' 2007 Community (Dis)Organization and Racially Motivated Crime study essentially tested the major explanatory models described in the summary of Green et al. in the context of a Chicago residential community, namely social disorganization or anomie, the economic competition-model and the protected community concept<sup>21</sup>. The study analyzed the effect of the organizational conditions of these geographically isolated communities on hate crimes seen against whites and Afro-Americans; in other words, in respect of the above models it took into account the macro-level group-organization of victims and perpetrators alike. In the course of the operationalization of social anomie the study devoted equal attention to neighborhoods with little social and economic capital and affluent areas with access to more resources to keep outsiders out (Lyons, 2007:816). The relevance of the latter is that typically criminological and sociological explanations focus exclusively on disadvantaged communities, assuming that due to economic hardship, ethnic diversity and a high rate of population fluctuation these communities are less and less capable of controlling their members, paving the way for impulsive and biased behavior patterns (Lyons, 2007: 819). Lyons operationalized the social capital based on the community introduced by Sampsons et al., using "collective effectiveness" mediating between economic conditions and crime. Two components of "collective effectiveness" are constituted by (1) social cohesion and trust, and (2) and informal community control standards tied to the community's sense of security and overall crime prevention. Accordingly, effective communities (especially in respect to youth) are characterized by a high level of formal supervision/discipline and, in respect to problems pointing to potential criminal activities, by the ability to intervene effectively. (Lyons, 2007:820). The study makes the assumption that ethnic-based economic competition for scarce resources is a result of modern societies' ethnically segmented market and economic structure. However, specific problems arise when the established economic equilibrium is disrupted and members of otherwise relatively isolated economic segments are forced to engage in face-to-face status-competition (economic-ethnic niches come into direct contact). Therefore, it is not sufficient to measure market players' average (ethnically/racially neutral) economic status; only group-specific economic status can fully grasp economic tensions affecting ethnic groups. Similar to the anomie model, the economic-ethnic model posits a negative correlation between an ethnic group's economic status and hate crime (Lyons, 2007:822). With the "protected community" model there is less emphasis on economic assets and more on the protection of a specific community identity and lifestyle from dangerous "outsiders" in relation to residential mobility (Lyons, 2007: 822-823). Relative to all the above, the model posits an indirect

---

21 Earlier I have not discussed the "protected communities" model, developed by Green as a potential synthesis of explanations listed by him. Lyons also refers to Green.

correlation between economic status and hate crime; the rising number of incidents is more characteristic of economically prospering, collectively more efficient communities (Lyons, 2007:823). Lyons used the number of hate crimes committed against whites and Afro-Americans in Chicago between 1997 and 2002 and the average crime rate as a dependent variable, and population figures between 1990 and 2000 (population numbers, ethnic composition, average economic status, ethnic economic status, economic inequality, migration mobility) as an independent variable, as well as social cohesion and informal social control-scale figures based on a special survey of a residential community (Lyons, 2007:831). The analysis' smallest geographic unit is demarcated by police precincts. Based on the research's novel findings, crime against African-Americans and whites differ in a number of important aspects. Crime committed against Afro-Americans are typically committed by communities with a relatively high level of organization, more access to economic resources and higher informal control, primarily by residential communities threatened by Afro-American mobility (Lyons, 2007:847). Moreover, thanks to their level of organization these communities have managed to keep crime rate under control, i.e., hate crime rates are clearly distinguishable from general crime. All this raises the question of "specialization" in crime aimed at Afro-Americans; perpetrators are distinguished from the majority by racist motivation and not a general disposition to commit ordinary criminal offenses (Lyons, 2007:848). In contrast, hate crime aimed at whites are committed in poor communities characterized by significant population instability and a pattern of crime more in tune with traditional forms of crime committed in the area. As a consequence, from a criminological point hate crime committed against whites can be traced to more complex causes and motivations where, for instance, simply looking for financial gain stands out. The picture becomes more complex when one considers that in many cases attacks against whites are in response to crimes against African-Americans (Lyons, 2007:848). In short, based on the research (social) community anomie and disorganization are suitable for explaining incidents against whites, while crime against Afro-Americans are characteristic of communities less affected by crime. One of the important direct lessons of the research is provided by a breakdown of statistically usually aggregated crime figures by victim groups and a demonstration of the need for the development of victim-group-specific explanations (Lyons, 2007:848). In respect of Europe, the position of migrants attempting to assimilate into developed welfare systems and domestic communities with access to resources through the lowest and marginalized social segment of the labor market, and the place occupied by domestic minorities in the majority community's status-hierarchy and territorial division provide much food for thought. The research has demonstrated the problematic nature of "context-free" general demographic indicators, because the "protected community" model may actually explain why middle class, affluent "lonely" individuals, with no criminal record and no ties to extremist groups, living in tight-knit communities, commit crime on occasion.

In this case risk factors are also present, but instead of at the level of individual traits, at the community level, making causality even more complex and oblique.

While Allison Harell's 2010 *Political Tolerance, Racist Speech, and the Influence of Social Networks* analysis is not concerned with hate crime, it makes important observations concerning the relationship between young people's social contacts and the acceptance

of politically rejected groups. She relied on the work of Harell Mutz, who demonstrated that individuals exposed to ethnically or racially heterogeneous networks/political diversity developed skills needed to manage heterogeneity that, in turn, having an impact on the individual, increased the recognition of political rights related to previously rejected political groups (Harell, 2010:728). The research studied Canadian high school students' acceptance of rejected social groups' freedom of speech in the context of network heterogeneity. Based on an explanatory logic developed in the course of earlier laboratory experiments, among participants with equal social status networks can positively affect inter-group attitudes through cooperative contacts. At the same time, the analysis also points to the problem of causality between networks and attitudes: the complexity of an individual's network is as much a result of his/her attitude to social diversity as it is the cause of the latter (Lyons, 2007:729). Put differently, attitude has a causal effect on the development of person's relationships, while the nature of these relationships as an environment has an impact on the attitude itself. The first causal development can be explained more or less as part of a conscious decision and the second evolves more on a functional basis, while the circular causal mechanism as a whole determines tolerance for (or hostility to) rejected groups. The research processed Canadian Youth Survey 2005-2006 data, where the dependent variable consisted of the rejection/acceptance of five rejected groups' freedom of expression, and the independent variable was the respondents' strong or weak affinity to ethnic or race-heterogeneity (Lyons, 2007:731). Based on the findings, young whites with heterogeneous networks were more likely to support peaceful rallies by rejected groups or the presentation of their views on television. In contrast, racist groups' tolerance for expression of opinion decreased with the heterogeneity of their network (Lyons, 2007:736). The research demonstrated the testing limits of similar studies; surveys focusing on the coexistence of social groups through static indicators (e.g., based on geographic location) are unable to directly measure genuine interaction between groups and can only conjecture about its existence.<sup>22</sup>

## Findings and recommendations

In respect to data available on hate crime it can be stated in general that their distribution is highly uneven across the continent, with core countries contributing significantly more data than the periphery. However, the lack of publicly available databases in the most developed nations is also a problem because the narrative format of their published reports, often running several thousand pages, do not lend themselves to an overview and analysis of the available data. The horizontal and hierarchic information flow between national and international organizations collecting, managing, publishing and analyzing data represent a European-wide problem.

While international reports discussed in detail above, often providing up-to-the-minute information, contain a large volume of data, international organizations have failed to develop a standard data collection and data management strategy.

---

22 Internet-based research may be able to change this, provided that the true identity of individuals can be established.

OSCE may be the only one with a transparent system; it requests national data from data providers using its own questionnaire and uses these to organize and present information through its own analyses. However, for all practical purposes national contact organizations with a solid knowledge of local data sources and data types only perform reporting needed for international organizations, which means that they do not publish crime data they manage and register and also fail to provide information on domestic data sources. If not a single official or civil organization volunteers to coordinate all these sources and data, in many countries a number of institutions collect data on hate crime in vain.

In the international arena FRA and other international organizations have been publishing reports covering the entire Union for about a decade, although they continue to face data collection problems, reporting a shortage of data from countries that for years have been engaged in longitudinal data collection on hate crime. International organizations are even less familiar with local data managed by civil organizations or their usefulness in identifying extremism throughout Europe. At the national level information sharing between government and civil organizations is another problem; in general, civil organizations rely on official statistics, while the official institutional system rarely takes advantage of resources offered by the civil sector. As a result, at the national level – the main source of data going to international organizations – the collection of data on hate crime is primarily in the hands of the state agencies. In respect to the “East-West slope” the latter statement can be fine-tuned by pointing out that in countries further to the west data collection by official organizations is more dominant, while in periphery countries the monitoring activities of local civil organizations play a more important role in supplementing official data. Interestingly, in the case of large international human rights organizations, e.g., ENAR,<sup>23</sup> Statewatch<sup>24</sup>, etc., the “slant-effect” does not apply; even in developed Western countries the civilian control and correction of sophisticated official data works effectively. General experience shows that official data collection focuses on criminal cases in a more limited sense, and the background on the broader context of these incidents is provided by civil organizations. The hierarchical approach described in the theoretical chapter, putting more emphasis on studying selected groups, is particularly true of European countries’ data collection practices. Aside from an analysis of particular victim groups, official reports taking a look at the broader context of hate crimes are primarily focusing on the unmasking of far-right, far-left and terrorist scenes, i.e., for the most part, they describe the conditions of violence with organizational and group backgrounds. Philosophically and empirically alike a hierarchic approach hinders the understanding of ordinary racist violence with no affiliation to extremist ideology or groups. Despite the problems enumerated above, in respect to hate crimes European policy-making has led to the emergence of similar analytic and statistical meta-categories in various countries. Country-specific data differ primarily along concrete hate-crime situations, although the attribution of biased motivations to traditional criminal acts as an aggravating circumstance carries the same meaning everywhere. Categories used to present data are similar in all countries with case numbers broken down by factual circumstances and motivations, and basic information is supplemented contextually with data on the crime scene,

---

23 <http://www.enar-eu.org/>

24 <http://www.statewatch.org/>

i.e., its time, target and group organizational aspects. The monitoring of groups usually establishes the number of organizations, their membership, organized events and ideology. Obviously, despite a correspondence between meta-categories, crime data from different European countries cannot be compared without a clarification of the various case definitions underlying these categories.

Based on the above it can be concluded that in Europe there is a dearth of adequate commensurable empirical data either to account for hate crime or to set demarcation criteria for “endangered” groups. In respect to “endangered groups”, instead of specific empirical data, the development of new indicators should be based on nationally available data categories. The problem may be traced in part to the fact that we are facing a dynamically changing institutional and legal environment producing a flood of European data essentially changing year-after-year. On the other hand, a power- and policy-based approach classifies varied social and psychological phenomena under a few legal provisions and a single generic concept – for an understandable reason from the point of power and the legislature – while the problem grasped by such a policy does not necessarily coincide with the phenomenon lending itself to scientific research. It is also questionable whether a single major phenomenon can be the posited leading to the development of a single comprehensive explanation.

Effective research requires the separation of hate crime policy- and political science interpretive levels, because the criminalization of different acts, patterns of behavior and groups at the global level results in their classification as a single abstract category. One can conceive of three alternative solutions for data management and research. First, estimating latency and improving already available crime data, and making it more commensurate are obvious options. Second, existing crime data can be supplemented with other databases’ economic-demographic data, although this may result in a theoretically less focused analysis with a fundamentally demographic logic and a shifting center. Third, we can also develop new research projects producing more specific indices needed to explain the phenomenon, using existing data files, if necessary. In addition, it may be useful to link data on hate crime to information available on overall discrimination and its practical aspects; there is a large accumulation of the latter and criminal acts can also be interpreted as part of ordinary discrimination. All research strategies could benefit from a comparative pre-screening of national data to provide, in part or in full, access to internationally or at least regionally applicable data.

## AVAILABLE DATASETS ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The RAXEN report is the only one ready to undertake a comprehensive account of hate crimes, making a distinction between micro-, mezzo- and macro-level explanations. While the other documents cited take an in-depth look at the international, national policy and social context of such incidents, they make no real attempt to develop comprehensive explanations, perhaps due in part to the insufficiency of data for international comparison and statistical analysis. Therefore, it may be worth summarizing various types of theoretical explanations relevant to the topic with the help of a study by Green et al., *Hate Crime: An Emergent Research Agenda* (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001) that later may also serve as a guide for interpreting the findings of supplementary empirical research presented below. Green makes a distinction between two fundamental types of causality analysis in identifying vulnerable groups: the individual-psychological and social approach (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001). Individual explanations focus essentially on identifying psychological motivations behind the act, which can be described as an explicit psychological orientation or convictions activated by specific situations lurking in the background (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:484). In contrast, macro-sociological explanations aim to define a broader social, economic and political context leading to individual acts. The authors distinguish six general categories used to explain such acts. (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:485).

The approach based on psychological traits makes an attempt to identify psychological reasons behind the commitment of crime. Major definitions of hate crime, based on the assumption that perpetrators harbor hostile feelings towards their victims, take the relevance of this consideration for granted. This approach associates and explains these acts with extreme prejudice in the context of Allport's conclusions, who traced a wide range of discriminative behavior to affective disorders (frustration, projection and paranoia, etc.) tied to stereotypes. While theories related to authoritarian personalities try to develop the perpetrators' standard personality profile, based on an analysis of attitude-research personality traits, this is insufficient for an explanation. For only a small percentage of individuals with an authoritarian streak commit these crimes (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:485).

Aside from individual prejudices, socio-psychological explanations also try to identify the circumstances leading to violent behavior. Some of the models trace individual acts to small-group dynamics where violent attitudes proliferate under peer pressure or peer values, making members extremists or susceptible to such behavior patterns. Empirical studies have demonstrated the relevance of these factors in white racist groups. Other approaches, primarily European research projects, looked at the correlation between psychological orientation and broader social motivating forces, more specifically the causal effect of the electronic and print media. Accordingly, the media presentation of various hate crimes may not only lead to the proliferation of such acts (by way of providing examples) but may also act as a direct motivating forces through the presentation, promotion and legitimization of stereotypes associated with potential victim groups. The



media's secondary causal role is seen when it disseminates and reinforces the statements of political forces and politicians building on existing stereotypes (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:486).

The sociological approach traces its origin to Durkheim's a modernization theory, associating crime with the criminal actions and aggression of young populations exposed to rapid social changes. One version of the sociological theory was tested specifically in post-communist countries where social organization is undergoing radical change, claiming that the perpetrators of crime are mostly modernization's collective or individual victims, i.e., socially unintegrated individuals and members of tight-knit communities "threatened" in their existence.<sup>25</sup>

A broader explanation is offered by the globalization model focusing attention on marginalized, poorly educated and easily identifiable migrants emerging in different, primarily developed countries (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:487). "Economic theories" explain this social anomie not with the disintegration of social relations but with frustration-transference and group competition for resources generated by economic difficulties. According to the so-called 'realistic group conflict theory', hostile behavior can be traced to a gap in the economic power of diverse groups. The authors indicate that the theory is in need of empirical fine-tuning regarding the areas of competition (jobs, housing and education, etc.) and status that may potentially motivate these groups to commit crime. The question is whether a dominant group occupying a higher rung in the social hierarchy is more prone to launching a preemptive strike (defending territory) against a weaker group occupying a lower status, or whether it involves action on the part of a ruling elite on the verge of losing its dominant position. In this process one must already look at the role of political elites and articulate interest groups in the concentration and mobilization of structurally inherent frustrations<sup>26</sup> (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:488). The historic-cultural school studies the impact of political discourse on the commission of crime, although taking the long view. This explanation posits hate crime in the context of long-term (*longue durée*), all but "immutable" cultural traditions and behavior patterns. While the authors believe that at this point the culturalist approach has yet to offer convincing causal connections, it has proved to be useful in grasping the radically and consistently differing crime rates of societies with similar social structure (e.g., in comparing hate crime trends in the USA and Canada) (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:486).

Finally, the political theories of hate crime study the mobilization of grievances (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:488). According to political explanation relying on the theory of social movements, instead of the perpetrator's real or perceived grievances related to the victim, the determining factor is the "political opportunity structure" that eventually justifies the offense. This implies the existence of forums and means suitable for the expression of personal grievances (obviously also structured by society and groups), legitimizing the expression of prejudices in public and in political discourse, as well as the

---

25 In the text there is repeated reference to the wave of xenophobic attacks following unification with East Germany after 1991.

26 For instance, from this point instead of socialization for direct violence, extremist political movements may play a more important role in taking extremist views to the public and construing frustration as a legitimate public cause, as we have seen in Jobbik's Roma-communication.

weak probability of hate crime prevention and criminalization. The “opportunity-structure” may lead to a number of mutually contradictory and empirically studied conclusions. In respect to political organizations, on the one hand the absence of organizations articulating extremist views in mainstream political discourse may lead to the escalation of violence<sup>27</sup> and, on the other hand, the presence of extremist politicians and organizations may focus passions and kindle violence<sup>28</sup>.

In respect to the opportunity-structure one should not ignore the feebleness of the institutional environment (police, prosecution, courts, etc.) its distant, indifferent and potentially conniving role in racism, including the behavior of the political elite. At the same time the authors emphasize that while the opportunity-structure fundamentally has a “liberating” effect, support from the political elites is instrumental in reinforcing the phenomenon<sup>29</sup> (Green-McFalls-Smith, 2001:489).

Lena Roxell's study (Roxell, 2011) specifically looked at registered hate-crime accomplices and specialization in such crimes. The study points to problems in the official registration of crime and the resulting limits to research (e.g., victims are more likely to report serious rather than minor incidents of crime, and crime committed by foreigners<sup>30</sup>) (Roxell, 2011:206). It all suggests that important hate crime types are missing from official data and may only be studied through other means, i.e., research conducted with victims. Based on international studies, one can also question the reliability of the definition of crime motivation. After studying 2976 hate crime incidents registered in the USA between 1997 and 1999, Levin and McDevitt found that 66% of the committed crime was motivated by “sensationalism”, 25% by self protection, 8% by revenge and only 1% of the perpetrators “wished to save the world” from undesirable groups (Roxell, 2011:203). In the case of young offenders researchers have usually found prejudices harbored against a number of minorities. In their case, a high level of intolerance was associated with parents' poor education and low social status, troubled family life and, at the personal level, by restlessness, aggression and the lack of empathy, as well as poor school performance. (Roxell, 2011:202). These circumstances are also used as a vulnerability factor in criminal behavior. Roxell's own research focused on xenophobe, anti-Islam and homophobe attackers registered by the Swedish police in 2006, charged with assault, threats and molestation, with special regard to accomplices and specialization in hate crimes (Roxell, 2011:198, 205). The available data on offenders covered age, gender, past criminal records and involvement as an accomplice (Roxell, 2011:199). Research findings show

---

27 This was one of the possible explanations for a wave of violence against foreigners in the newly unified Germany in the 90s.

28 In connection to the Roma murders in Hungary, one cannot ignore Jobbik's discourse and the effect of extremist organizations of the type of the Hungarian Guard that radicalized public life.

29 The relationship between the political-opportunity structure and the elite is complex, because the elite is simultaneously a part of and promoter of the structure, or perhaps the preventer of racist incidents caused by the structure.

30 Although based on most criminological data and research the offenders are usually “strangers”, according to the author this largely depends on the definition of “strangeness”. For it is possible that while there is no personal acquaintance between the victim and the offender, some offenders included in the study live in the same neighborhood as the victim, went to the same school or worked at the same place (Roxell, 2011:201).

that the overwhelming majority of the offenders were men known to the majority of their victims.<sup>31</sup> Although most of the crime committed in 2006 was xenophobic in nature, the perpetrators of crime against homosexuals had the lowest average age and 55% of the suspects were repeat offenders, there is no significant difference regarding the age, gender or criminal record of those committing a variety of criminal acts. The committed crimes are associated almost exclusively with “lone offenders” showing no sign of specializing in hate crime (Roxell, 2011:212).

Marshall H. Medoff uses the rational decision theory to analyze the economic/demographic factors motivating hate crime (Medoff, 1999). Medoff starts with the assumption that the level of hate crime decreases with a rise in (1) market income, (2) the value put on time, (3) age and (4) the fight against crime (Medoff, 1999:959).<sup>32</sup> For the most part, the findings have supported the underlying hypotheses. Hate crimes have a negative correlation with the unemployment rate, the percentage of the 15-29 age group in the total population, the given country's liberal attitudes and the level of education. A negative correlation was seen in relation to the level of market income. At the same time, the intensity of law-enforcement and religious beliefs had no significant effect on hate crime, just as urbanization, low employment status, social mobility showing a downward trend, all considered to be typical causes behind hate crime, were not seen as major contributing factors either (Medoff, 1999:970). Of all the findings, the correlation between a liberal ideology and high level of education with the number of crime incidents requires further elucidation. According to the economic theory, the cost of producing one unit of hate crime is the lowest in liberal states with the most tolerant attitudes, for in these states the identification of potential victims is easier and marginal costs for offenders are the lowest. A higher level of education similarly contributes to the identification of criminal acts: those with more education (states with such population) usually express more tolerant and liberal political views. (Medoff, 1999:967).

Matt E. Ryan and Peter T. Leeson studied the empirical correlation between the existence of extremist groups and hate crime in the United States (Ryan-Leeson, 2011). The research compared the number of hate groups (e.g., KKK and neo-Nazis) identified by the Southern Poverty Law Center with the FBI's Hate Crime Statistics state-by-state indicator for the period between 2002 and 2008. A number of demographic and economic variables were used in the research<sup>33</sup>, in part as control and in part as independent variables (Ryan-Leeson, 2011:257). The research tested the “frustration-aggregation” thesis, postulating that people experiencing economic difficulties take out their frustration on defenseless social groups (Ryan-Leeson, 2011:255). The selection of demographic indicators relied on past observations, according to which urbanization is conducive to crime, the incident of hate

---

31 Although in only 30% of the cases could the offenders even be identified.

32 The social-economic data came from the Statistical Abstract of the United States 1996 and the U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Reports 1996, and hate crime figures were based on FBI Uniform Crime Reports 1995 database (Medoff, 1999:871).

33 Economic variables include unemployment rate, the number of those living under the official poverty line and the gross state product per capita (GSP). Demographic variables: the percentage of urban residents, the percentage of Afro-American and Jewish minorities, the percentage of those abused under the age of 18. Official demographic data for the period under review come from the Statistical Abstract of the United States database.

crime is directly related to the size of minority populations and people subject to abuse as children are more likely to become criminals (Ryan-Leeson, 2011:257). The findings did not offer proof for the conclusive role of either extremist groups or economic/demographic factors in the commitment of hate crimes. The number of extremist groups did not or barely showed a significant correlation with the level of hate crime. As predictive indicators, economic factors indicated but a weak correlation, while demographic indicators could not be used for this purpose at all (Ryan-Leeson, 2011:262). In light of Medoff's paper referred to above, it is interesting to see the weak predictive effect of general economic and demographic variables on crime. However, it is clear that research by both Ryan and Medoff demonstrate the effects of certain economic indicators, although urbanization, the percentage of minorities, social status and mobility, typically identified as major causes of crime motivated by racism, do not appear to be significant. Moreover, even the role of specific factors (e.g., religion, education and political attitude) may be interpreted only at the organizational level or in a broader social context.

Research looking at the underlying causes of violence in Western European and political violence also turned to the rational decision theory to uncover economic factors. An analysis by Raul Caruso and Friedrich Schneider compared data<sup>34</sup> from 12 countries for the period between 1994 and 2007 (Caruso-Schneider, 2011). Simultaneously, the authors tried to uncover "factors creating opportunities for terrorism over the long term" and the brutality of these acts (Caruso-Schneider, 2011:37). Their economic explanation placing the concept of opportunity cost<sup>35</sup> in the center starts with the assumption that the number and brutality of terrorist acts (based on the number of those killed or injured in these acts) is determined by a negative outlook and a drop in present or future prospects for economic success. With this the "opportunity cost" of participating in a terrorist act decreases as the gap in profits from unproductive terrorism and productive activity becomes narrower (Caruso-Schneider, 2011:48). According to terrorism's economic "deprivation model", poverty and income inequality make deprived groups more frustrated, and make participation in terrorist acts "worthwhile" in their eyes. According to the "immiserizing modernization theory", economic development puts some social groups at a disadvantage, i.e., for them the "opportunity cost" of terrorism decreases (Caruso-Schneider, 2011:38). The authors took into account present (unemployment, inflation, productivity and the openness of the economy) and future variables (investment-rate and youth employment rate) influencing economic opportunities to explain the number of terrorist acts and the number of injured in such acts as independent variables, as well as political variables associated with terrorism based on professional literature (mandate fragmentation, the duration and consistency of policy and voter participation).<sup>36</sup> Based on the findings, the study of factors influencing terrorism resulted in the reinforcement

---

34 France, UK (incl. Northern Ireland), Spain, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Switzerland and Sweden.

35 The opportunity cost is a special cost; it is incurred when with the choice of a line of business we relinquish other equally profitable opportunities.

36 The data had been provided by the Global Terrorism Database, Penn world tables, Key Indicators of the Labour Market (ILO-KILM), the Polity IV and a Comparative Political Data Set III databases. Due to similarities in the countries' educational level, the research did not make use of education and educational attainment indicators that may also be linked to terrorism.

of the deprivation and the modernization theses alike. In the case of the deprivation thesis, strong negative correlation was found between economic conditions and the level of terrorism. For instance, a 1% increase in the GDP decreased terrorist acts by 1.64%, and a same increase in productivity decreased terrorism by close to 5%. The negative effects of modernization are indicated by a positive correlation between terrorism and investments (as expected future economic growth potential) and youth unemployment (as frustration pointing to the future). A 1% growth in GDP-rated investment is associated with 3% and a 1% rise in youth unemployment to 0.5% increase in terrorist acts. Interestingly, the fragmentation of parliamentary mandates among the parties, i.e., the fragmentation of the political system, is also positively associated with the number of terrorist acts (Caruso-Schneider, 2011:44). Factors responsible for economic growth also offer an explanation for the brutality of terrorism: according to the authors, in developed countries with a high rate of income terrorists also wish to be more effective and productive. The staying power of governments also shows a positive correlation with the brutality of terrorist acts. The authors maintain that in the case of durable and stable governance the brutality of terrorists may also increase in order to elicit more attention and support from the population (Caruso-Schneider, 2011:48). In short, the study's economic theses shed light on the effect of economic inequality on political instability and political violence.

## The measurement of political violence

While from the point of both fundamental and applied research measuring the acceptance of political violence is a salient issue, relatively little relevant information is available on the topic. It is of the essence if one considers that the measurement of propensity poses a number of methodological challenges. It is interesting to note, however, that although it is not easy to identify groups ready to accept violence (e.g., vulnerable to recruitment by extremist organizations), there are general tendencies that can be recognized regardless of the applied methods. Below we present the relevant findings of a survey based on a Hungarian representative sample (Konfliktusmonitor) and that of the 2008 European Values Survey.

### *Konfliktusmonitor database*

Based on a sample of 1011 responses to the statement, "Violence is acceptable if it serves a noble cause", we established two groups. 178 agreed with the statement (17.6%) and 589 rejected it (58.29%). Those placing themselves in the middle on a scale of five or declined to give an answer were left out of the comparison. The group agreeing with the statement included more men and people with less education than the group of those expressing their disagreement, although in respect of age there was no significant difference between the two. The distribution of answers showed the strongest relationship with the following statement: "I would rather be a prominent than a happy person". We also studied the relationship between the acceptance of violence and social dominance orientation (SDO). Based on the findings, the group accepting violence achieved a higher score on the SDO scale's social dominance sub-scale, although the difference is insignificant along the equality preference. There are fewer apparent differences in respect to

satisfaction with life and the assessment of family background. While the group accepting violence can be said to be more satisfied with life, they see the family as more rigid, rejecting and punishing.

One of the most interesting correlations is seen in relation to the scale measuring national feelings. Creating a single scale containing 20 items, we have found that the group accepting violence achieved a somewhat higher score in respect to national feelings. For an in-depth study of the correlation we subjected these items to a factor analysis dividing them in two groups: separating positive views of one's own group from negative statements related to the outgroup. While in respect to positive feelings related to one's own group there is no difference between those accepting and those rejecting violence, a negative perception of the outgroup is more characteristic of those accepting violence. The group accepting violence also differs from other respondents in the sample in such complex attitudes as the assessment of historical events. A classic and telling example is the group's attitude towards the Arrow-Cross party.

Looking at the group's socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics, the most important conclusion is that with the application of a single, not particularly strongly worded item, one might successfully identify a sub-sample holding slightly distinct opinions. Considering that the group accepting violence can be characterized with higher social dominance orientation, a more negative assessment of the outgroup, a stronger sense of mission, less accepting family background and, compared to the total sample, a unique historical understanding, one can state that these connections mostly known from qualitative research can also be demonstrated statistically. Also, it is an interesting intermediate result that the life satisfaction in the sub-sample referred to above is higher than that, in light of higher social dominance and a denigration of the outgroup, may refer to a measure of system-justification. However, interpretation of the cited findings is limited by two important factors. The first clearly apparent problem is caused by slight discrepancies found in descriptive statistics. However, publication is justified by the fact that these relations show a logically and substantively consistent pattern. The other special feature is that the interpretation of the findings would be greatly facilitated if the party preferences and political orientation of the respondents were known. However, such data is not available.

### *European Values Study*

The analysis below was based on the following statement in the 2008 European Values Study (EVS): "Terrorism under certain circumstances can be justified/must be always condemned/neither". We compared groups choosing the first or the second response option first in the entire sample and then, to identify potential differences between specific countries, in some sub-samples as well. Looking at socio-demographic backgrounds and based on the aggregate data of countries participating in the survey, there are more men and young people among those accepting violence under some circumstances than among those rejecting violence. The group that accepts terrorism considers work, family and religion less relevant, and looks at leisure and politics as more important. Accordingly, it shows more interest in politics and is more likely to discuss political issues. As for the level of political activity, members of the group show strong interest in all forms

of political activity (they have either already attended or would like to attend the listed political activities) The most pronounced differences is that they are less likely to oppose unofficial strikes or the occupation of a building/factory than the rest of the sample. The sub-samples also show the difference in respect to various political systems. Those more ready to accept terrorism are less opposed to a strong leader, rule by a technocratic government or the army.<sup>37</sup> In light of all the above, it is hardly surprising that they have less confidence in democratic institutions as well. We compared the distribution of responses to terrorism with opinions on immigrants (5 items in all), with marriage, religion, sexual orientation and abortion (20 items in all). The data show that the group more likely to accept violence under certain circumstances sees immigrants as less threatening, is more tolerant of them and, based on the other set of questions, has a generally more accepting attitude. This intermediate result justified a comparison of the two groups along a number of other variables considered to reflect traditional social values (e.g., cohabitation, attitudes on parenthood, the right of homosexual couples to adopt children). Additional studies have also demonstrated that in general the group accepting violence is more accepting and less tradition-bound.

Similar to the observations offered by the Konfliktusmonitor database, it is evident here as well that screening along a single item is already sufficient to perform certain basic analyses, although discrepancies seen in descriptive statistics are not spectacular here either. The profile of those more accepting of terrorism shows the outlines of a group more open to political topics and even specific actions, while more critical of the democratic system currently in place.

However, the reliability of these findings can be questioned on several counts, especially since the differences between the two groups cannot be said to be significant. It is conceivable that the observed differences come from the fact that those more accepting of violence are also less likely to follow social norms, i.e. social exigencies have less purchase on them.

Below, we show the differences between specific countries along the variables presented above. In the course of our analysis we focused on whether differences between specific countries can be shown along the factors related to the acceptance of violence. If the goal is the development of an internationally applicable measuring tool, this is an extremely important issue. The highest rate of respondents saying that terrorism was acceptable under certain circumstances was seen in Finland, Greece and Romania. Looking at attitudes towards immigrants, confidence in institutions, the overall "justifiability" of divorce, homosexuality and abortion, we saw the following results. In the case of Finland no significant differences were detected in respect to immigrants, although there were differences when it came to confidence in institutions and the "justifiability" phenomena listed above. Moreover, a higher level of political discourse can also be demonstrated. In Greece the two groups, those accepting and those rejecting violence, differ along the issues of immigrants, confidence in institutions and justifiability. Romania represents a marked exception; there is no difference between the two groups in respect to the perception of immigrants, the level of confidence in institutions or political discourse and,

---

<sup>37</sup> The biggest discrepancy was seen in respect to the army. 'Democracy' was the fourth alternative in the questionnaire.

in fact, of the three countries Romania is the only one where the power of the army is rejected by significantly fewer people otherwise accepting violence than in the other sub-sample.

Due to the political nature of the phenomenon under review these groups are worth comparing based on their political orientation and party preferences. The EVS database features the following variables on this topic: political orientation (left-right self-definition along a scale of 10), party preference and party preference converted to the left-right self-definition scale. In respect to ideological bent, two issues can be considered: its direction (right or left) and its intensity. If we assume that support for both left- and right-wing extremism goes hand-in-hand with an acceptance of political violence, it is reasonable to apply a so-called intensity scale that in practical terms means the recoding of respondents' original self-definition, where radical and moderate positions are positioned in the same place, regardless of their left or right orientation. Below we will present differences demonstrated with the help of the traditional left-right scale and party preference, as well as with the intensity scale referred to above.

In all four countries one sees a drift to the left by the group accepting violence, and the only difference is seen in the magnitude of the shift compared to the total sample. It is also interesting to note that while people put in the sub-sample typically place themselves in a more committed ideological positions (farther from the center) although not necessarily in extremist positions. In connection to the listed results one of the most important observations is that if one is to see clearly the reasons behind the acceptance of political violence, differences between specific countries must be taken into account. In other words, political activity in the given country and its relationship to democracy cannot be left out of the analysis and the interpretation of the results. The findings related to political radicalism must be treated with caution because, as has been shown in previous analyses, in general the sub-sample more accepting of violence can be characterized with more tolerant attitudes (presumably not independent of orientation).

### *Measurement problems*

The reported data and findings have demonstrated serious deficiencies when it comes to the targeted identification of individuals potentially supporting/committing political violence and the measurement of the acceptance of violence. However, in light of the above, some salient observations can still be made in respect to the applied methods.

The first question is whether it's worth calling the object of the measurement by its proper name. It may be reasonable to ask about the advantages and drawbacks of using direct wording. In the EVS database the featured item asks about a rather extreme sub-case of political violence. Due to the purported distorting effect of adhering to social norms, it may contribute to a situation where fewer respondents give an affirmative answer.<sup>38</sup> However, it may be useful if those not "petrified" by such wording are put in the same

---

38 In the case of a survey looking specifically at the acceptance of violence, the need may arise for the control of social desirability applied in some fashion. Professional literature offers a number of tools for the task, such as the lie-scale applied in Kruglanski's Need for Closure scale (1993) allowing the filtering of individuals trying to conform to norms in the extreme.



group, for this way presumably we end up with a sub-sample with more character. In turn, this makes future analysis considerably easier. The use of a wide open question leads to situation where, in some cases, so few people end up in a sub-sample as to make it unsuitable for developing conclusions supported by proper testing. In an earlier World Values Survey (WVS) database one finds a more general statement: *"The use of violence for political ends can never be justified"*. Provided that we accept the comparison of these two databases compiled at different times, it is evident that this wording elicited less resistance from participants for this time more people expressed their acceptance of violence (in this case answering 'I agree/I don't agree').

The Konfliktusmonitor questionnaire also uses a different language where, instead of political ends, the question refers to *"a noble cause"*. There is also a significant difference between the options made available to respondents. In the case of the EVS participants may essentially choose between answered questions, raising the problem that their wording may inspire respondents to give answers more in line with accepted standards. The WVS and the Konfliktusmonitor databases already operated with different levels of agreement with the statement, although there is an important difference here as well: in the case of the former the wording is in reverse and there is no median score (a 4- and 5-point scale). In the identification of vulnerable groups the role of factors indicating a correlation cannot be ignored under any circumstance. These may refine the prediction of readiness to accept violence by an individual. Starting with the simplest one, socio-demographic variables play an important role in this context. The role of various attitudes cannot be ignored either (e.g., political interest and political orientation). However, it is also extremely important to mention the ethical aspects of measuring. When interpreting the findings one must always keep in mind that the classification is based on answers given to a single item that does not automatically justify labeling some respondents as people "inclined to accept violence". A survey of this kind carries a great risk of stigmatization.

Overall, in the databases referred to above little role is given to personality traits examined in qualitative research. Thus, it is difficult to make the conclusion whether or not these are actually associated with the acceptance of political violence. However, a reliable interpretation of the findings definitely requires an attitude assessment related to "general" violence that, in turn, could serve as a kind of "benchmark" in the study of political violence. It is easy to concede that individuals with a higher level of aggression are more likely to give an affirmative answer to an item tied to political violence. Aside from the fact that relatively few people are included in the group of those showing more readiness to accept violence, it should not be ignored that this group is not homogenous either. The major difference is the social context itself: as it also became evident during the presentation of the findings, in each country the phenomenon may have a different attitudinal background. National or regional characteristics, such as the level of political activity or cultural differences expressed in commonly accepted standards, make a definite difference.

## Conclusions

Data from empirical analysis appear to reinforce earlier explanatory models and research findings on hate crime. In line with psychological, sociological and economic models, groups of those more prone to violence primarily include young people, people with economic and social handicap and mostly men. Factors leading to a development of an authoritarian personality also come into play both at the individual and the group level (e.g., a rigid family background, social dominance and hostility to outgroups). Support for strong leaders and the army, a lack of confidence in democratic institutions, an emphasis on national feelings and a higher level of political activity are all part and parcel of political rationale and mobilization. An alternative interpretation of historical events can be identified as a component of a "historical-cultural" mindset. At the same time, some items cannot be logically associated with a higher acceptance of violence in some groups. An example for this is the assessment of work, family or leisure time and, in fact, a more tolerant attitude towards immigrants, resulting in findings that defy expectations.

And with this we have come to one of the central conclusions of empirical analysis: the acceptance of political violence, the measurement of related attitudes and identification based on these findings does not mean that someone would actually commit such acts. Therefore, the definition of vulnerable groups and screening for predictive factors is possible only by considering additional social contexts.

Group-level measurement fundamentally assumes that micro-level individual attributes, conditions and attitudes come into play within the framework of micro- or mezzo-level families, various groups and institutions, even as at the macro level the given group's hierarchical or perhaps equal relation to other groups and the place it occupies in the social structure and the market, etc., remain determining. Groups and institutions offer the individual the immediate environment that, through tolerant or racist norms and behavior patterns, may fundamentally determine the expression of personal attitudes, their translation into action or the lack of peer groups, i.e., integration may contribute to the development of deviant behavior. An analysis of specific Facebook pages allows for the targeted identification of difficult-to-measure marginalized groups and individuals, for a search of politically motivated subjects particularly susceptible to hate crime. In turn, with a better understanding of the social context, the nature of these groups allows for a more comprehensive analysis of the findings.

The inclusion of the group represents a distancing from traditional explanations suggested by criminological data, for disorganized social strata at a lower level of socialization, emotionally-motivated individuals in a state of deprivation and beyond social control (whether individually or as members of a group) are predisposed to commit hate crime. As part of the findings, research taking advantage of community and institutional contexts may even arrive at conclusions that defy expectations (e.g., an interpretation of state statistics on a high level of education) and, in fact, from a criminological point may associate anti-specific factors (high status, income and no criminal record) with criminal acts that carry a predictive power only through collective mediation.

### Personal interviewing research

#### *Hungary*

##### **About the survey in Hungary**

The research was conducted in June 2014 by Ipsos Zrt., where interviewers conducted personal interviews in the homes of respondents. The sample was 1,000 individuals and represents the Hungarian adult population over the age of 18, taking into account gender, age, schooling and type of domicile. While the study has a statistical error of 3.1 per cent and in cases where the questions, instead of the entire sample, involved just a specific group of respondents, the margin of error is higher.

A more extensive set of questions applied in the Hungarian CAPI research allowed for a deeper analysis of the acceptance of political violence. Below, we shall look at the level of tolerance for violence in general and then take a closer look to see in what situations, to what extent and against which social groups people believe that the use of violence can be justified. Then we present factors explaining the acceptance of political violence. We take stock of various socio-demographic variables, political interests and activities, general views about democracy and party preferences. Subsequently, we look at various personality traits. We analyze the effects of specific prejudice types, such as anti-Roma sentiments, anti-Semitism, homophobia and xenophobia. Moreover, we give a close examination of the correlation between right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and the acceptance of political violence – categories widely used in professional literature.

#### **Political violence – general perceptions**

We measured general perceptions of political violence through three questions. In all cases we listed two propositions and asked respondents to indicate which of the two is closer to their opinion. The propositions are as follows:<sup>39</sup>

- Democracy and political violence.
  - Proposition 1: 'Regardless of the objective, in a democracy the use of violence is unacceptable.'
  - Proposition 2: 'If needed to reach important objectives, even the use of violence is acceptable.'
- The end justifies the means.
  - Proposition 1: 'The use of violence is not justified by any objective.'
  - Proposition 2: 'When it comes to objectives considered important by you, even violence can be used.'

---

<sup>39</sup> In the questionnaire questions did not follow the same order as to avoid automatic responses.

■ Support for terrorism as an extreme form of political violence.


Proposition 1: ‘Terrorism is to be condemned under all conditions, regardless of its justification.’

Proposition 2: ‘Under some conditions terrorism is the only means to express one’s political opinion.’

23 per cent of the respondents believe that to achieve important objectives the use of violence is acceptable even in a democracy. 20 per cent say that violence can be used for objectives they consider important. Views on terrorism are less tolerant: 12 per cent of the respondents believe that under some circumstances terrorism is acceptable.

### Tolerance for political violence

(%, *n* = 1000)



In respect to all three questions it was found that men are more likely to support violence. From the point of age, only attitudes to terrorism show a difference: young people, perhaps more prone to radicalism, consider it slightly more acceptable. The level of education is important only when it comes to views on the relationship between democracy and political violence: those with less education are much more likely to find the two compatible. The same can be said of urban residents, who also have a more favorable view on terrorism. Regional differences also presented interesting results: compared to the entire sample, more residents of the Northern Plain believe that in a democracy even violence can be used to achieve an important objective. However, when it comes to terrorism, people living in central Hungary express more tolerant views. While 30 per cent of the sample lives in this region of Hungary, within the group supporting terrorism they

account for 46 per cent. It is important to note that this is not due to residents making up the majority of those living in the region for they are less likely to be accepting of terrorism. Considering all free variables, clearly Jobbik sympathizers are the most likely to support violence. While 18 per cent of those with a party preference are Jobbik voters, within the sample the number of these voters saying that violence is compatible with democracy comes to 28 per cent, those agreeing that violence is justified to achieve certain ends 25 per cent, and those accepting terrorism 30 per cent. Fidesz voters, with the exception of terrorism, the assessment of which is average within their ranks, are markedly against the use of violence in the other two cases. Voters with other party preferences think that terrorism is unacceptable under any circumstances.

**Acceptance of political violence by party preference**  
(in per cent)


	Fidesz sympathizers (n = 362)	Jobbik sympathizers (n = 123)	Sympathizers of the other parties (n = 202)	Whole sample (n = 1000)
Regardless of the objective, in a democracy the use of violence is unacceptable	73	50	68	69
If needed to reach important objectives, even the use of violence is acceptable	22	39	23	23
missing data (does not know, did not answer)	5	11	9	8
The use of violence is not justified by any objective	77	57	67	72
When it comes to objectives considered important by you, even violence can be used	19	32	24	20
missing data (does not know, did not answer)	4	11	9	8
Terrorism is to be condemned under all conditions, regardless of its justification	84	72	87	82
Under some conditions terrorism is the only means to express one's political opinion	13	22	8	12
missing data (does not know, did not answer)	3	6	5	6

‘Justifiable’ ends

Here we asked respondents to what extent they believe that violence is acceptable to achieve specific objectives. In the list of potential situations, where one’s family is threatened stands out: in this case close to half the respondents (47 per cent) say that violence is justified and only 24 per cent reject that option unequivocally. When it comes to the other objective related to personal life, when the respondent’s livelihood is threatened, the rate of those for and against violence is 31 and 36 per cent, respectively. In case of more abstract political objectives, support for violence committed in defense of the nation and personal freedom is exceedingly high. In the first case 39 per cent support and 29 per cent oppose violence, while in the latter case these figures stand at 35 per cent and 34 per cent, respectively. The use of violence receives the least support when it comes to inequality reaching unacceptable levels in society and the threat of natural resources, although it must be noted that even here the rate of support comes to 29 per cent.

The justification of violence in different situations

(% and average on a 1–5 scale, n = 1 000)



In short, there are many who believe there are situations where violence is justified. One third in the sample (32 per cent) believes that violence is unacceptable in all the above situations and an additional 12 per cent would support violence only in one case. Of course, while acceptance is not the same as action, it can be assumed that those supporting violence in some situations are more liable to commit violence, or in the case of violence are more likely to offer moral excuses for themselves and others.

The position taken on the above situations is less dependent on the respondent's socio-demographic background.<sup>40</sup> In all cases the conclusion is that men are more likely to justify violence than women. With the exception of the Hungarian nation and the environment, this is also the case for younger people. Those living in larger settlements hold similar views, except when one's livelihood is threatened and citizens are repressed.<sup>41</sup> On the whole,<sup>42</sup> men, young people, those with fewer financial means<sup>43</sup> and residents living in areas with higher population are more likely to believe that in order to reach certain ends violence can be justified.

## Hostile groups

We also examined which social groups respondents felt that the use of violence is acceptable against. Opinions on this subject are significantly more diversified than what we have seen in reactions to other cases. An exceptionally large percentage of the people believe that the use of violence is justifiable when it comes to terrorists (63 per cent) and criminals (47 per cent). Above we have seen that support for violence was exceptionally high when the Hungarian nation was perceived to be in danger. This is reflected in

---

40 We studied correlations through linear regression, taking into account the respondent's gender, age, education, financial position and place of residence. While the models are relevant in all cases, the percentile explained by independent variables nowhere reaches 5%.

41 In the listed cases age and settlement type have no significant effect.


42 The composite index based on these variables has been created primarily through principal-component analysis. The index emerging as a result of weighted totals derived from variables in the course of the principal-component analysis retains the largest possible amount of information content, not to mention that the information loss can be quantified. The method has the further advantage that with the help of communality attached to variables one can examine what percentage of the variable spread is retained by the main component, i.e., whether the specific variable belongs to the measured dimension. We have applied the widely accepted rule of thumb: communalities must come to a minimum of 0.25, and the retained information content to at least 33%. In our case, the minimum communality was 0.618 and the retained information content 72.9%. Subsequently, with the help of weights established with main components we created an index whose size equaled that of variables measured on the original, five-grade Likert-scale.

43 Respondents' financial position was measured with the help of an index based on durable goods in the household (e.g., personal computer/laptop, car and digital camera). This was made necessary by the high incidence of refused answers concerning variables measuring income, as well as problems related to the reliability and validity of these variables. We created the index with the help of the so-called z-Score model that, instead of simply adding up the number of durable goods in one's possession, also weights it with a number of durable goods at one's disposal. As a result, common consumer goods have a lower weight and smaller and rare ones a higher weight in the financial index.

the fact that 40 per cent of the respondents would support violence against traitors and enemies of the nation. The same number of respondents feels that violence is justified against radical left- and right-wing groups (28 per cent).

### The justification of violence against certain groups

(% and average on a 1–5 scale, n = 1000)





Hungarian society's strong anti-Roma attitude is demonstrated by the 29 per cent acceptance of violence against this group. Respondents were more likely to justify violence against drug users than against homosexuals (35 and 14 per cent, respectively). In light of other research which suggests a high degree of homophobia in Hungary, the latter figure is intriguing and may suggest that while respondents condemn homosexuality, in this case they consider the use of violence inappropriate. We found similar attitudes towards authoritarian leaders threatening democracy (26 per cent), banks (25 per cent) and politicians (23 per cent), as well as towards multinational companies (18 per cent) and Jews (16 per cent).<sup>44</sup>

Essentially, support for potential violence against various groups does not depend on the respondent's socio-demographic characteristic: in most cases none of these applied variables account for respondent attitudes.<sup>45 46</sup>

## Violent action

In the political activity block in the questionnaire, to be discussed in more detail below, some of our questions related to particularly violent actions, so we include them here. It holds for all of these that only a negligible number of respondents (1 per cent) committed such acts, and the vast majority, four-fifths in all cases, would never consider committing such acts at any time.

It can be stated that on the whole<sup>47</sup> men are more likely to accept violent action. We also studied the attitudes of those who find the use of violence justifiable against certain objectives or groups. While each variable on its own has an effect on the studied attitude, the first variable contains the second variable's explanatory power.<sup>48</sup>

---

44 Later, during an examination of correlation between variables, we saw that this is not a coincidence.

45 Attitudes to homosexuals have been the most dependent on the respondent's socio-demographic background; however, even here the rate explained by the model came to only 4%. Such attitudes were more acceptable by men, those in a dire financial situation and residents of small settlements.


46 To help later analyses we established a composite index to measure to what extent the respondent considers the use of violence acceptable against specific groups. Here as well, we primarily applied the main-component analysis. We left out questions related to criminals, terrorists and homosexuals because, even though their communality exceeded 0.25, the fact that it consistently fell short of that of other variables (0.461; 0.344 and 0.44, respectively) clearly suggested that it does not constitute part of the given dimension. In the case of the main component created with the remaining variables the smallest communality came to 0.513, and the retained information amount 64%. Subsequently, with the help of weights established through main components we created an index whose size equaled that of variables measured for the original, 5-grade Likert-scale.

47 To measure violent civil political activity we established a composite index. The Cronbach alpha value came to 0.878. In establishing the measure we weighted differently the respondent's answer to the question: 'can you imagine participating or have you already participated in violent action?'. Activities supported by fewer respondents were given more weight. Due to a high frequency, this had little relevance here, although later we used the same method when we asked about general political activity.

48 We studied the correlation of variables through a linear-regression analysis. We included the following variables in the model: the respondent's gender, age, education, financial position and type

## Violent civil political action on the part of respondents

(per cent, n = 1 000)



We also asked to what extent the respondent accepts these attitudes from others. Respondents were found to be more accepting when it involved the majority. This is especially true when someone turns to violence when his or her livelihood is at stake: 3 per cent of the respondents find this acceptable in all cases and an additional 15 per cent under certain circumstances.

On the whole<sup>49</sup> the acceptance of violent action is more common among those believing that violent action for certain objectives and against certain groups is justifiable, and both variables have their specific effect.<sup>50</sup>

---


of residence, the acceptance of the use of violence under some conditions and against specific groups. The percentile explained by the model is 6.9%.

49 To measure violent civil political activity we established a composite index. The Cronbach alpha value came to 0.921. In establishing the measure we gave a different weight to respondents' answers to the question: 'can you imagine participating or have you already participated in violent action?'. Activities supported by fewer respondents were given more weight.

50 We studied the correlation of variables through a linear-regression analysis. In the model we included the following variables: the respondent's gender, age, education, financial position and place of residence, the acceptance of the use of violence under some conditions and against specific groups. The percentile explained by the model is 7.7%.

## Tolerance for violent civil political action

(per cent, n = 1 000)



At this point of our study we turned to the analysis of background variables that in our assumption may have an effect on the acceptance of political violence, and thus may help us in drawing the profile of individuals highly susceptible to supporting violence.

## Political attitudes

### *Political interests, civil political activity*

Slightly fewer than one third of the respondents showed interest in politics: 27 per cent showed some interest and 4 per cent showed a great deal of interest.


Respondents' demographic characteristics have little influence on political interest. Generally speaking, men, the elderly, residents of larger settlements, those with higher level of education and the financially better off show more interest in politics.<sup>51</sup> Those more tolerant of violence in certain situations or against specific groups are characterized by stronger political interests.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>51</sup> We studied the correlation of demographic variables through a linear-regression analysis. The included variables accounted for 9% of the heterogeneity in the political interest variable.

<sup>52</sup> In respect to the acceptance of violence in some situations, the value of the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.125, and in respect to the acceptance of violence against specific groups 0.104.

## Political interest

(n = 999)




The questionnaire contained a number of questions trying to find out respondents' attitudes to various forms of civil political activity.

It is clear that a small percentage of respondents have already participated in one of the listed activities. The largest number (8 per cent) are those who have already collected or signed petitions, while in respect to the other activities actual participation fluctuates between 1-3 per cent. The number of those who, while not having engaged in such activities in the past, do not rule out that possibility in the future shows significant variations. It is important to note that participants believe it is important whether a strike or demonstration is unlawful. In the latter case the percentage of those who had actually participated in such events has dropped by one half or one third, while those contemplating such action has halved. In this set of questions there are two items that come close to the definition of political violence: first, the vilification of a corrupt politician, even in his/her presence and, even more directly, pelting or hitting a corrupt politician. Tolerance for these actions is also extremely low.

On the whole it can be stated that<sup>53</sup> the question of one's political activism is fundamentally determined by one's political interest: those more interested in politics are significantly more active. In addition, we also found that men, young people, residents of larger

<sup>53</sup> To measure violent civil political activity we established a composite index. The Cronbach alpha value came to 0.922. In establishing the measure we gave a different weight to respondents' answers to the question: 'can you imagine participating or have you already participated in violent action?'. Activities supported by fewer respondents were given more weight. Variable distribution shows strong accumulation hubs. The most important one is that 54% of the sample has never been engaged and has no plans to engage in such activities.

settlements, those with more education and those in a better financial position are more likely to have engaged or plan to participate in such activities. However, in respect to gender, place of residence and schooling this outcome is more directly mediated by financial position and political interest, i.e. men, residents of larger settlements and people with more education are typically better off and show more interest in politics, in effect making them more active.<sup>54</sup> Those more accepting of violence in certain situations and against specific groups are politically more active.<sup>55</sup>




54 We measured the effects of the included variables with the help of correlation, partial correlation and linear regression. Variables included in the regression model accounted for 14% of the heterogeneity of the civil political activity variable.

55 In respect to the acceptance of violence in some situations, the value of the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.233, and in respect to the acceptance of violence against specific groups 0.159.

In respect to the above set of questions we also asked respondents to what extent they find others’ attitudes acceptable.

Relative to activism measured at the individual level, it is evident that the order of level of acceptance and political activity is very similar. In respect to issues the respondents find socially more acceptable, they are most likely to have engaged in and would not rule out participating in such activities in the future. At the same time, levels of acceptance and activity are significantly different from each other. Essentially it can be concluded that the discrepancy is the most frequent at the individual level, fluctuating between 14–17 per cent. In the case of less frequent occurrences the difference is 5-7 per cent (unauthorized strikes and roadblocks represent some exception, where the discrepancy is somewhat larger).



Looking at social acceptance in its entirety<sup>56</sup> we found that political interest is the most relevant factor: the politically more active also consider various political activities more acceptable. The other variables affect attitudes to civil activity quite similarly to those above, with two differences: first, there is no differentiation between men and women in this regard. Second, the effect of the type of settlement one lives in on the attitudes to civic activity is significant in this case. It is also understandable that those living in larger settlements are more likely to think that, regardless of all their other demographic features, others consider these forms of activities more acceptable. Here as well, the effect of schooling is reflected in one's financial position, i.e. those with more education consider these activities more acceptable because they are in a better financial position.<sup>57</sup> Those more tolerant of violence in certain situations or against specific groups are more likely to think that others are politically more active.<sup>58</sup> This variable correlates somewhat better than the variable measuring one's own political activity.

### **Concept of democracy**

On the whole, respondents consider it important to live in a country ruled by democracy (a 1–10 scale average of 7.75). At the same time, the majority tends to see the current state of the country in a negative light and many think that its current governance cannot be described as fully democratic (6.15), and human rights are not adequately respected (6.03). Essentially, general opinion on the state of democracy in Hungary is barely affected by respondents' demographic features. The only notable exception is that those living in larger towns or cities are stronger in their conviction that living in a democracy is important.<sup>59</sup> However, there is a correlation between the acceptance of the use of violence and opinion on the current state of democracy in Hungary. Those who believe that Hungary is less democratic and perceive that human rights are curbed find violence more acceptable.<sup>60</sup>

---

56 To measure violent civil political activity we established a composite index, again giving a different weight to respondents' answers to the question: 'to what extent do you support the specific activity?'. Activities supported by fewer respondents were given more weight. Variable distribution shows strong accumulation hubs here as well, 43% of the sample would not accept any such activity. In this case, the Cronbach alpha index was 0.947.

57 We measured the effects of the included variables with the help of correlation, partial correlation and linear regression. Variables included in the regression model accounted for 14% of the heterogeneity of the civil political activity variable.

58 In respect to the acceptance of violence in some situations, the value of the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.264, and in respect to the acceptance of violence against specific groups 0.186.

59 The correlation is relatively strong, the value of the standardized regression coefficient (beta) is 0.19, and its significance is 0.000.

60 The value of the Pearson correlation coefficient is  $-0.169$  when it comes to views on the state of democracy relative to the acceptance of violence in some situations, and  $-0.099$  relative to the acceptance of violence against specific groups. In respect to the enforcement of human rights it is  $-0.143$  and  $-0.133$ , respectively.

## ***Elections and party preferences***


Two-thirds of the respondents believe that voting is a basic requirement to be exercised in all cases. This rate is somewhat higher than the 62 per cent that went to the polls in the 2014 parliamentary election. The perception of the importance of voting is fundamentally a function of education: those with higher education are much more likely to say that the right must be exercised. While 62 per cent of those with the lowest education agree, when it comes to those with a high school diploma or a degree the rate climbs to 76 and 91 per cent, respectively.

68 per cent of the respondents named a party they would vote for if elections were held this Sunday. An additional 5 per cent, while expecting to go to the polls, do not know which party they would vote for. 17 per cent would not go to the polls and one in ten respondents declined to answer the question.

37 per cent of the respondents would vote for Fidesz (54 per cent of those with a clear party preference), 12 per cent for Jobbik (18 per cent), 8 per cent for MSZP (Hungarian Socialists Party, 12 per cent), 3 per cent for DK (Democratic Coalition, 5 per cent), 3 per cent for LMP (Politics Can Be Different, 4 per cent) and 2 per cent for Együtt-PM (Together – Dialogue for Hungary, 4 per cent).

### **Party preferences**

*(százalék, n = 1,000)*



Compared to the average, among Fidesz voters there are more women, those with less education, those financially worse off, and people living in small villages. Among Jobbik supporters men, young people and those with vocational training are overrepresented. Interestingly, it cannot be concluded that they are in a dire financial situation, leading to




the observation that the party can convince a lot of voters with vocational education, specifically those who are better off within this class. Jobbik supporters are more evenly distributed by territory. Our data also reflects tendencies seen at the elections, namely that Jobbik is no longer popular only in the most deprived regions of the country where there are large Roma populations. Essentially, the feature of other parties<sup>61</sup> is shaped by the features of MSZP voters, the largest group in the category. These voters come mainly from the elderly living in Budapest and those with high school diplomas.

An examination of the attitudinal background shows that the real difference lies between Jobbik and other party voters. The exception is represented by a perception of the state of democracy in the country and the enforcement of human rights, and the fault line clearly runs between pro-government and opposition voters. On the other hand, Jobbik sympathizers show more interest in politics, are significantly more active in political life and express more tolerance for political violence.<sup>62</sup>

**Prejudice**

***Anti-Roma attitudes***

In our research we measured anti-Roma attitudes applying a strong proposition. We asked respondents to what extent they agreed with the statement that Gypsies are born criminals. Over half the respondents (58 per cent) agree with that statement to some extent. 11 per cent did not respond.



61 In correlation analysis, due to low item numbers, aside from Fidesz and Jobbik voters, we were forced to aggregate the supporters of other parties.

62 They are more accepting of civil political action on the part of others, but only because they are also more deeply involved in such activities.

On a four-grade scale the average index of anti-Roma attitude is 2.77. Overall, men and those with vocational training tend to be more anti-Roma. In terms of territorial distribution, we found that anti-Roma attitudes are more common among residents of medium-sized cities, as well as those living in the Northern Plain and Central and Western-Transdanubia regions. This – a relatively new phenomenon – has been clearly demonstrated at the 2014 parliamentary elections in Jobbik's performance, the party whose supporters are significantly more anti-Roma than the average population.

### **Anti-Semitism**

We gauged the level of anti-Semitism using seven items.<sup>63</sup> Of these, six measured to what extent the respondent believed in Jewish world conspiracy.<sup>64</sup> The propositions were as follows:

- Jews tend to extend their influence on the global economy;
- Jews often operate in secret, behind the scenes;
- Jews sometimes meet secretly to discuss issues important to them;
- Jews aim to dominate the world;
- Jews want to have a decisive voice in international financial institutions;
- Jews achieve their group goals by plotting secret agreements.

The application of these items in measuring political violence is justified if one considers that belief in these statements generates enemies directly who – the respondent may believe – must be fought with the use of violence, and such an attitude is also a good predictor of other personality traits (Bilewicz et al. 2013).

The seventh item measures Jewish isolation, asking respondents to what extent they agree with the statement, 'Jews remain strangers in Hungarian society – they keep their old cultural values and standards, and do not adjust to Hungarian customs'.

The average of the composite anti-Semitism index relative to the entire sample is 2.89.<sup>65</sup> In this context, differences among respondents with different demographic backgrounds are significantly smaller than what we found in respect to anti-Roma attitudes. Jobbik supporters are clearly more intolerant (3.34). From the territorial point we found additional differences: residents of Budapest and mid-size towns are more anti-Semitic, and the same can be said about those living in central Hungary (especially Budapest), northern Hungary and the Northern Plain.<sup>66</sup>

---

63 The seven-component anti-Semitism index was created primarily using the main-component analysis. The lowest communality was 0.607, and the retained information amount was 78.6%. Subsequently, with the help of weights established with main components we created an index whose size equaled that of variables measured on the original, five-grade Likert-scale.


64 The item set was also used in studying anti-Semitism in Poland (Bilewicz et al. 2013).

65 It is important to note that in respect to these questions the rejection rate was exceptionally high, fluctuating between 19% and 30%. In part this is explained by a relatively high latency in respect to anti-Jewish sentiments.

66 Men are more likely to be anti-Semitic and while the correlation is significant, the difference between the two genders is all but negligible.

## Anti-Semitic stereotypes

(Agreement / disagreement with the statements, %)




## Homophobia

We showed respondents two statements and asked them to choose one that they agree with more. The first statement was as follows: 'Homosexuals are just like other people with the same rights to a full and free life'. The second statement: 'As homosexuality is unnatural such relationships should not be allowed'. 53 per cent of the respondents chose the first and 35 per cent the second option. 12 per cent declined to respond to the question. Men, those with little education and thus worse off financially, and residents of rural towns are more likely to condemn homosexuality. At the regional level, Northern Plain residents fall in that category. It is interesting to note that Jobbik voters are not more homophobic than the average, while it is significantly more characteristic of Fidesz voters.

### Opinions on homosexuals

(per cent,  $n = 1000$ )




## Xenophobia

Attitudes towards migrants coming from within the European Union are somewhat more favorable than towards those coming from countries outside. In respect of the first group 31 per cent believe that the number of migrants is acceptable and 36 per cent that it is too high. Regarding the latter group the corresponding figures are 25 per cent and 47 per cent, respectively. At the same time, one quarter of the respondents have no opinion on the level of immigration.

## Opinions on immigration


(per cent, n = 1 000)



Looking at xenophobia, we measured roughly the same indicators as in the case of anti-Roma attitudes. We asked respondents to what extent they agree with the statement that the majority of immigrants are criminals. Close to one fifth of the respondents (18 per cent) refused to answer the question, although in this case we assumed that instead of hiding their opinion, the majority of respondents simply have no personal experience with migrants. The majority of respondents (54 per cent) do not agree with the statement, while one-fifth (21%) shares that opinion to some degree.

## To what extent do you agree with the statement that the majority of migrants are criminals?

(százalék, n = 1000)



For the entire sample, on a four-grade scale the average index of xenophobia is 2.25. This rate is less dependent on the respondent's socio-demographic background, although the attitude is more prevalent than the average among those with less education and those living in county capitals. There is no difference among those holding different party preferences.

## **Prejudice and political violence**

There is a connection between prejudices against various groups, although the strength of the correlation shows that here we are dealing with different, clearly distinguishable sentiments. Attitudes to the Roma and migrants are strongly related, although there is the danger that the actual relationship is strengthened by the similar wording of the two propositions.<sup>67</sup> Anti-Semitism is clearly separate from these attitudes.<sup>68</sup> There is a moderate relationship between homophobia on the one hand, and anti-Roma and anti-Jewish attitudes.<sup>69</sup>

With the exception of homophobia, justification for the use of political violence in various situations and against specific groups is explained by all prejudice indicators. However, in the case of political violence tied to various situations the explanatory force of anti-Roma and anti-migrant attitudes overlaps with anti-Jewish sentiments.<sup>70</sup> When it comes to the acceptance of violence against specific groups, xenophobia proves to be redundant.<sup>71</sup>

## **Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation**

In our research we also looked at right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). In the first case, to measure attitudes we analyzed respondents' response to the following five statements:

- A true patriot must take action against those condemned by the country's leaders.
- Immoral relationships are due to parents and teachers who forget that physical punishment is still the best method of education.
- Traditional religious values should be less emphasized; instead everyone should decide for him/herself what is and what is not ethical.

---

67 'Gypsies are genetically predisposed to crime' and 'the majority of immigrants are criminals'. The correlation value between the two variables is 0.537.

68 Its connection to anti-Roma attitudes can be characterized by a 0.277 correlation value, and hostility to immigrants by a 0.228 correlation value.

69 In respect to anti-Roma attitudes and anti-Semitism the beta value is 0.135 and 0.176, respectively.

70 The relationship between the acceptance of violence in some situations and anti-Roma attitudes, and hostility to immigrants may be characterized by a correlation coefficient of 0.162 and 0.124, respectively. However, looking at partial correlations and keeping anti-Jewish sentiment under control, statistically the correlations drop to zero.

71 The correlation between the acceptance of violence against specific groups and hostility to immigrants is 0.218. However, by keeping anti-Roma sentiment and anti-Semitism under control, statistically the correlation drops to zero.

- Most social problems would be solved if we got rid of immoral and degenerate individuals.

For the entire sample, the composite RWA average index is 2.48.<sup>72</sup> Authoritarianism is more characteristic of people with less education and residents of smaller rural towns, northern Hungary and the Northern Plain. This trait is particularly prevalent among Jobbik voters.

Social dominance orientation (SDO) was gauged based on responses to the following two statements:

- There are times when violence is needed to put other groups in their proper place.
- To get ahead in life, in some cases other groups must be suppressed.

For the entire sample, the composite SDO average index is 2.18.<sup>73</sup> Social dominance orientation is more characteristic of men, young people, those with vocational training and residents of rural towns. In regional terms, it is more prevalent among those living in central Hungary and the Southern Plain. Here as well, relative to the sample average, Jobbik supporters are overrepresented.

The acceptance of political violence both in certain situations and towards specific groups is primarily explained by personality traits.<sup>74</sup> Social dominance orientation has a significant effect on the first and a slightly stronger effect on the second.

## **Key factors in the acceptance of political violence in a multi-dimensional space**

In this chapter of the study we summarize the effects of variables presented above on the acceptance of violence potentially used in certain situations and against specific groups. Explanatory variables will be included in the model in groups and in successive stages. The assignment of variables to specific groups was determined on the basis of earlier analyses. First is the group of socio-demographic variables and party preference. As a sec-

---

72 The RWA index made up of the above items was created primarily using the main-component analysis. Here we had to leave out the proposition on traditional religious values because, while the communality exceeded 0.25, it was significantly lower for the others (0.394) suggesting that it does not constitute a part of that given dimension. In the case of the emerging main component the lowest communality was 0.579, the retained information amount 60.9%. Subsequently, with the help of weights established with main components we created an index whose size equaled that of variables measured on the original, five-grade Likert-scale.

73 In the case of SDO we created an index with an averaging of items, whose size equaled that of variables measured on the original, five-grade Likert-scale. In respect of two items, in linear terms the resulting main component does not differ from the sum of the two components. The correlation between the variables is 0.701.

74 Earlier studies have shown that while right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are both suitable for predicting different positions, specifically concerning prejudice, they carry distinct psychological content (Heaven and Bucci 2001) and thus in our model we decided to use the two variables separately.

ond step, we included the respondent's civil political activity. As a third step, we included two prejudice-indicators, anti-Roma sentiments and anti-Semitism.<sup>75</sup><sup>76</sup> Finally, right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation were also included in the model.

People facing financial difficulties, the politically more active and those holding anti-Semitic views and characterized by right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are more likely to find violence used in certain situations justifiable.<sup>77</sup>

However, it is interesting to analyze how the inclusion of control groups changes the explanatory power of specific variables. Following the inclusion of the first group it became immediately evident that the effect of age and settlement type is transmitted through party preference, in this case voting for Jobbik.<sup>78</sup>

In the course of building a model, the effect of opting for Jobbik is slowly eroded: first it drops significantly when anti-Roma sentiments and anti-Semitism are included in the model, and is removed entirely with the introduction of RWA and SDO as by that time the effect of the variable is no longer significant. This clearly shows that choosing Jobbik is but a 'symptom'; in fact, the acceptance of violence is a function of the respondent's extremist, authoritarian and prejudicial attitudes. The results of this research project show that examining the willingness present in society is just as important as doing so with the political supply side's actors who build on that.

It is also interesting to note the 'course' of anti-Roma attitudes that, when included, carry a significant explanatory power and lose their relevance with the introduction of RWA and SDO indicators.

The politically more active, those holding anti-Roma and anti-Semitic views and with high RWA and SDO scores tend to be more accepting of the potential use of violence against various social groups.<sup>79</sup>

A change in the effect of the variable measuring the choice for Jobbik is very similar to that seen in the previous model. One might assume that the fact that the variable measuring anti-gypsy attitudes stayed in the model can be attributed to the presence of Gypsies within the group, but the effect of the variable is significant even if this group is temporarily removed from the index.

---

75 As a third step, first we operated with variables measuring the state of Hungarian democracy, although these were not significant for any violence category and their interference effect was also negligible.

76 The effect of homophobia and xenophobia has always been weak, and we realized that these items are transmitted by anti-Roma sentiments and anti-Semitism, which explains our decision to drop them.

77 This is the result of the final regression model, i.e. we see the effect of a single variable while all the other variables included in the model are under control. The model offers an explanation rate of 32.6%.

78 In our study's '*Justifiable*' ends chapter we said that this attitude is affected by the respondent's age and the type of settlement. Now that we have included 'party preference' in the model we realize that these effects are no longer significant.

79 This is the outcome of the final regression model. The model offers an explanation rate of 35.1%.



## *Measuring political violence – recommendations on methodology*

Based on the findings of the present study, in this section we are going to discuss variables that, in our opinion, should be kept or rejected, including variables whose continued relevance should be reconsidered. We must call attention to a fundamental methodological problem. Since there has been no systematic measurement of social violence to date, we must rely on the findings of the present study as we develop our recommendations. It is important to note that the questionnaire is based on theories of prejudice and hate-crime, and randomly used questions posed in other relevant studies, i.e., the development of the questionnaire had been preceded by a long process of conceptualization and operationalization. With all that, the adequacy of our recommendations will have to be tested in future studies. Subsequent findings in this chapter shall be interpreted in that light.

### **Public perceptions of political violence**

To measure the public perception of political violence we used three pairs of propositions. The variables used for measurement do not constitute a composite index.<sup>80</sup> However, the responses are scaled, i.e., if someone supports violence in the case of a “tougher” proposition, he would do the same in respect to “softer” indicators as well. In our case this means that the person who does not reject the use of terrorism is likely to believe that ends close to his heart justify violence, and that democracy and political violence are reconcilable.<sup>81</sup>

### **Ends and groups**

As we have seen earlier, we approached the issue of political violence specifically from two angles. We wished to find out for what ends and against which people respondents believe that violence can be justified. In this chapter of our study we try to identify variables that we believe can be dropped in future surveys.

Deletion may be justified in two cases. Either the variable in question is not related to or has but a weak connection to the dimension to be measured. Or it is redundant, i.e., compared to the other involved items it does not carry additional information, making its measurement in the presence of the other variables irrelevant. In both cases we apply two methods: an internal consistency study with the help of the Cronbach alpha calcula-

---

80 As it involves dichotomous variables, we measured the consistency of the index based on variables using the so-called Kuder-Richardson 20 (KR-20) formula. In studying index values, we used the maximum values accepted for Cronbach alpha. In the case of the three variables – KR-20 = 0.455. The item looking at the relationship between democracy and political violence has the weakest link to the rest, although the value of KR-20 is only 0.519 even after the removal of this item.

81 We measured the scale structure with the reproducibility coefficient. This shows the percentage of the original responses that can be reproduced based on scale scores created with the help of variables. According to the accepted rule of thumb, the index must have a minimum value of 0.9. In our case this came to 0.94, which means that based on the scale scores 94% of the responses can be reproduced.

tor and a principal-component analysis. While the results are closely related<sup>82</sup>, we believe that their simultaneous study may lend our recommendations more substance. In all cases we have also studied correlation coefficients<sup>83</sup>, although it is important to note that their analysis alone would not have yielded results because this only describes the paired relationship of the variables.

## **Variables unrelated to dimensions**

In the course of testing we took into account the followings:

### **Cronbach alpha**

Corrected Item-Total Correlation: the value belonging to one variable shows the correlation between the given item and the index from other items based on aggregation. In this case we considered a value of 0.2 as clearly, and between 0.21-0.3 as slightly problematic.

Cronbach's Alpha if Item deleted index: for all variables it shows the value of Cronbach alpha if the variable in question were deleted. In this case we try to find out whether there is a variable whose removal would increase the Cronbach alpha value.

### **Principal-component analysis**

We looked at communalities. Communalities under 0.25 were taken as a clear sign of non-dimensionality. Moreover, we found it intriguing when the communality of one variable fell short of that of other variables. We also looked at by how much the information content increases with their removal.

In the case of ends, based on the Cronbach alpha index we found no variable we would recommend for deletion without hesitation. However, when it comes to the analysis of communalities, in the case of the variables „When the Hungarian nation comes under threat“ and „If your family is threatened“ the values we found were lower than those for other variables<sup>84</sup>. Fundamentally, these two variables proved to be more difficult to define because in this case the rate of those sharing the same opinion is high, i.e., presumably even those who on the whole reject violence would agree with these statements. Based on the aggregate data one may draw the conclusion that in themselves these variables would be absolutely unsuitable to measure the acceptance of political violence for various ends, although used together with the others they clearly belong to the dimension to be measured. However, if we have to get rid of one of the items (e.g., to shorten the questionnaire), we definitely recommend their deletion. With all that, in international

---

82 However, it is an important difference that while the principal-component analysis serves for the creation of weight-cumulated indices, the Cronbach alpha calculates with an index created through the aggregation of the variable with specific weight.

83 This is all the more logical because both Cronbach alpha and the principal-component analysis are based on that.

84 73% of the information preserved by the main component that includes all variables. With the removal of the first variable mentioned it increases by 3, with that of the second by 2 and with the simultaneous removal of both by 5 percentage points.

surveys we would rather recommend the removal of the item related to the family because the positions taken on the other one may be more subject to the given country's value system.

In the case of groups, based on Cronbach alpha analysis we cannot recommend the deletion of a single variable.<sup>85</sup> Based on the principal-component analysis, the communalities of questions related to criminals, terrorists and homosexuals fall far short of that of other variables, although all exceed 0.25.<sup>86</sup>

## **Redundant variables**

When testing these, we considered the followings:

### **Cronbach alpha**

Corrected Item-Total Correlation: we considered variables characterized by a value of over 0.8 to be redundant, those with a value of over 0.85 as highly redundant.<sup>87</sup>

### **Principal-component analysis**

We looked at communalities. Exceptionally high communalities were seen as a sign of redundancy. We also investigated by how much the information content increases with their removal.

In the case of justifiable ends, based on Cronbach alpha values the following items are considered redundant<sup>88</sup>:

"When inequalities become unbearable within society."

"If someone wants to limit your personal freedom."

"If the government oppresses its citizens."

---

85 Incidentally, in respect to ends and here as well the reason is that these variables are closely related to each other.

86 59% of the information is preserved by the main component that includes all variables. The three items referred to here were left out in the development of the composite index created and analyzed earlier. With the removal of the item related to criminals the information content preserved in the main component increased by 1, with the removal of the item related to terrorists by 2 and with that related to homosexuals by 1 percentage points. The simultaneous removal of all three variables resulted in a 5 percentage point increase.

87 Professional literature urges reflection already at values over 0.75.

88 The proposition "If natural resources and the future of the next generation are threatened" is at the borderline.

The principal-component analysis also shows that their communality stands out.<sup>89</sup> In the case of ends we don't necessarily believe that due to redundancy the variables should be dropped, although if it becomes necessary, we recommend the ones referred to above.<sup>90</sup> In the case of an international survey, a selection among these variables may also be determined by prevailing conditions in the country under review.

In the case of groups the Cronbach alpha analysis does not show significant redundancy and looking at communalities we didn't find high peaks either. Earlier we had also seen that in this set of variables the amount of information preserved by the main component was also much smaller. The question is raised whether the position of these groups differs from each other, in other words whether there are sets of groups whose positions are more related to each other than that of other groups. The answer is, yes, there are.<sup>91</sup> The strongest correspondence has been seen when it comes to the acceptance of violence against extremist rightists and leftist groups.<sup>92</sup> The link between these variables is much stronger than to any other variable.<sup>93</sup> The next significant nodal point is constituted by variables measuring the acceptance of violence against the following groups: politicians, banks, Jews and multinational companies.<sup>94</sup> It is also strongly related to the perception of politicians and authoritarian leaders<sup>95</sup>, although the link is much weaker with the other three variables. The perception of criminals and terrorists also shows a relatively strong relation.<sup>96</sup>

It is safe to say that variables showing strong correlation measure similar things<sup>97</sup>, although these connections also greatly depend on the political situation and climate prevailing in the given country, and thus their removal carries definite risks. Moreover, we

---

89 Based on multiple correlation coefficients characterizing variables, the variable measuring the first recommended item is explained by the other variables by 72%, the second by 70% and the third by 75%.

90 The decrease of the reserved information amount doesn't reach even 1% if these are deleted one by one or together.

91 We performed the analysis with an examination of the correlation coefficient. With the help of Maximum Likelihood factor analysis we also examined whether there is a latent structure behind the positions of various group types, although the fit of the factor model and its interpretability were not adequate.

92 The value of the correlation coefficient between the variables is 0.862. Incidentally, this is the highest value of them all.

93 Interestingly, if we look at them together it is related to variables measuring the acceptance of violence against criminals and drug addicts. Radical leftist groups are also linked to the perception of authoritarian leaders threatening democracy. While this may be attributed to historical reasons, it is interesting to note that the perception of the radical right is much less related to this. (All high-lighted correlations are above 0.5.)

94 In this instance, the paired correlations to each other exceed 0.7 in all cases. The perception of a link between Jews and multinational companies is exceptionally strong: in this case the correlation is 0.814.

95 The correlation coefficient is 0.717.

96 The correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.793.

97 With all that, the social background of the perception of right and left radical groups may differ from each other.

recommend that if closely related items are featured together in a survey, they should be placed at a distance from each other in the questionnaire. If the analysis of various situations becomes important, an effort could be made to find a more accurate definition of these nodal points in a future study as well.

If the question to be answered is whether a survey of situations or groups is more relevant, we would opt for the former. Analyses appear to suggest that the explanatory power of the latter is already subsumed in the former, i.e., when the two were featured simultaneously in models and the former was kept under control, the effect of the latter was insignificant.

In respect to the commitment of violent acts we found it may be irrelevant to query about this because the percentage of those who had already acted and even of those who would contemplate to commit such acts in the future is negligible.

This has been demonstrated even in the case of questions related to political activism bordering on political violence<sup>98</sup>.

### **Factors predisposing one to accept political violence**

Earlier studies clearly show that the acceptance of political violence is fundamentally motivated by divergent personal traits, such as right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and prejudice. In the latter category in Hungary anti-Roma attitudes and anti-Semitism proved to be major explanatory variables. The weak explanatory power of anti-migrant sentiment may be attributed in part to the similarity of the variable's wording with that of the anti-Roma variable. However, it is even more notable that, compared to countries characterized by strong anti-migrant sentiment and where the ideology of far-right parties is also dominated by that attitude, there are few immigrants in Hungary. This also means that in an international study the anti-migrant variable or set of variables should not be ignored by any means.

Since in the current survey, when looking at anti-Semitism, we essentially measured belief in Jewish world conspiracy we cannot say to what extent other dimensions of anti-Semitism would have affected attitudes toward political violence. However, based on earlier and already mentioned studies and recent findings, we assume that a reduction has been the right decision. Earlier we have said that when developing the composite index we had to leave out one of the items<sup>99</sup> measuring Jews' outsider status and, in our opinion, the removal of the other item<sup>100</sup> would render the index even more consistent.

---

98 The vilification and defamation of a corrupt politician, even in his presence, and more directly, throwing things at or hitting a corrupt politician.

99 "Jews don't have their own culture, they try to appropriate important things in their country of residence."

100 Jews have remained foreigners in Hungarian society – they preserved their old culture and norms, and refuse to adopt a Hungarian lifestyle." The variable's commonality is 0.607, while that of all other variables is over 0.805. With the removal of the variable the information content of the principal component increased by 5 percentage points.

When measuring RWA we mentioned that we had to leave out the statement related to traditional religious values, although the remaining variables sufficiently captured this personality trait. Since based on the models the SDO proved to be extremely important, we recommend the inclusion of additional items for its measurement.

In short, it is important to see that the effects of the respondent's demographic features, party preference and political activism follow from his personality traits that, in turn, are closely related to these variables. If the need arises for a more detailed study of the associative space of political violence, we should look for other standardized tests identifying personality and showing a correlation with a propensity for the acceptance of violence. The application of such standardized tests is all the more practical because they can be used to great effect in international studies as well.

## United Kingdom

### About the survey in the United Kingdom

The research was conducted in November 2014 by Ipsos Mori. The sample had a size of 1003 individuals. The sample represents the UK adult population over the age of 16 and takes into account gender, age, schooling and type of settlement. While the study has a statistical error of 3.1% and in cases where the questions, instead of the entire sample, involved only a specific group of respondents, the margin of error is higher.

As there are large differences between survey prices in Hungary and the UK, our scope of research was limited in the United Kingdom. We put those two item-groups on the questionnaire which seemed to be the most relevant ones – based on preliminary findings from the Hungarian survey.

First, respondents were asked the extent to which they thought violence was justifiable to achieve certain objectives.<sup>101</sup> They were given six scenarios to answer:

- The British nation faced a threat; the government oppressed its citizens; there was an attempt to limit your personal freedom; social inequality become unbearable; your livelihood was threatened and your family faced dangers.

Second, respondents were asked whether they thought that violence was justifiable against certain groups.<sup>102</sup> They were given 14 different groups:

- Terrorists; Radical right wing groups; Radical left wing groups; Traitors and enemies of the nation; Gypsies; Politicians; Banks; Jews; Drug addicts; Homosexuals; Authoritarian leaders undermining democracy; the Homeless; Muslims and Immigrants.

For both sets of questions, the data were then broken down according to gender, age, social grade, working status, ethnicity, government office region (meaning where in the UK they are from), whether there are children in the household, and income level.

The key findings and themes from each set of questions are presented below. Data are presented in both mean score format and percentages of those who thought violence was justifiable or unjustifiable.

### Using violence to reach specific objectives

Overall, respondents felt that violence was most justifiable if 'their family faced danger' (63 per cent thought it was justifiable and 18 per cent unjustifiable, with a mean score of 3.88 / 5); while respondents felt that violence was least justifiable if 'social inequality

---


101 Using a scale of 1 – 5, where 1 means '*I consider it completely unjustifiable*'; and 5 means '*I consider it completely justifiable*'.

102 Using a scale of 1 – 5, where 1 means '*I consider it completely unjustifiable*'; and 5 means '*I consider it completely justifiable*'.

became unbearable’ (only 23 per cent of people thought it was justifiable and 44 per cent unjustifiable, with a mean score of 2.53). The only other scenario that scored a mean of over 3 (suggesting overall justifiable) was if the British nation faced a threat.

It is to be noted, however, that for all questions, at least 10 per cent of respondents could not decide, and a significant proportion responded that they thought it was neither justifiable nor unjustifiable (i.e. responding with 3 on the Likert scale).

**The justification of violence in different situations**  
*(% and average on a 1–5 scale, n = 1 003)*



These results mask significant differences visible in each question across different socio-demographic groups. These are broken down according to each scenario, with key differences pulled out (where differences are not mentioned, this is because they were deemed too insignificant to warrant elaboration in this paper).



### ***If the British nation faced a threat***

Overall, 48 per cent of people felt that violence was justifiable if the British nation was facing a threat and 18 per cent that it was not justifiable (19 per cent of people thought it was neither justifiable nor unjustifiable and 14 per cent couldn't decide). This question had a mean score of 3.60.

Men were more likely to think violence was justifiable (52 per cent) than women (44 per cent). Older people were more likely than younger people to think it was justifiable: 39 per cent of those aged 15-24 thought violence was justifiable; compared to 59 per cent of those aged 55-64, and 53 per cent of those aged 65 or older.

Social grade (broken down by AB / C1 / C2 / DE)<sup>103</sup> does not appear to be particularly significant in respect of correlations. While 53 per cent of AB respondents felt violence was justifiable (the highest proportion), so did 45 per cent of C2 respondents (the lowest proportion). Similarly, 47 per cent of employed people thought violence was justifiable, compared with 49 per cent of those not working. However, those in high-income groups (earning £25k per year or more) were more likely to think violence was justified (57 per cent) than those earning up to £11,499 (42 per cent).

### ***If the government oppressed its citizens***

Overall, only 24 per cent of respondents consider violence justifiable if the government oppressed its citizens, compared to 40 per cent who thought it was unjustifiable; with a mean score of 2.63

As above, men were more likely to consider it justifiable (28 per cent) than women (21 per cent). In terms of age categories, there were no obvious correlations in age among those who thought it was justifiable (26 per cent of 15-24 thought it was justifiable; the same proportion as 45-54 year olds). However, on the whole older people were more likely to think violence was unjustifiable (the difference being accounted for by fewer who answer 'neither' or 'cannot decide'). Thirty-one per cent of 15-24 year olds thought it unjustifiable, compared to 49 per cent of 45-54 year olds.

Based on the mean scores, those of a higher social grade were more likely to think violence unjustifiable (AB scored 2.53) than those of a lower social grade (DE scored 2.75); while those who were not working (2.52) were more likely to think it unjustifiable than those who were (2.71). Those with a middle income (£11,500-24,999) were more likely to think violence was not justifiable (mean score: 2.56) than either low (2.76) or high (2.70) income.

Respondents from London were the least likely to think violence was justified (15 per cent); while those from the North were the most likely (31 per cent). However, those from the North were more likely than those from London to think it was unjustifiable too (37

---

<sup>103</sup> AB is higher and intermediate managerial, administrative, professional occupations (22.17% of UK adults); C1 is supervisory, clerical and junior managerial, administrative, professional occupations (30.84%); C2 is skilled manual occupations (20.94%); DE is semi-skilled and unskilled manual occupations, unemployed and lowest grade occupations (26.05%).

per cent versus 28 per cent) – since 30 per cent of people from London could not decide. In terms of mean scores, those from Wales were the most likely to think violence was unjustifiable (2.38), while those from the North the least (2.82).

### ***If there is an attempt to limit your personal freedom***

Overall, 28 per cent of respondents felt it was justifiable for violence to be used if there was an attempt to limit their personal freedom; and 40 per cent thought it unjustifiable (20 per cent thought it was neither; and 12 per cent could not decide). This gave a mean score of 2.74.

Men were more likely than women (mean score of 2.95 versus 2.55) to think violence was justifiable. There was no clear correlation with age: 30 per cent of those under 24 thought it justifiable; compared with 28 per cent of those over 65. While 15-24 year olds' mean score was slightly more favourable to violence (2.94 compared to 2.65 for those over 65), other age groups scored very similar.

Interestingly, the lower the social grade, the more likely respondents thought violence was justified. Based on mean scores, AB scored 2.48; C1 scored 2.70; C2 scored 2.88 and DE scored 2.95. Similarly, those on lower income groups were more likely to think violence was justified (mean score of 2.92 for those earning under £11,499) than those on higher income (2.67 for those earning £25k and over).

Ethnic minorities were less likely than White British to think violence was justifiable under these circumstances (2.60 versus 2.80). Similarly to other questions, those in London were the least likely to think violence was justified (18 per cent) but this is partly accounted for by the high numbers who were not sure. In terms of regional mean scores, the North (2.98) and the South (2.96) were the most likely to think violence was justifiable.

### ***If social inequality became unacceptable***

Overall, 23 per cent of respondents felt it was justifiable for violence to be used if social inequality becomes unacceptable; and 44 per cent thought it unjustifiable (20 per cent thought it was neither; and 12 per cent could not decide). This gave a mean score of 2.53. This was the lowest mean score.

As for all the responses, men were more likely than women to think violence was justifiable (mean score of 2.69 versus 2.38). In this instance, younger people were slightly more likely to think violence was justifiable than older people. Twenty-eight per cent of those aged 15-24 thought it justifiable, compared to 20 per cent of those over 64 (mean scores were 2.71 versus 2.48).

Those of lower social grade were more likely (2.66 mean score for DE) than those of high social grade (2.47 for AB) to think violence justifiable – although employment status made very little difference to responses. Income, however, did: 41 per cent of those earning under £11,499 thought violence was unjustifiable, compared to 29 per cent of those earning over £25k. Ethnicity, unlike in the other questions, was also not correlated with attitudes.

### ***If your livelihood was threatened***

Overall, 31 per cent of respondents felt it was justifiable for violence to be used if their livelihood was threatened; and 42 per cent thought it unjustifiable (15 per cent thought it was neither; 11 per cent could not decide and 1 per cent refused to answer). This gave a mean score of 2.74.

As above, men were more likely than women to think violence justifiable (a mean score of 3 versus 2.5). Generally speaking, young people were more likely to think that violence is justifiable than older people – although this was not a uniform pattern: under 24s scored a mean of 3.03, the highest of all groups: while those aged 45-54 were the lowest at 2.41.

In terms of social grade, the lower the social grade, the higher the response that violence was justifiable (AB: 2.53; C1: 2.58; C2: 2.81; DE: 3.10).

Unlike other responses, non-Whites were more likely to think violence was justified than Whites (based on both mean scores and percentages). In terms of regions, people living in the North were the most likely to think violence justified, those from Scotland the least, and the highest income group was less likely than low and middle income groups to think violence justified.

### ***If your family faced dangers***

Overall, 63 per cent of respondents felt it was justifiable for violence to be used if their family faced dangers; and 17 per cent thought it unjustifiable (11 per cent thought it was neither; 19 per cent could not decide and 1 per cent refused to answer). This gave a mean score of 3.88. This was the highest mean score.

Men (mean score of 4.02) were more likely than women (3.72) to think violence was justifiable; and older people were more likely than younger people – although this is not a uniform pattern. The mean scores based on ages were as follows: 15-24 scored 3.69; 25-34 scored 3.57; 35-44 scored 4.07; 45-54 scored 3.77; 55-64 scored 4.19 and 65+ scored 4.02. Unlike other questions, social grade did not appear to make a significant difference (at least not in a uniform way). Income, however, did – as those in the highest income groups were more likely than those in the lowest income groups to think violence was justifiable (4.05 versus 3.84).

In terms of region, respondents from London were the least likely to think violence was justifiable (mean score of 3.16) and those from the North the most likely (mean score of 4.21). White respondents thought violence was more justifiable than non-Whites (3.95 versus 3.36).

### ***Correlations within particular groups***

Looking at the results as a whole, there are some discernable patterns that emerge. That said, looking at the data set as a whole, the only socio-demographic factor that was consistently correlated with thinking violence was justifiable across every scenario was gender. Men were always more likely than women to think violence was justifiable. (Although still, on the whole, often had a mean score of less than 3, meaning they thought violence was unjustifiable for several scenarios).

While it might have been expected that age would be broadly correlated with attitudes to violence, this appears to be dependent on the question. For example, while young people are broadly more likely to think violence is justifiable if governments oppress their people; or if social inequality reaches an unacceptable level, older people think it more justifiable if the British state is in danger or if their family is under threat. It is not clear what thematic pattern this suggests.

Similarly, social grade, income level and employment status – all socio-economic demographic factors – appear to have various correlations depending on the question (and not always the same). Overall, low social grade is more likely to result in higher levels of justifying violence – although not across every question. High income groups are more likely to support violence if the state is in danger, or their family is at risk – but less likely than low income groups if personal freedom is limited, if social inequality becomes unacceptable or their livelihood's threatened. It is, perhaps, unsurprising that low social grades and income groups are more likely to consider violence acceptable if social inequality becomes unacceptable and their livelihood threatened, since they are the most likely to suffer personally from those consequences.

In terms of ethnicity, most scenarios find that White respondents were more likely to think violence justifiable than non-Whites. However, ethnicity made little difference in respect of whether people felt that violence was justifiable if social inequality becomes unacceptable. If someone's livelihood is at threat, ethnic minority groups were more likely than White people to think violence is justifiable. The extent to which these are driven by economic, cultural, or other considerations is not clear.

The region of the country where violence is most likely to be considered justifiable tends to be the North of the UK, although again, this varies considerably. London, by contrast is typically the region with the lowest levels of support for violence in terms of percentage of people who think it is justifiable – although not always in terms of mean scores. This may be partly driven by the very high proportion of ethnic minorities living in London. Whether there are children in the household, and whether someone is employed or not does not appear to make a major difference.

### **Using violence against specific groups**

Overall, respondents felt that violence was most justifiable against terrorists (58 per cent thought it was justifiable, 17 per cent unjustifiable, with a mean score of 3.8). This was by some margin the group with the highest score.

Following terrorists, radical political groups – both left wing, right wing and 'traitors and enemies of the nation' – scored the next highest level of acceptability of violence. The mean score for whether violence was justifiable against traitors and enemies of the nation was 3.07; for radical right wing groups 2.68 and for radical left wing groups 2.60. 'Authoritarian leaders undermining democracy' was the only other group that scored a mean of over 2 (2.32).

In terms of ethnic minority or religious groups, there was low levels of support for violence (at least, in comparison to the other groups listed): Jews, Gypsies, Muslims and immigrants all scored low levels of justified targets for violence, with between 3 – 6 per cent of people thinking violence was justifiable.


Interestingly, banks and politicians scored more highly than these groups – with 10 per cent of respondents thinking violence was justified against politicians, and 9 per cent against banks.

In terms of other groups, 10 per cent of people thought violence was justified against drug addicts – and only 3 per cent against the homeless. (In terms of mean score and percentage that think that violence is justified, homeless people and Jews are the least likely to elicit support for violent action).

As for question 1, however, there was a significant number of people who either responded that that they thought violence was neither justified or not justified (between 5 – 22 per cent depending on the question); or could not decide (between 9 – 17 per cent, depending on the question).

## The justification of violence against certain groups

(% and average on a 1–5 scale, n = 1003)



We have broken down the results for further analysis based on the following categories for ease of reference: 'extremist groups'; 'political groups'; 'ethnic / religious groups' and 'other groups'.

### ***Extremist groups***

Terrorists are the group that by far elicits the highest level of support for violence. (Extremists in general elicit high levels of support for violence for reasons that are discussed below). Older people are slightly more likely to justify violence (the mean score for 15-24 year olds is 3.63; for those over 64 it is 4.05). Social grade, working status, and income do not appear to be correlated in any linear or patterned way. People living in the North are more likely to justify violence; and those in London the least.

The same pattern emerges with left and right wing radical groups and traitors and enemies of the nation – albeit all at a lower level of support for violence compared to terrorists. Men are more likely than women to justify violence; older people are slightly more likely to justify violence than younger people, although it does not increase steadily with age; and people living in the North are more likely to justify violence than those living elsewhere. While there are small differences elsewhere, they are not very large.

Authoritarian leaders undermining democracy was the group which elicits the most uniform set of results. Leaving gender aside – in which men are always more likely to justify violence than women – there were no very obvious patterns based on socio-demographic background.

### ***Political groups***

In respect of politicians, men are more likely than women to justify violence. Age is more complex: while 15-24 year olds are the most likely to justify violence (both in terms of mean score – 2.18 – and percentage which justifies it – 16 per cent) it does not decrease in a uniform way with age. In terms of social grade, the lower the social grade the higher the support for violence against politicians (in terms of a mean score, DE scores 2.23 while AB scores 1.57). Interestingly, employment status does not appear to make a difference: but income does. Those earning above £25k are less likely to consider violence justified than those in middle income groups, who are less likely in turn than those in low income groups (1.57 versus 1.95 versus 2.02). Ethnic minorities are more likely (mean score 2.33) to justify violence than Whites (mean score 1.80). Unlike in other questions, those living in London are more likely to consider violence justifiable (2.26) compared to other regions.

An almost identical pattern emerges in respect of banks – with younger people the most likely to justify violence; along with low income groups, low social grade groups, ethnic minorities, and those living in London.

### ***Ethnic / religious groups***

The most striking thing about these results is how low levels of support for violence was for all groups based on ethnicity or religion. Because they were all so low it is difficult to pull out any clear patterns. However, there were a small number of insights available.

For every group listed above, support for violence tends to decrease as age increases. With the exception of Gypsies (and only then by a tiny margin) the age category 15-24 is the most likely to support violent acts against these groups. While the trend is generally that older people are less likely to disagree with violence, there are some exceptions. For example, those over 64 are more likely to support violent action against immigrants and Muslims than those aged 45-54 or 55-64.

Moreover, for every group listed above, support for violence increases as social grade decreases. Irrespective of the group, AB is the least likely to justify violence, followed by C1, followed by C2, followed by DE. (Based on mean scores). It also increases informally as income decreases irrespective of the group (with one small exception, which is that middle income respondents are more supportive of violence than low income respondents in regard to Gypsies).

Interestingly, support for violence against these groups is always higher among non-Whites than Whites (albeit at a low overall level for both). Similarly, unlike the answers from question 1, respondents from London are always the most likely to support violence, irrespective of the group.

### ***Other groups (drug addicts, homosexuals, homeless people)***

Irrespective of the group – and similar to the results for ethnic and religious groups – younger age groups tend to be more likely to justify violence than older (although it is not a uniform pattern, and there are exceptions). Nevertheless, for drug addicts, homosexuals and the homeless, the 15-24 age category is the most likely to justify violence (mean score of 1.81, 1.58 and 1.48 respectively.) In each case the group least likely to justify violence is the 55-64 year old age group (mean score of 1.56, 1.24 and 1.19 respectively). Broadly speaking, support for violence decreases with each age category increase, until 64+, for which it increases slightly.

There is also a similar and uniform increase in the support for violence as social grade decreases. For all three groups, the support for violence is lowest in social grade AB, then increases for C1, increases further for C2 and reaches its peak with DE. In the same way as the responses for ethnic and religious groups, support for violence decreases with increases in income (with one small exception, middle income groups are more supportive of violence than low income groups in respect of drug addicts).

Similarly to the results about religious and ethnic groups, ethnic minorities are more supportive of violence than Whites in respect of every group listed. For example, 24 per cent of ethnic minorities consider that violence is justified against drug addicts, compared with 8 per cent of Whites; while 13 per cent of ethnic minorities consider violence against homosexuals justified compared to 4 per cent of Whites.

Again, similar to the results above, in every case people from London are the most likely to justify violence against these three groups, by some margin. For example, 24 per cent of people from London consider violent action against drug addicts justifiable compared to 5 per cent from Wales; 12 per cent consider violence against homosexuals justifiable compared to 3 per cent from Scotland; and 5 per cent consider violence against home-



less people justifiable compared to 2 per cent from the North. However, it is to be borne in mind that London has a significantly higher proportion of ethnic minorities than the other regions, which is likely to account for some of the variation.

### ***General correlations***

As with question 1, men are more likely than women to justify violence, irrespective of the group in question.

Terrorists are by far the group that elicits the highest level of support for violence. This may be because the terrorists are the only group that has an assumed activity that is violent. This general rule also holds for the other groups that elicit high levels of support for violence (radical right wing; radical left wing; traitors and enemies of the state). Of all those included in the survey, these groups have some implicit moral position, whereas the other groups listed do not.

It is of note that 'political groups' – politicians, authoritarians, banks – were significantly more likely to elicit responses that justify violence than groups based on ethnicity or religion. Moreover, the types of respondents that justify violence against these groups are quite different from those who justify violence against the political extremists (and justify violence as an abstract principle in question 1).

While ethnic minorities were less likely to support violence against political extremists – and to justify violence in the question 1 scenarios – they were more likely to support it against politicians, bankers, ethnic and religious groups and 'other' groups. Similarly, a decrease in social grade is very clearly and consistently correlated with an increase in support for violence against all groups – except the political extremists, where the relationship is not uniform.

A very similar relationship emerged in respect of age. In respect of political extremists – terrorists, radical right / left groups or traitors – the 55-64 and over 64 age groups were consistently the most likely to support violence (based on mean scores). However, in respect of individual groups – whether religious or ethnic groups, politicians, bankers, homosexuals, drug addicts or the homeless – it was always the youngest age group (15-24) that scored the highest levels of support for violent acts.

### ***Comparison of the Hungarian and British results***

During the two public surveys, data was collected using the same methodology both with regards to the questions asked and the approach used to ask the questions, resulting in a clear chance to compare the two question blocks' results in Hungary and the United Kingdom.

### ***Use of violence in a variety of situations***


In both countries the respondents saw the use of violence validated the most when the life of their families was in danger. Sixty-three percent of Britons thought that the use of force was corroborated to some extent in that situation, while forty-seven percent of

Hungarians thought the same. The difference in terms of scale averages (on a scale of 1-5, where the higher value means the stronger validation of the use of force) is present as well. In the Hungarian sample the value is 3,41 while in the British it is 3,88.

The same dissimilarity between the two samples is visible in connection to the second most preferred option, where the nation was in danger. Thirty-nine percent of Hungarians and forty-eight of Britons believed that use of force is adequate when it comes to this situation. Similarly to the previous situation, the support for the use of force is higher among the British.

The other four situations, on the other hand, show different tendencies, as Hungarian results show a higher support for aggression. The last item in the order of preferences concerns a scenario where „social inequality become unbearable” for both countries. The order of the remainder of the scenarios is different in the two sample but this does not constitute a significant difference.

**The justification of violence in different situations, in Hungary and in the UK**  
(average on a 1–5 scale)




### Use of force against a variety of groups

Contrary to the support for the use of violence in certain situations, Hungarians tolerated the use of violence against groups more than those questioned in the United Kingdom. The slightest difference between the two countries is apparent in connection with the most preferred option. Both Hungarians and Britons accept the use of force against terrorists most widely. The scale averages calculated for this option are leaps and bounds ahead of those for other groups. Both nationalities put 'traitors and enemies of the nation' in second place. In this case, scale averages differed relatively minimally (0.17). The use of violence against radical groups (both left and right-wing) was the other category in which the British sample was only slightly different from the Hungarian one.

### The justification of violence against certain groups, in Hungary and in the UK

(average on a 1–5 scale)



Acceptance of the use of force against certain groups of society was markedly higher for Hungarians than it was among Britons who were asked. This discrepancy was especially visible with regards to drug users and gypsies. The Hungarian average was higher by 1.3 points in the former and by 1.15 points in the latter case on the 1-5 scale, constituting a remarkable difference. Homosexuals and Jewish people as minority groups were the ones against whom the use of violence was the least accepted both among Hungarians and Britons. However, the survey's result shows an average of 1.41 and 1.36 in England, while the Hungarian averages are notably higher (2.23 and 2.31).

## Online interviewing research

### *About the research*

Demos has been collecting survey data from Facebook supporters of various political parties in the UK and Hungary.

Facebook allows third parties to design adverts which are shown to Facebook users who can be targeted based on the preferences or data they have shared on the site. We designed a series of adverts which ask users to complete a survey. Users who click on the survey are then redirected to a survey page where they are presented with a consent page; and then asked to complete the survey. We asked a series of questions relating to basic demographic data, social and political attitudes data and a series of questions relating to attitudes toward violence.

Data collection involved a survey recruitment design pioneered by Demos that uses Facebook to target people who 'Like' specific pages. Using the same techniques as in the *New Face of Digital Populism* and *New Political Actors in Europe* series (Demos, 2011 and 2012-13), surveys were conducted via Facebook. Facebook was selected because it is the most widespread and popular social media site in Europe, and political parties have a sizeable presence on the platform (particularly in respect of young people). Facebook allows for adverts to be targeted at users based on their political preferences, although this is not always as precise as we would like (for example, it allows advertising directed at people who like categories such as a specific political party, but this tends to also include those who like similar parties too).

Targeted individuals were shown an advert on Facebook inviting them to click on a link to complete a survey. On clicking the advert, participants were redirected to a digital survey page hosted by the website Survey Monkey, setting out the details and purpose of the surveys along with an invitation to take part. There was no monetary compensation for partaking in the surveys.

### *Data Collection Caveats*

This recruitment technique allows collection of a sizeable dataset from a largely unexplored group of individuals who are hard to recruit via traditional recruitment approaches. However, there are caveats to keep in mind.<sup>104</sup>

First, the population is self-selected. It is thus hard to control for what groups partaking individuals affiliate with and how many individuals from a given group partake. While the survey is advertised to a broad population of individuals that affiliate with political groups on Facebook, there is no control over what individuals ultimately complete the survey. In this particular study, this left us with somewhat different data sets for the UK and Hungary, and in places gained disproportionate numbers of responses from supporters of different parties.

---

<sup>104</sup> For an in-depth discussion of the method's strength and weaknesses, see Bartlett et al. (2012), *The New Face of Digital Populism*.

Second, this study targets individuals who follow political parties on Facebook, and not political actors or activists themselves. Therefore, one ought to be careful about drawing generalisations about the parties and groups in question, as survey participants do not necessarily represent the groups in their entirety.

Third, Facebook's advertisement options do not allow the targeting of specific groups, but rather a collection of *similar* groups. Therefore, it is not possible to disaggregate respondents according to which Facebook advert reached them. Respondents are thus asked which political groups or movements they most closely affiliated with and categorized accordingly.

This sample is not a perfectly representative sample of the population, nor is it a representative sample of Facebook users. This is a self-selecting survey, which means only those who chose to respond do so. Although the research team targeted adverts at users in a way to create a sample that was broadly similar to Facebook users in the UK and in Hungary as a whole (based on gender, age, and political affiliation) because of the way Facebook targeted advertising functions, it is not possible to create a perfect sample. Self-selection also creates a potentially significant (and unknown) bias in the survey responses. It is with these caveats that the results should be read.

### *Research in the United Kingdom*

In order to recruit respondents, we targeted the Facebook supporters of six British political parties and movements (Liberal Democrats, Conservatives, Labour, UK Independence Party, EDL and British National Party).

We ran six separate campaigns for each party, targeting various age and gender categories in order to reach as representative a cross section of the supporters of these groups as possible.

Adverts and surveys were administered in English. In total, this yielded 2,128 completed survey responses. We kept all surveys where at least three quarters of the survey was completed. We include the percentage of non-response for each question.

### **Demographics**

The majority of respondents (75 per cent) were male, and 20 per cent were female. Four per cent responded that they preferred not to answer (one per cent did not answer).

Age categories were broken down into six categories. The largest age category is 16-25 (35 per cent of respondents). The rest is as follows: 26-35 is 7 per cent; 36-45 is 10 per cent; 46-55 is 21 per cent; 56-65 is 15 per cent; and 65+ is 11 per cent. One per cent did not answer.


In terms of where respondents live, 45 per cent come from a town or small city; 15 per cent from a big city; 16 per cent are from a country village and 17 per cent from the suburbs or outskirts of a big city. Three per cent are from a farm or home in the countryside. The remainder either did not respond or said they did not know.

Overall, 40 per cent of our sample were in paid work; 22 per cent were students. In terms of education levels, 46 per cent say their highest level of education is higher education, 38 per cent say secondary school, and 6 per cent say vocational school.

In respect of political views, we asked respondents whom they voted for in the 2010 election. 17 per cent said the Conservative Party; 16 per cent said the Labour party, 14 per cent said UKIP, 8 per cent said the Green Party; 13 per cent said the BNP. (The remained either replied ‘other’, ‘don’t know’, ‘I did not vote’ or did not answer).

Political activism

Respondents were asked a series of questions relating to their political activity: whether they have taken part in various actions. Respondents were asked if they ‘have done’, ‘might do’, ‘would never do’ to participating in a boycott, a lawful demonstration, unofficial strikes, occupation of buildings, signing a petition, or using personal violence like fighting with other demonstrators or the police.



The results show that a relatively high proportion of respondents have taken part in peaceful and lawful demonstration: 37 per cent have joined a boycott, and 78 per cent have joined a strike. A relatively small proportion have been involved in more serious and violent activism: just 4 per cent have used violence like fighting with police or other dem-

onstrators (although 11 per cent say they 'might' do). There is a relatively high proportion of people who say they might take part in potentially unlawful activity – 32 per cent say they 'might' join an unofficial strike, while 25 per cent say they 'might' occupy buildings.

When cross-tabulated against where people place themselves on the political spectrum and age categories, further insight is available. (We asked respondents where they place themselves on the political spectrum, where 1 means left and 5 means right.)

### ***Joined a boycott***

Of those who answered '1' on the political spectrum (meaning far left, n=289 in total, or 14 per cent of the total sample) 91 per cent said they 'have' or 'might' join a boycott. Sixty eight per cent said they 'had' joined a boycott in the past – the highest proportion by some margin. By contrast, 47 per cent of those who answered '2' on the political spectrum said they have joined a boycott; and 41 per cent of those who answered '5' had joined a boycott. The lowest was '4' on the political spectrum, where only 28 per cent of people had joined a boycott. However, a large proportion across the political spectrum said they either had or might take part.

In terms of the effect of age, 28 per cent of those 16-35 said they have joined a boycott; compared to 44 per cent of those aged 36 and over. (This might be explained simply by the age difference: since 41 per cent of those aged under 35 said they might join a boycott; compared with 33 per cent of those aged over 35).

### ***Joined a lawful demonstration***

There were similar results when respondents were asked if they had taken part in a lawful demonstration. Again, the highest proportion of people who answered '1' on the political spectrum said they had (69 per cent) and the lowest proportion was those who answered '4' (20 per cent). Similarly to the question above, a high proportion of all groups said they either 'had' or 'might' join a lawful demonstration. A similar result was found in respect of the effect of age: with those over 35 being more likely than those under 35 to have taken part in a lawful demonstration (38 versus 26 per cent); but less likely to say they 'might' do in future (36 versus 47 per cent).

### ***Join unofficial strikes***

Again, those who consider themselves to be far left were most likely to either have (27 per cent) or might (49 per cent) take part in unofficial strikes – followed by those who answered '2' on the political spectrum question; with the centre right ('4' on the spectrum) being the least likely to get involved in this type of activity (4 per cent said they had, and 25 per cent said they might). Overall, far fewer people are involved in this type of activity: only 6 per cent of those under 35 had, and 13 per cent of those over 35.

### ***Occupy buildings***

Once more, a similar result obtains: as a proportion, those answering '1' on the political spectrum question were more likely than other groups to either have already (18 per cent) or might (47 per cent) take part in occupying buildings. Only 19 per cent of this group said they would 'never' be involved in this type of activity, compared with 39 per



cent of those who answered '2'; 57 per cent who answered '3'; 69 per cent who answered '4' and 56 per cent who answered '5'. For this activity, younger people were more likely to say they either had or might take part (35 per cent in total) compared to older people (29 per cent).

**Sign a petition**

A very high proportion of people in every category had or might sign a petition; similarly with the age categories.


**Used personal violence like fighting with the police or other demonstrators**

Interestingly, this is the only question where far left respondents were not the most likely to have taken part in an activity: 6 per cent of those who answered '1' had taken part in the above; compared to 8 per cent of those who answered '5'. For this activity, 60 per cent of those who answered '1' said they would 'never' use personal violence, compared with 77 per cent of those who answered '2'; 77 per cent of those who answered '3'; 77 per cent of those who answered '4' and 60 per cent of those who answered '5'. This suggests, unsurprisingly, that this activity is mainly the preserve of the more radical fringes. Younger people are marginally more likely than older to say they had or might take part in this activity. 18 per cent of those aged 16-35 said they 'had' or 'might' take part, compared with 12 per cent of those aged over 35.

**Political and social attitudes**

We asked respondents a series of questions about their attitudes toward democracy, free expression, immigration, and how happy they would be having friends from different ethnic or religious groups.

We asked participants the following question: 'on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the United Kingdom?'




This suggests that, on balance, respondents are not satisfied with the way democracy works in the UK: 62 per cent of people are either not very or not at all satisfied.

Interestingly, when broken down according to where they sit on the political spectrum, we found that there was little difference between those who were far left, far right, or centre. (19 per cent of those on the far left were either 'very' or 'fairly' satisfied; for those who answered '3', the corresponding percentage is 23 – a fairly minor difference. Those under 36 were slightly more satisfied (25 per cent were either fairly or very satisfied) compared to those aged 36 and over (17 per cent).

We asked respondents their views on free expression. The question was asking whether or not people agreed with one of the following two statements. First: 'everyone should be free to express their political views openly, even if they are extreme'. Second: 'those who hold extreme political views should be prevented from expressing them openly'.

### Opinions on free expression




(18 per cent of people did not respond to the question). There are not any significant differences based on respondents' position on the political spectrum; or whether they were under 36 or aged 36 and over.

We asked respondents a question about their views on immigration.

When broken down according to position on the political spectrum, unsurprisingly those on the left of the spectrum are more likely to 'allow many' or 'allow some' compared to those on the right of the spectrum. Young people are more likely to either allow 'many' or 'some' (45 per cent in total) compared to those aged 36 and over (31 per cent in total).

**To what extent to you think the UK should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from most British people to come and live in the UK?**




We asked respondents about their views on gay men and lesbians: ‘to what extent do you agree with the following statement: gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life’. Overall 69 per cent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed; 8 per cent disagreed. Two per cent said they didn’t know – and 20 per cent did not fill in the question.

We asked respondents questions about whether they would feel happy with their children being friends with people from different religious and ethnic groups (1 meaning they would feel ‘totally uncomfortable’ and 5 meaning they would feel ‘totally comfortable’).

On the whole, regardless of the specific group in question, those on the left of the political spectrum were more likely to be comfortable with the children being friends with people from different religious and ethnic groups than those on the right; and those under 36 were more likely to be comfortable with this than those aged 36 and over.

**Attitudes about children being friends with people from different ethnic or religious groups**




**Trust in institutions**

We asked respondents a series of questions related to whether they tended to trust or tended not to trust various political institutions out of 5. (1 meaning ‘do not trust at all’, 5 meaning ‘have complete trust’).

These results show that, unsurprisingly and in line with other statistics on the subject, the legal system and the police enjoy the highest levels of trust among the UK public; while politicians, the government and the European Parliament enjoy very low levels of trust (although no institutions enjoy high levels of trust in absolute terms).

Examining these results in respect of political persuasion and age, the general trend is that people aged 36 and over are less trusting of every single institution than those under 36. This suggests that trust in political and legal institutions is not the result of hundreds of aggregated (but separate) direct experiences of institutions, but rather a generalised attitude toward trusting people in power or institutions that govern their lives.



## Attitudes to violence

We asked respondents four questions about their attitudes toward violence. (It is to be noted that this part only offered answers to chose from, there were no open questions). We ran a series of cross-tabulations against these responses in order to determine whether there were any correlations between different answers. Those which returned interesting results are included below.

### How strongly do you agree with the following: using violence to pursue political goals is never justified.

Agree and strongly agree	60%
Disagree and strongly disagree	24%
DK/NA	16%

Those who place themselves at the centre of the political spectrum are more likely to agree with the statement (74 per cent) than those on the right (66 per cent) or on the left (57 per cent).

Those who trust the legal system more are also more likely to agree that violence to pursue political goals is never justified. Seventy-five per cent of people who trust the legal system agree with the above statement, compared to 63 per cent who do not trust the legal system. (A similar score obtains in respect of trust in the British government). Younger people are also slightly less likely to agree with the statement: 51 per cent of those aged 16-35 agree or strongly agree, compared with 66 per cent of those aged 36 and over.

### **How justifiable is fighting with the police?**

Justifiable	21%
Neither justifiable nor unjustifiable	18%
Unjustifiable	30%
DK/NA	31%

Unlike the previous question, age appears to matter less for this answer. Only 20 per cent of those aged 36 and over think it justified, compared with 22 per cent of those aged 16-35. There is a small correlation – as expected – between trust levels in the police and whether or not fighting with the police is justifiable. Twenty eight per cent of people who do not trust the police consider violence is justifiable, compared with 22 per cent of people who do trust it.

### **How strongly do you agree with the following: I wouldn't feel bad about hitting someone if they really deserved it.**

Agree and strongly agree	43%
Disagree and strongly disagree	35%
Didn't answer / don't know	21%

When cross-tabulated against age, there is very little difference between those under 36 (42 per cent agree / strongly agree) and those over 36 (44 per cent agree / strongly agree). A small difference is visible in respect of life satisfaction. Eleven per cent of people who are not satisfied with their lives agree that they wouldn't feel bad hitting someone; compared to 6 per cent of people who are satisfied with their lives.

### **Terrorism is everyday news. In principle everyone is against it, but there is still room for differences of opinion. Which statement do you most agree with?**

Terrorism for whatever motive must always be condemned	65%
There may be certain circumstances where terrorism is justified	14%
Didn't answer / don't know	21%

There is a fairly large difference between age groups. Seventy-three per cent of those over 35 believe terrorism must always be condemned, compared to only 54 per cent of those aged between 16-35. Interestingly, satisfaction with democracy – often considered to be a significant factor in attitudes toward violent action – makes no difference to the answer to this question. Surprisingly, attitudes toward immigration does appear to make a difference. Forty eight per cent of people who believe that the UK should allow ‘many’ immigrants think terrorism should always be condemned: but this increases to 90 per cent of those who think the UK should allow ‘a few’. Unsurprisingly, there is a strong affinity between those who believe that ‘using violence to pursue political goals is justified’ and those who think that ‘terrorism may be justified under certain circumstances’. Thirty per cent of those who think violence to pursue political goals can be justified think terrorism may be permissible under certain circumstances, compared to 10 per cent of those who do not.

### **Factors correlated with support for violence**

However, these cross-tabulations are less rigorous than a full regression analysis, which allows for other variables to be held constant. Nevertheless, we isolated respondents who had supported violence across all four scenario questions (agreement with the following statements: ‘using violence to pursue political goals is never justified’; ‘how justifiable is fighting with the police?’; ‘I wouldn’t feel bad about hitting someone if they really deserved it’; and ‘terrorism for whatever motive must always be condemned’).

In order to provide more comparable data, for this section, we have removed the non-response data from each question.

In total, there were 135 respondents from the UK that agree with violence (or said they did not know) for all of the above questions. This allowed us to examine more closely what other attributes or responses correlated with support for violence.

In terms of age, 44 per cent were aged 16-25, which was by some margin the largest age category (the next largest was 46-55 at 16 per cent). Interestingly, the smallest age category was 76-85 (2 people) and then 26-35 (6 people, or 4 per cent).

Unsurprisingly it tended to be men who agreed with violence – 98 men, compared to 18 women (and 18 who said they would rather not answer; and 1 who did not answer).

In terms of location, those who were from a town or small city were the most likely to agree with violence: 55 people (or 41 per cent). However, this is simply in line with the overall survey demographics.

The most likely category to agree with violence in terms of employment and education was those in paid employment (47 people, or 35 per cent) and those for whom university was their highest level of education (58 people, or 43 per cent).

In terms of voting preference, 23 per cent of those who agreed with violence said they voted in the 2010 general election for ‘other’ – meaning not one of the mainstream parties listed. A further 15 per cent said they did not vote, and 14 per cent said they didn’t know. By contrast only 5 per cent had voted for the British National Party. This is very different from the sample as whole (where 18 per cent said the Conservative Party; 18

per cent said the Labour party; 15 per cent said UKIP; 5 per cent said the Green Party and 1 per cent said the BNP. The remainder either replied 'other', 'don't know', 'I did not vote' or did not answer).

This suggests that it is those most disengaged from the political process that agree with violence. However, the European election results are slightly different: 30 per cent of respondents said they had voted for UKIP; and 19 per cent the Green Party (16 per cent said 'other'). Interestingly, in the overall sample 54 per cent said they voted UKIP, 12 per cent said the Green party, and 9 per cent said 'other'.

In terms of the left-right split, those who self-defined as far left (placing themselves as '1' on a 1 to 5 political spectrum) were the most likely to agree (33 people, or 28 per cent). In the sample as a whole the far left comprise just 15 per cent.

In terms of political activities, those who agree with violence are significantly more likely than the overall sample to say they have or might engage in various actions. For example, 61 per cent have joined a boycott; compared to only 42 per cent for the sample as whole. Similarly, 78 per cent of the violent sub sample either have or might join an unofficial strike, compared to only 48 per cent of the overall sample; and 68 per cent either have or might occupy a building, compared to only 37 per cent of the sample overall.

In terms of satisfaction with democracy, 78 per cent of those who agreed with violence also said they were either 'not at all' or 'not very' satisfied with democracy. However, this is not significantly different from the survey as a whole where 74 per cent were either not at all or not very satisfied with democracy.

Similarly, 77 per cent of those who agreed with violence said everyone should be free to express their views openly, even if they are extreme. However, this is not significantly different from the survey as a whole where 68 per cent said the same.

Of those who agreed with violence, 39 per cent thought the UK should allow 'many' people of a different race or ethnic group to come to the UK (compared to only 16 per cent who thought the UK should allow 'none'). In the sample as a whole, however, only 20 per cent thought the UK should allow 'many', and 17 per cent thought the UK should allow 'none'.

In respect of whether gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives, of those who agree with violence, 87 per cent either agreed or strongly agreed. (In the survey overall 86 per cent of respondents per cent either agreed or strongly agreed).

In terms of how those who agree with violence felt about their children being friends with children from different religions or races, in each category, the most common response was that they would feel 'totally comfortable'. (However, it is to be noted that 22 per cent of respondents did not complete this question in the total sample).



## Attitudes about children being friends with people from different ethnic or religious groups

(% that feel 'totally comfortable')

	African	Jewish	Muslim	Roma
Those who agreed with violence	33	42	27	28
In the whole sample (only valid answers)	32	43	22	21
In the whole sample	25	34	17	17

In terms of trust in institutions, the highest proportion of those who agreed with violence tended not to trust institutions at all, in every category. However, as above, this also reflects the overall proportions of those who completed all the surveys.

## Trust in political institutions

(% of answers 'do not trust at all')

	British govt	British parliament	European parliament	Legal system	Police	Political parties	Politicians
Those who agreed with violence	48	43	44	25	28	47	55
In the whole sample (only valid answers)	46	41	62	24	19	42	53
In the whole sample	37	33	50	19	16	34	43

Interestingly, these results show that it is particularly a lack of trust in the police that distinguishes the violent sub sample from the overall sample.

## Overall

- Young people are more likely to support terrorism in principle.
- Those who do not trust the legal system are more likely to support violence.
- Anti-immigration sentiment is correlated with not supporting terrorism.
- A suggestion that disengagement from mainstream political parties is correlated with support for violence; although a lack of trust in the police also appears to be a factor.
- There is also a relatively strong correlation between various types of political activity and support for violent activity.

## *Research in Hungary*

In order to recruit respondents, we targeted the Facebook supporters of eleven Hungarian political parties. We ran separate campaigns for each party, targeting various age and gender categories in order to reach as representative a cross section of the supporters of these groups as possible.

Adverts and surveys were administered in Hungarian. In total, this yielded 4,991 completed survey responses. We kept all surveys where at least three quarters of the survey was completed. We include the percentage of non-response for each question.

### **Demographics**

The majority of respondents (53 per cent) were male, and 39 per cent were female. Two per cent responded that they preferred not to answer (six per cent did not answer).

Age categories were broken down into six categories. The largest age category is 56-65 (32 per cent of respondents). The rest is as follows: 16-25 is 12 per cent; 26-35 is 7 per cent; 36-45 is 6 per cent; 46-55 is 18 per cent; 66-75 is 20 per cent; and over 76 is 4 per cent. One per cent did not answer.

In terms of where respondents live, 34 per cent come from a big city, 33 per cent from a town or small city and 20 per cent from a country village. The remainder were from the suburbs of a big city (8 per cent) and a farm (1 per cent). Five per cent did not respond.

Overall, 35 per cent of our sample were in paid work; 36 per cent were retired, six per cent were students, only 4 per cent were unemployed. (Five per cent did not answer). Thirty six per cent had higher education level, the same proportion said their highest level of education was secondary school, and 18 per cent said vocational school.

In respect of political views, we asked respondents whom they voted for in the last parliamentary elections. Fifty-one per cent said MSZP / Együtt / DK / PM / MLP. Eighteen per cent said Fidesz / KDNP; thirteen per cent said they voted for Jobbik; five per cent said they did not vote; and 9 per cent did not answer. This suggests a marginally more left-wing sample than the population at large.

This sample is not a perfectly representative sample of the Hungarian population, nor is it a representative sample of Facebook users. The same caveats apply in this research as for the UK study.

We also asked respondents who they voted for in the May 2014 European election. Forty-two per cent said they voted for DK, 16 per cent said Fidesz, 12 per cent said Jobbik and 4 per cent said MSZP.


We also asked respondents where they sat on a political spectrum. In total, 34 per cent of people responded with '1' (meaning far left); 13 per cent '2' (centre left), 13 per cent '3' (centre), 11 per cent '4' (centre right), and 22 per cent '5' (far right). Seven per cent said they do not know. (All non-responses are removed for this answer).

## Political and social attitudes

We asked respondents a series of questions about their attitudes toward democracy, free expression, immigration, and how happy they would be having friends from different ethnic or religious groups.

First, we asked participants the following question: ‘on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the Hungary?’

**Satisfaction with democracy**




This suggests that, on balance, respondents are not satisfied with the way democracy works in the Hungary: only 14 per cent said they were either very or fairly satisfied.

Interestingly, when broken down according to where they sit on the political spectrum, we found that there was a very significant difference in the way they answered the question. Of those who said they were ‘far left’ (answering ‘1’ on the survey), only 1 per cent were satisfied with democracy. By contrast, of those who said they were far right (answering ‘5’ on the survey) 18 per cent were satisfied. Those who answered ‘1’ or ‘2’ (far left and centre left) were more likely to be dissatisfied than those who answered ‘4’ or ‘5’ (centre right and far right).

Those under 35 were less satisfied than those aged 36 and over (although this could be driven by a third variable, such as political views). 58 per cent of those 36 and over were ‘not at all satisfied’ compared to 38 per cent of those under 36.

We asked respondents about their views on free expression. The question was asking whether or not people agreed with one of the following two statements. First: ‘everyone should be free to express their political views openly, even if they are extreme’. Second: ‘those who hold extreme political views should be prevented from expressing them openly’.

### Opinions on free expression




(19 per cent of people did not respond to the question, and 6 per cent said they did not know). This is different to the results in the UK, where there is a higher proportion that agree everyone should be free to express their political views openly.

As above, there was a significant difference depending on where the respondent sat on the political spectrum. Those on the far left were more likely (57 per cent) to think people should be prevented from expressing their views openly than those on the far right (24 per cent). Similarly age also appeared to make a difference: 49 per cent of those under 36 thought everyone should be free to express their views openly, compared to 36 per cent of those aged 36 and over. (And similarly only 14 per cent of those under 36 thought extreme views should be prevented, compared to 41 per cent of those aged 36 and over).

We also asked respondents a question about their views on immigration.

Unlike other questions, when broken down according to position on the political spectrum, there is relatively little difference across the groups. For example, 17 per cent of those on the far left say Hungary should allow many; compared to 20 per cent of those on the far right. Equally, age does not appear to make a major difference either: 15 per cent of those under 36 say Hungary should allow many immigrants, compared to 17 per cent of those aged 36 and over.

**To what extent do you think Hungary should allow people of a different race or ethnic group from Hungarian people to come and live in Hungary.**




We asked respondents about their views on gay men and lesbians: ‘to what extent do you agree with the following statement: gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives’. Overall 54 per cent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed; 22 per cent disagreed. Three per cent said they didn’t know and 22 per cent did not answer the question.

We asked respondents questions about whether they would feel happy with their children being friends with people from different religious and ethnic groups (1 meaning they would feel ‘totally uncomfortable’ and 5 meaning they would feel ‘totally comfortable’).

On the whole, regardless of the specific group in question, those on the left of the political spectrum were more likely to be comfortable with their children being friends with people from different religious and ethnic groups than those on the right; and those under 36 were more likely to be comfortable with this than those aged 36 and over.

**Attitudes about children being friends with people from different ethnic or religious groups.**




**Trust in institutions**

We asked respondents a series of questions related to whether they tended to trust or tended not to trust various political institutions out of 5. (1 meaning ‘do not trust at all’, 5 meaning ‘have complete trust’).

These results show that, unsurprisingly, and in line with other statistics on the subject, no institutions enjoy particularly high levels of complete trust.

The low level of trust in the legal system and the police is notable (although this depends in part on how you measure it). This does not vary greatly with age.

Unlike the UK, the European Parliament is more trusted than the national government. Interestingly, people under 36 appear slightly less likely to trust the European Parliament than those aged 36 and over. Those to the left had far higher levels of trust than those to the right.



There is quite a significant difference depending on where people sit on the spectrum. Those who say they are left or far left are far less likely to trust the Hungarian government than those on the right or far right (this is likely to be because the current government is right wing).

## Attitudes to violence

We asked respondents four questions about their attitudes toward violence. We ran a series of cross-tabulations against these responses in order to determine whether there were any correlations between different answers. Those which returned interesting results are included below.

### How strongly do you agree with the following: using violence to pursue political goals is never justified.

Agree and strongly agree	67%
Disagree and strongly disagree	14%
Didn't answer / don't know	19%

There is general agreement that using violence to pursue political goals is never justified.

Those who place themselves at the centre of the political spectrum are slightly more likely to agree with the statement (78 per cent) than those on the right (74 per cent) and slightly less likely than those on the left (79 per cent). These are very minor differences.

Those aged 36 and over are slightly more likely to agree with the statement (71 per cent) compared to those under 36 (52 per cent) (although some of this difference is also down to the higher proportion of people under 36 who said they 'don't know'). Sixteen per cent of those under 36 and 13 per cent of those aged 36 and over disagreed.

Those who trust the legal system more are also more likely to agree that violence to pursue political goals is never justified. Eighty-four per cent of people who trust the legal system agree with the above statement, compared to 78 per cent who do not trust the legal system.

### **How justifiable is fighting with the police?**

Justifiable	50%
Neither justifiable nor unjustifiable	17%
Unjustifiable	6%
Didn't answer / don't know	27%

For this question, age has a small effect: 53 per cent of those aged 36 and over think fighting with the police is justifiable, compared to 38 per cent of those under 36. There is a small correlation – as expected – between trust levels in the police and whether or not fighting with the police is justifiable: 22 per cent of those have no trust in the police think violence against them is justified; compared with only 9 per cent of those who trust them.

### **How strongly do you agree with the following: I wouldn't feel bad about hitting someone if they really deserved it.**

Agree and strongly agree	36%
Disagree and strongly disagree	40%
Didn't answer / don't know	24%

For this question, these are very similar answers to those observed in the UK survey.

When cross-tabulated against age, there is a difference between those under 36 (44 per cent agree / strongly agree) and those aged 36 and over (34 per cent agree / strongly agree).

A small difference is visible in respect of life satisfaction. Thirty nine per cent of people who are satisfied with their lives would not feel bad about hitting someone if they deserved it; compared to 55 per cent of people who are not satisfied with their lives.



**Terrorism is everyday news. In principle everyone is against it, but there is still room for differences of opinion. Which statement do you most agree with?**

Terrorism for whatever motive must always be condemned	70%
There may be certain circumstances where terrorism is justified	8%
Didn't answer / don't know	22%

There is a fairly large difference between age groups. Twenty-three per cent of those under 36 think that terrorism can be justified in certain circumstances, compared to only 7 per cent of those aged 36 and over. Unsurprisingly, there is a strong affinity between those who believe that 'using violence to pursue political goals is justified' and those who think that 'terrorism may be justified under certain circumstances'. Eighteen per cent of those who think violence to pursue political goals can be justified think terrorism may be permissible under certain circumstances, compared to 8 per cent of those who do not.

### **Factors correlated with support for violence**

However, as noted above, these cross-tabulations are less rigorous than a full regression analysis, which allows for other variables to be held constant. Similarly to the UK study we isolated respondents who had supported violence across all four scenario questions. In order to provide more comparable data, for this section, we have removed the non-response data from each question.

In total, there were 108 respondents from Hungary that agreed with violence (or said they did not know) for all of the above questions. This allowed us to examine more closely certain demographics and attitudinal results correlated with support for violence.

In terms of age, 32 per cent were aged 16-25, which was by some margin the largest age category (the next largest was 46-55 at 19 per cent). The smallest age category was 76-85 (1 person) and then 36-45 (6 people, or 6 per cent).

Unsurprisingly it tended to be men who agreed with violence – 69 men (67 per cent), compared to 26 women (25 per cent) (and 8 who said they would rather not answer).

In terms of location, those who were from a town or small city were the most likely to agree with violence: 47 people (or 44 per cent). This is despite the fact that only 33 per cent of respondents were from a town or small city.

The most likely category to agree with violence in terms of employment and education was those in paid employment (39 people, or 36 per cent) and those for whom secondary school was their highest educational achievement (41 people, or 38 per cent). This is broadly in line with the percentages found in the survey overall.

In terms of voting preference, 41 (39 per cent) of those who agreed with violence said they voted in the last parliamentary election for Jobbik; and 24 per cent said they voted for MSZP / Együtt / DK / PM / MLP. A further 13 per cent said they did not vote. Similarly the European election results find that 49 per cent of respondents who agreed with violence voted for Jobbik; and 15 per cent for DK.

This is very different from the sample as a whole, where only 14 per cent said they voted for Jobbik in the last parliamentary elections and six per cent said they did not know. (In the May 2014 European election, 50 per cent said they voted for DK, and only 14 per cent said Jobbik.)

In terms of the left-right split, those who self-defined as far right (placing themselves as '5' on a 1 to 5 political spectrum) were the most likely to agree (42 people, or 40 per cent). In the sample as a whole, however, only 22 per cent of people were from the far right, compared to 34 per cent from the far left.

In terms of satisfaction with democracy, 79 per cent of those who agreed with violence also said they were either 'not at all' or 'not very' satisfied with democracy. However, this is not significantly different from the survey as a whole, where the figure is 80 per cent.

Similarly, 75 per cent of those who agreed with violence said everyone should be free to express their views openly, even if they are extreme. This is markedly different from the survey as a whole, where only 48 per cent of respondents agreed with the same statement.

Of those who agreed with violence, 46 per cent thought Hungary should allow 'a few' people of a different race or ethnic group to come to Hungary (compared to only 8 per cent who thought Hungary should allow 'some'; and 9 per cent who thought 'many'). In the sample as a whole 36 per cent thought Hungary should allow a few; 24 per cent thought 'some' and 21 per cent 'many'.

In respect of whether gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own lives, of those who agree with violence, 44 per cent either agreed or strongly agreed. (Overall 68 per cent of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed.)

In terms of how those who agree with violence felt about their children being friends with children from different religions or races, in each category, the most common response was that they would feel 'totally uncomfortable'; and this was in marked difference to the survey overall – in each case the violence sub sample was markedly more likely to feel uncomfortable – especially in respect of Roma.

In respect of trust in institutions, the major difference between the violent sub sample and the sample overall was that the latter was markedly more likely to distrust the legal system and the European Parliament. (This is notably different from the UK results).

### Why is the role of social media important in spreading extremist ideas

There has been a change over the last decade in the way people access, consume and produce media: a shift away from mainstream media and toward internet-based content and social media. Hateful or offensive content has been present on the internet from its inception. For example, *Stormfront*, recognised as one of the first 'hate sites', has operated since at least the early nineties. However some believe that social media has made it easier to publish and spread extreme or offensive views.

Radical right wing parties and movements are well established to be early and active users of social media, both as a way of producing cheap and rapid propaganda; creating a coherent group identity, and organising events and activities<sup>105</sup>.

This study examines the way a selection of populist right wing pages on Facebook and Twitter accounts can shed some light on the way these groups use social media. Although it is increasingly recognised that these groups are active users of social media, there is a lack of research into precisely how they use it.

It is important to stress that both Facebook and Twitter have terms and conditions which prevent hateful and extremist groups and content being on the platform. For instance, Facebook prohibits and removes hate speech, which it defines as 'content that directly attacks people based on their: race, ethnicity, national origin, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, sex, gender, or gender identity, or serious disabilities or diseases'. Although they do not allow hate speech, sometimes people post disagreeable or disturbing content that does not violate the platforms' policies.

### Methodology

This study was conducted using both Facebook and Twitter. The reason both sites were used was because both are known to be popular with the groups in question; and both platforms allow researchers to collect and analyse data from them in a relatively easy and structured manner.

It is possible to manually collect social media data in a number of ways - copying, screen grabbing, note-taking, and saving web-pages. However, where large volumes of data are involved, the most appropriate method is to collect the data automatically. This is done through connection to a platform's 'Application Programming Interface' ('API'). The API is a portal that acts as a technical gatekeeper of the data held by the social media platform. They allow an external computer system to communicate with and acquire information from the social media platform. Each API differs in the rules they set for this access: the type of data they allow researchers to access, the format they produce this data in, and the quantities that they produce it in.

---

105 See Demos (2012) *The New Face of Digital Populism* for an overview.

Some APIs can deliver historical data stretching back months or years, whilst others only deliver very recent content. Some deliver a random selection of social media data taken from the platform, whilst others deliver data that matches the queries – usually keywords selected by the analyst - stipulated by the researcher. In general, all APIs produce data in a consistent, 'structured' format, and in large quantities. Facebook and Twitter's APIs also produce 'meta-data' – information about the data itself, including information about the user, their followers, and profile. This meta-data can be a rich source of information of value to social media researchers, often containing information on everything from the sender's device type, to their account creation date, location and social media following<sup>106</sup>.

There are several types of API access to Facebook data, most of which have been designed for app makers, such as Public Feed API, a Keyword Insights API, a Marketing API and Atlas API<sup>107</sup>. For this work we used the Public Feed API which allows researchers to access all data that has been posted on a public Facebook page. (Access to all Facebook data is predicated on the user's settings and who has agreed to share information with them. Facebook's privacy structures are complex - potentially, any single user can have a distinct privacy setting for every piece of data they share. The Public Feed API will only return data that is public).

Using the Public Feed API, we collected data from selected Facebook pages from the UK and from Hungary. We used 'R', an open source software that allows researchers to access publicly available data from public pages. These pages were handcrafted by the researchers who are subject matter specialists in the subject.

We also collected tweets via Twitter's 'stream' and 'search' application programming interfaces (APIs). The 'search' API returns a collection of relevant Tweets from an index that extends up to roughly a week in the past. The stream API continually produces tweets that contain one of a number of keywords to the researcher, in real time as they are made. Identifying specific accounts also allows researchers to collect the last 3,200 tweets from that account. These tweets are then returned to the researcher's own computer data set in a Json file, which can then be subject to analysis. We analysed the data using a software package called Qlik. As for Facebook, we subjected the data to a series of analysis.

In both instances we did not attempt to collect or use any personal information about individuals; nor did we attempt to identify any individuals. We have obscured all account names and quotes to ensure no individuals are identified, and deleted all the data following the analysis. (Although a decision was taken to mention some large organisational accounts). The purpose was to understand the broad patterns of behaviour. For Facebook we did not collect any data from groups or from individual's pages; and we did not collect any data from closed pages. We did not attempt to collect or use any personal information about individuals; nor did we attempt to identify any individuals. Where a user's name or ID was collected inadvertently, it was deleted.

---

106 C Miller, 'Social Action on Social Media', Nesta Working Paper, Working Paper Series (Nesta: 2015)

107 <https://developers.facebook.com/docs/graph-api/other-apis>

It is important to stress that these are in many cases quite experimental methodologies. There are no firmly established 'best practice' methods to collect and analyse data of this nature. Further, this is designed as a scoping study. Therefore findings need to be read with caution.

## United Kingdom Results

### *Facebook*

Over 2 months (1st October 2014 – 1st December 2014) we collected 497 posts from Facebook pages of ten populist right wing groups from the UK, which gave a total of 930,145 interactions (an interaction can be a 'like', 'share' or 'comment'). We tried to collect a fairly wide spread of different groups that have a presence on Facebook; and a number that was broadly comparable in size to the Hungary case study. Based on the experience of the researchers, we selected the following: Britain First<sup>108</sup>, British National Party<sup>109</sup>, English Defence League (EDL)<sup>110</sup>, EDL Forum<sup>111</sup>, English Nationalist Alliance<sup>112</sup>, I Am Proud to be British<sup>113</sup>, Infidels of Britain<sup>114</sup>, Send the SAS to Catch Jihadi John<sup>115</sup>, South Wales British Movement<sup>116</sup>, and the Yorkshire Angels<sup>117</sup> (a female division of the EDL). However, there are many more similar Facebook pages that could have been part of this study – in particular, there are at least 20 EDL pages run by regional divisions.

It is important to stress that we do not claim that any of the pages included in this study are hateful, or that the content there is 'hateful'. Instead, we have focused this study on populist right wing Facebook pages, which are frequently accused of being a place where a high volume of hateful content is posted or shared. We refer to these pages as 'populist right wing' pages throughout, and have found that there is a very wide range of content posted and shared there. 'Posts' in this sense refer to updates that were made on the page by the administrator(s) of that page.

### **Overall data on the size and scale**

On a measure of total 'page likes', the UK based Page Britain First is the most popular page of its kind in Europe: with 569 thousand page likes; and a total reach of 51 million users at the time of writing<sup>118</sup>. (This data is only available to page admins. It was publicly shared by the administrator of Britain First on their public page.)

---

108 <https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritainFirst?fref=ts>

109 <https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritishNationalParty?fref=ts>

110 <https://www.facebook.com/EDL-English-Defence-League-238696516197018/timeline/>

111 <https://www.facebook.com/English-Defence-League-EDL-Forums-130356320328490/timeline/>

112 <https://www.facebook.com/English-Nationalist-Alliance-170875669635671/timeline/>

113 <https://www.facebook.com/ImProud2BeBritish?fref=ts>

114 <https://www.facebook.com/INFIDELS-OF-BRITAIN-352629524764287/timeline/>

115 <https://www.facebook.com/CatchJihadiJohn?fref=ts>

116 <https://www.facebook.com/South-Wales-British-Movement-775558882477451/timeline/>

117 <https://www.facebook.com/Yorkshire-Angels-English-defence-league-168144953236977/timeline/>

118 At the end of September, 2015 number of page likes was almost 924 thousand.

On average, posts in our collection had 1871 interactions (which includes likes, comments and shares) per post. However, this is skewed by a small number of highly active posts. If we remove the top 10 most popular posts, the average is 1,200).

This masks enormous variation. The most popular piece of content had over 100 thousand interactions (below); and was posted by the group 'Britain First'. (See below). This is a photo of Prince Harry and William. Typically, Britain First posts content which is not overtly political in nature. By contrast, 30 per cent of the posts had fewer than 100 interactions. This illustrates the way in which a small number of very popular or 'viral' posts can have a dramatic reach (at least in terms of online reach), and a large proportion of posts have a relatively small reach.

### **The most popular Facebook post<sup>119</sup>**



### **An analysis of network / membership structure and how that effects how content is shared**

In order to better understand the way information and ideas flow across these pages, we selected the UK pages and examined the extent to which individuals who commented in one page also commented on another page. This data was taken from Facebook's API through R and visualized in Gephi, an open source network analysis tool.


---

<sup>119</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/OfficialBritainFirst/photos/a.347167375428530.1073741829.300455573433044/573245729487359/?type=3&theater>

The images below show how the users are clustered around the different groups they are active in, including how active they are in each group they are members of. This is called 'edge rank'.

To build a network map, we extended our sample to 92 pages Facebook pages, which contained a total of 54,495 unique users, who between them made 159,437 comments on those pages. (This is calculated by collecting the comments and working out the number of unique user IDs that contributed to that data set). We extended the sample in order to make a more meaningful network map, as we wanted to examine how our pages fit into a wider network of users. To extend the network, we added a number of UK Independence Party (UKIP) Facebook pages; and added a number of EDL regional division pages. This analysis finds that 16.2 per cent of users are active on two or more pages; 1.3 per cent are active in four or more. It suggests that there are a small number of highly active users that create content in several pages.

### Network of users




### What type of posts are most effective at reaching a wide audience

In order to determine what type of posts were successful in reaching a wide audience, we examined a) the format of posts and b) the content and tone of posts.

Facebook API data allows researchers to determine what format posts take, divided by 'link', 'photo', 'status' or 'video'. The figure below shows what type of format was most widely used by the pages in question. Photos are extremely popular among these groups – which illustrates how important visual images are to these groups.

### Content Types (rounded to nearest %)



### Analysis of post content

In order to have a more nuanced understanding of what type and what tone of post is most popular, we analysed 129 of the most highly interacted with content from the 597 posts collected from these pages. We divided these into categories of content of post and tone of post. (The categories were selected by researchers based on a coding category created for this research. We judged post popularity by the average number of interactions they received).<sup>120</sup>

Content	Average of Total Interactions	Count of Category
Attack	27,302	2
Comment	28,005	48
News	9,978	60
Question	8,825	19
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>16,785</b>	<b>129</b>

Tone	Average of Total Interactions	Count of Tone
Angry	14,857	61
Celebratory	19,451	30
Neutral	17,775	38
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>16,785</b>	<b>129</b>

<sup>120</sup> In some cases samples were too small to be confident in precise percentages, so it's best used as illustrative data.



The most popular tone of posts on populist right wing pages was ‘celebratory’ such as in posts commemorating war dead or patriotic pride (often involving an image)<sup>121</sup>. The most popular content of post is ‘comment’ which we define as a ‘catch-all’ label applied to content that is created or shared by the page that commentates on a situation without necessarily referencing outside sources. These are very high averages because they are often skewed by a small number of very highly shared content.

On these pages, 5 per cent of all comments were categorised as counter speech, meaning comments which disagreed with the post or presented an alternative, more positive message.

### *Twitter*

Researchers created a handcraft set of 30 ‘seed accounts’, based, as far as possible, on a similar selection of groups as the Facebook pages. These were public accounts which were known to the researchers to be active and open supporters of the English Defence League (a UK street based anti-Islamism movement) or the British National Party. Based on these seed accounts we then built a network out of users who followed those accounts and then collected tweets posted by those users in the past 3 months. We have anonymised all accounts and not named any individual user or included any posts, to protect user privacy. Rather, the purpose of the work was to better understand the nature of the network of users.

### **Structure of network**

By building up a network in the way described above, we were able to determine the general shape of the network of accounts associated with right wing populist accounts on Twitter.


Based on our analysis, we found a total of 46 thousand users in the network. Of those, 8 thousand follow at least two other users; around 3,700 follow at least 3, and around 1,500 follow at least five. Two-hundred and ninety six – which might be considered ‘the hardcore’ network – follow at least ten.

We took the 46 thousand accounts and produced a network map to illustrate the extent to which different users follow multiple accounts within the network. These maps are built using Gephi, an open source network analysis tool. We plotted each user and page on the map. If a user had interacted with a post, a connection (or ‘edge’) was drawn between the two users.

As the diagram below illustrates, there are small clusters of activity which are not always embedded in the entire network. The cluster to the right in the diagram is of British National Party supporters – which highlights the fact these users follow just a single account from the network, and not others users.

---

121 Celebratory content is that which celebrates the page or its values.



## Levels of activity

Of the 1,500 'core' accounts identified, 1,040 had been active in the last three months (around 69 per cent of the total). We then collected data from those accounts, and found that – over the last three months – they had posted 795 thousands tweets. This averages at around 760 tweets per account over the period in question, which is around 8 tweets per day per account.

In order to have a better understanding the sort of content being posted by these accounts, we collected the top 'hashtags' being used in tweets<sup>122</sup>. The chart below shows the top 15 hashtags used over a three month period – and the number of times they were used. This shows a number of things.

- First, there is a lot of engagement with (or discussion about) mainstream media outlets and stories. UKIP, the BBC and BBC Question time are all popular hashtags among the network and all relate in some sense to mainstream subjects.
- Second, as expected, there is a considerable amount of discussion relating to Islam and Islamism.
- Finally, the network has used hashtags that are associated with right wing (or extreme right wing) politics. 'Tcot' refers to 'Top Conservatives On Twitter' and is typically used in the United States. More extreme, 'WhiteGenocide' is a phrase sometimes

<sup>122</sup> A hashtag is a typically just a word with an accompanying # sign, and is used to allow the content to be more easily findable by other users who search Twitter for those hashtags.

used by extreme right wing groups to describe what they consider a general diminution of the white race around the world – typically as part of a wide plot by various shadowy groups.

## Top Hashtags



Across the network overall, we searched for the most popular single tweet. It related to a call by one user to ban the burka in the UK. It included an image and encouraged other users to re-tweet it, which was done 3,815 times. Encouraging someone to re-tweet content is a common strategy to increase its reach. It is not possible however to determine how many other users may have seen it – although it is likely to be well in excess of one hundred thousand people.

## Hungarian Results

Facebook

Between February 2014 and June 2015 we collected 13,877 posts from 18 public Hungarian Facebook pages, which gave a total of 3,501,055 interactions (an interaction can be a 'like', 'share' or 'comment'). Most of the selected Facebook pages were connected to far-right groups or movements; some support pro-Russian propaganda; and a small number could be described as militaristic or spreading conspiracy theories. These pages were selected by researchers based on their knowledge of the subject (but they are not all named, in order to protect individual privacy – only the largest pages are mentioned by name). As above, we did not collect any information from private or password protected pages. As for the UK research, it is important to stress that we do not claim that any of the pages included in this study are hateful, or that the content there is 'hateful'. Instead,

we have focused the Hungarian research on far-right wing, militaristic or conspiracist Facebook pages, which are frequently accused of being a place where a high volume of hateful content is posted or shared.

### Overall data on the size and scale

Within our set of Facebook pages Jobbik's official page is the most popular, with 298,876 likes as of end of September 2015.

On average, posts in our collection had 252 interactions (which includes likes, comments and shares) per post. This is by far less, than the average interaction in the UK sample (1,871). The most popular post appeared on the page of Jobbik and had 40,842 total interactions (29,134 likes, 732 comments and 10,976 shares). This was a celebratory photo posted to commemorate international women's day, showing young women at a wedding ceremony in traditional Hungarian clothes.

#### The most popular Facebook post<sup>123</sup>



<sup>123</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/JobbikMagyarorszagertMozgalom/photos/a.10152008068391405.1073741874.287770891404/10153043631511405/?type=1>

The number of interactions generated by the second most popular post was less than half of this. The top five posts appeared on the Facebook page of Jobbik, but only two of them were celebratory: one was critical of the government (against the government's planned Internet tax), one was a nationalistic (supporting the use of buses that were manufactured in Hungary) one was critical of the police, and the other celebratory posts celebrated Jobbik's first winning candidate in a single-member constituency.

### The 2<sup>nd</sup> – 4<sup>th</sup> most popular Facebook posts



As Jobbik's Facebook page is the most liked one in our sample, it is not surprising that among the first 85 most popular posts there is only one<sup>124</sup> which was posted on another page (Jobbra Át, or 'Turn to the right'). This was an image saying that ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries (that were part of Greater-Hungary before Trianon) are also part of the Hungarian Nation. This post was the 6<sup>th</sup> most popular with 13,292 interactions (most of them, 11,768 were 'shares').

The 100 most popular posts (ranked by the number of interactions they have generated) are dominated by photos (89 of them were photos, 10 were links and there was 1 video).

It is important to mention that a post that linked to an article on Alfahír.hu (an online media outlet connected to Jobbik) generated 10,551 interactions. The article<sup>125</sup> reported about a crime committed by gypsies against young non-gypsy Hungarians. This high level of popularity reflects how anti-Roma attitudes are present and embedded in the Hungarian society and in particular among sympathizers of Jobbik<sup>126</sup>.

### **An analysis of network**

In order to better understand the way information and ideas flow across the selected Hungarian Facebook pages, we examined the extent to which individuals who directly engaged with a page by commenting on one page directly engaged with another page. This data was taken from Facebook's API through R and visualized in Gephi, an open source network analysis tool.

Our sample contained a total of 39,514 unique users, who made 168,334 comments on those pages. (This is calculated by collecting the comments and working out the number of unique user IDs that contributed to that data set).

Most of the commenters are active on only one page (83 per cent). A further 12 per cent are active on two pages and slightly more than 5 per cent commented on at least 3 fanpages. Regarding number of comments, the most popular fanpage is Jobbik's, with 124,303 comments by 30,691 unique users on the last 1,000 posts between 13th October 2013 and 24th July 2015. The second most popular page is Alfahír, where 6,534 unique users made 29,265 comments on the last 1,000 posts. (These 1,000 posts were posted since April 2015 meaning that while Jobbik's community is much larger, the community engaging with Alfahír is more active). In both cases these comments then spark a conversation in the replies to that initial comment.

More than half of the users active on all pages commented on only one post (52.75%). 15.6 per cent commented twice. 84 per cent of the active users have no more than 5 comments. Only 8 per cent commented on more than 10 times.

---


124 <https://www.facebook.com/JobbraAt/photos/a.201859210010910.1073741828.201838506679647/349345621928934/?type=1>

125 [http://alfahir.hu/ugy\\_megverte\\_a\\_cigany\\_gyerek\\_az\\_iskolaban\\_hogy\\_koponyatorese\\_lett](http://alfahir.hu/ugy_megverte_a_cigany_gyerek_az_iskolaban_hogy_koponyatorese_lett)

126 Bernát, Juhász, Krekó, Molnár: *The roots of radicalism and anti-Roma attitudes on the far right*, 2013. Available online: [http://www.tarki.hu/en/news/2013/items/20130305\\_bernat\\_juhasz\\_kreko\\_molnar.pdf](http://www.tarki.hu/en/news/2013/items/20130305_bernat_juhasz_kreko_molnar.pdf)

The graphic below shows how the users are clustered around the different groups they are active in, including how active they are in each group they are members of. This is called 'edge rank'. Clouds of blue dots that are connected to only one Facebook page (coloured in orange) represent users who commented on only one page. Clouds that are connected to more than one page contain users who are active on more than one Facebook page.

### Network of users



As noted above, Jobbik's page received the most comments by far: but the majority of these commenters are active on only this page. On the upper half of the image the group pro-Russian pages can be seen close to each other. This means that a large part of their commenters are active on 2 or more of them. Conspiracist pages tend to be relatively distinct – on the top of the image, but through their common commenters they are also connected to the network.



## The refugee crisis on the Facebook page of Jobbik and Alfahír

Jobbik has an extremely anti-migrant (pro-nationalistic) stance in the current refugee crisis. This is clear from their Facebook page – most of their posts were connected to this issue. To get a detailed view on how these posts spread, we conducted further research of the pages of Jobbik and Alfahír between 12-17 September, 2015. We took the 118 posts that appeared during this period and produced a network map to illustrate the extent to which different users interacted with these posts. We plotted each post on the map with yellow dots. Unique users, who either liked, commented or shared these posts are represented by the blue dots. If a user had interacted on two particular posts, a connection (or 'edge') was drawn between the two points. Users with a high number of edges had interacted with a number of different posts.

As the diagram below illustrates, the posts are clustered into 2 separate groups. In the upper group are the posts appeared on the Facebook page of Jobbik, while in the lower groups are posts on the Alfahír page. We can see some edges connecting these groups, which means there were users who interacted with posts from both of these pages: 8 per cent of users liked posts from both Jobbik and Alfahír, while 73 per cent liked only Jobbik's posts and 19 per cent liked Alfahír's posts. This means Jobbik can reach to a much wider audience via its Facebook page than Alfahír can. Some posts (highlighted on the image) were very popular and a lot of users interacted with them, who generally are not active on these pages (the large blue spots with only one edge). This means that these images could trigger a lot of attention from Facebook users who are not core sympathizers of Jobbik.





## Twitter

Researchers created a handcraft set of 24 Twitter 'seed accounts' from Hungary. These were accounts which were known to the researchers to be active and open supporters of Jobbik (regional, local organizations of the party). Based on these seed accounts we then built a network out of users who followed those accounts and then collected tweets posted by those users in the past 3 months.

### Structure of network

We produced a network map to illustrate the extent to which different users follow multiple accounts within the network. As the figure below illustrates, similarly to the UK result, there are small clusters of activity which are not always embedded in the entire network. The cluster in the lower-right corner represents supporters of Jobbik's official Twitter account – which highlights the fact these users follow just a single account from the network, and not others users, just like BNP supporters in the United Kingdom.



### Levels of activity

We identified 499 'core' accounts, these followed at least four others in the network. Among them only 127 unique users had been active in the last three months (around 25 per cent of the total, a far less number than we got in the UK research). We then collected data from those accounts, and found that – over the last three months – they had posted

29,469 tweets. This averages at around 232 tweets per account over the period in question, which is less than one tweet per day per account. This is also significantly less active than the groups studied in the UK.

## Strengths and weaknesses of these methodologies

There is a growing interest in the field of 'big data' analytics and how it can be applied for social science research – including for the study of radical groups and movements. There is a considerable amount of relevant and useful data available on social media platforms, particularly Twitter and Facebook (although there are many others). Typically, social media datasets are far larger than comparative datasets gathered through conventional polling, interviewing and surveying techniques. This often (although not always) means it requires automated systems to collect and analyse them and this creates new methodological challenges. Social media data are often – although not always – generated by users themselves, and sometimes contain personal data, and this also creates new ethical concerns.

Overall, while there has been a considerable growth in the type and nature of social media research – especially in the commercial and advertising sectors – there is no broadly accepted best practice body of methodology and ethics about how to collect, use, and present these data sets for academic and social science researchers. Established ways of researching attitudes have long histories of use. This experience has consolidated into a body of good practice – dos and don'ts – that, when followed, ensures the quality of the research. Social media research does not have a long history of use, or a collective memory of what works and what doesn't. It uses new technologies in ways that are unfamiliar with the social sciences, often with new and important implications for research.

This research has found that:

- Social media has become an important and active venue for a wide variety of populist right wing activity.
- However, although the network appears large, it is often led by a relatively small number of dedicated and active users.
- Nevertheless, these pieces of content can reach relatively large audiences outside their own network of users.
- They use both Facebook and Twitter extensively to discuss and share information about both mainstream and very niche political issues. It is common for these groups to share 'mainstream' information in order to reach a wider audience.
- For reasons discussed below, however, we are very hesitant to draw general conclusions based on these data sets about the offline composition of these groups.

In very general terms, most social media data tends to share the following broad features, which are useful in terms of deciding when and where it is (and where it is not) a potentially useful source. These are both positive and negative attributes of these data sets.

## Strengths

*Relational:* Because most social media is premised on curated networks of users, most data include some information about the relationship between users. This can take several forms: for example, if a user follows another user; has posted to another user; has interacted with another user; or has shared another user's content. What these relationships mean remains an open research question.

*Real or near-real time:* Many social media platforms allow data to be collected as soon as it is posted. For example, on Twitter, researchers can access tweets as they are posted by users, making real time research work possible.

*High volume, available at low (or even no) cost:* One of the major benefits of this type of research work is that open social media data is available, often for free via APIs, and at very large scale.

*A new way in to understanding these groups:* Social media is an increasingly important way in which various groups – including radical groups – communicate with each other, share content, and build a sense of identity. It is, therefore, also a space that researchers need to understand in order to build up a better understanding of how they operate.

*Reactive and indirect:* Social media is often a reactive source of data; a space where people react to an event – either online or offline. This creates a dynamic relationship between media reports and stories and broader conversations which take place afterward; and creates new challenges in respect of accurately determining opinions and attitudes, which are often indirectly expressed.

## Weaknesses

*Demographic and self-selection biases:* many social media users do not demographically represent wider populations (they remain slightly younger, and more urban than average). Anecdotal and small-scale research suggests they might also be more liberal than average. Moreover, even collected data often does not represent all users, because it appears that many users go on Twitter or Facebook to express a particular reaction to an event if they have a strong opinion about it, and so they are not necessarily a representative sample even within the platform.

*Unpredictable:* It can be extremely difficult to predict in advance the likely volume and data quality of social media data on any given subject. This can make it difficult to plan in advance what topics and subjects can be researched.

*Forum specific biases:* Social media spaces are new social spaces, which are characterised by their own norms and mores. For example, based on our research, Twitter is a medium characterised by humour, sharing stories, and anti-establishment sentiment. For a human analyst not habituated with certain memes or group specific language it can be very difficult to determine likely sentiment or underlying attitude. This is even more difficult, if not impossible, when training any automated system to recognise these very subtle distinctions.

## Future uses

In summary, we believe, if used with careful methods and caveats, this type of research can be very useful to better understanding the nature and beliefs of groups – providing they have a presence on social media. In particular, we suggest it is of most value for the following purposes:

*Understanding trends in thinking:* Social media research offers a unique opportunity to understanding trends in thinking and beliefs within a group or set of groups. For researchers interested in how beliefs evolve over time – including in more or less violent directions – this type of research is invaluable.

*Group response to events or flashpoints:* Social media is a reactive platform. This means that much online traffic on both Twitter and Facebook tends to be driven by recent events, and individuals' response to them. This also provides insight into the way a group responds to specific external stimuli, which in turn can help provide greater understanding to how certain events are likely to provoke a response.

*Measure size and reach of content:* Most social media data includes 'meta-data' such as volume of interactions, re-tweets or shares. This allows researchers to gauge the possible reach of certain pieces of content – and indeed what is popular content among users. This could be 'engagement' (for example, it might be the ratio of users who viewed the page and those who signed up, which is a useful proxy of potential reach. We have been able to measure this effectively; volume and exposure, such as how many posts are being produced on the topic, and how many unique users are discussing it? Or how large is the audience? Is hate speech being limited to isolated communities (either by the communities themselves or Facebook's personalisation algorithms)?

*Understanding networks:* Network maps are relatively easy to construct, and provide a useful illustration of influential accounts or users within a data set – either to measure one's own position or to identify other important stakeholders talking on a subject.

*Counter-speech measures:* While this report has focused on populist right wing groups; the same approach can be applied to better understand users who are confronting or disagreeing with certain groups or ideas. This can be used to identify areas where the reach and engagement of this content could be increased.

On the whole, we are sceptical about these approaches as a way to 'predict' or 'spot' violent intention or behaviour. It is better understood as a useful research instrument for academic (and other) researchers, used in conjunction with other techniques. However, there are a number of challenges involved with using this research in a way that is useful for researchers, academics, and public policy specialists. Because it is a new discipline there are several considerations that should be met when decided whether to undertake this type of research or not.

*Does the research question require social media data – and does it need to be automated?* Based on the features of social media data as set out above, not all research questions require, or would benefit from, a social media component. A compelling case should be made as to why social media is a valid instrument of study for the research question, and why it is preferable to existing, more established research methods.

*Clarity over data access:* So called ‘black box’ data – where data is provided by a third party without clarity over methods, search terms used, or access levels – should be avoided wherever possible. This means that ‘off the shelf’ data analytics tools are likely to be less valuable than systems that allow researchers and analysts control over how the system operates.

*Clarity over sampling methods:* Data is sometimes acquired on social media platforms by something called key word matching. This is where data sets are trawled to identify and collect matches with (a) pre-determined word(s) or term(s). Because data are collected based on conversations rather than demographic or what we call ‘topographic’ details (for example, the power law features), it adds a high degree of uncertainty into the demographic background of any collected data set. These keywords can produce different kinds of problems – sometimes they are over-inclusive (and collect irrelevant data), and sometimes they are under-inclusive (and miss relevant data). In both these ways, key-word matching is inherently prone to systemic bias – meaning that the data collected and therefore the conclusions drawn, are affected in a non-random way by the search terms employed. With respect to data quality overall, it is important to make a distinction between internal and external validity. At present, for example, we do not believe Twitter is a valid instrument to conduct reliable, population-level opinion surveys. There are often significant problems with several types of self-selection bias in social media data and often no clear way to correct them. Statements making generalisations about overall public attitudes based on social media data sets – ‘external validity’ – should be made with extreme caution.

*Adherence to research ethics:* Conducting research using Twitter or Facebook data presents new ethical challenges in respect of how researchers should collect, store, analyse and present data. Because it is a new field of research, there are no widely accepted protocols and approaches for how to do this ethically. In the UK, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) principles of ethical research<sup>127</sup> is an excellent guide for conducting research of all kinds – and can be usefully applied to online as well as offline research. Social media research should adhere to the research ethics standards set out by the ESRC’s principles. The key questions are whether or not the research has sufficiently explained the risks and minimisation strategies for:

- The potential identification of individuals.
- Whether or not the research has sought informed consent, and, if not, why it is not considered necessary (ideally with reference to the expectation of privacy a research subject might have).

---

127 <http://www.esrc.ac.uk/funding/guidance-for-applicants/research-ethics/>

- Whether there is any possible harm to the individual, and what measures there are to minimise them.
- Whether techniques to 'cloak' or protect the identity of research subjects are necessary, and how that might adversely affect the quality of the research.

As a very general principle, where an individual is identifiable, explicit permission should be sought, unless a) it is clear that the subject has no expectation of privacy and b) the research will be significantly adversely affected unless the individual is identified.

## REFERENCES

- Alan Leschied, Debbie Chiodo: *Childhood Predictors of Adult Criminality: A Meta-Analysis Drawn from the Prospective Longitudinal*, *Revue canadienne de criminologie et de justice penale*, Juillet 2008
- Allison Harell: *Political Tolerance, Racist Speech, and the Influence of Social Networks*, *Social Science Quarterly*, Volume 91, Number 3, September 2010
- Arlin J. Benjamin Jr., Craig A. Anderson, Phillip K. Wood, and Angelica M. Bonacci: *Development and Testing of the Velicer Attitudes Toward Violence Scale: Evidence for a Four-Factor Model*, *AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR* Volume 32 (2006)
- Bilewitz, Michal, Winiewski, Mikołaj, Kofta, Mirosław és Wójcik, Adrian. 2013. „Harmful Ideas, the Structure and Consequences of Anti-Semitic Beliefs in Poland. *Political Psychology*, Vol. 34. Issue 6, pp. 821–839.
- Cohen, Jacob. 1988. *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences* (2nd edition). Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Donald P. Green, Laurence H. McFalls, and Jennifer K. Smith: *Hate Crime: An Emergent Research Agenda*, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 27 (2001)
- EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report: TE-SAT 2012, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/europoltsat.pdf>
- FRA Annual Report 2012, *Fundamental rights: challenges and achievements in 2012*, [http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/annual-report-2012\\_en.pdf](http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/annual-report-2012_en.pdf)
- FRA, *Minorities as Victims of Crime*, 2012, [http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2012-eu-midis-dif6\\_0.pdf](http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2012-eu-midis-dif6_0.pdf)
- Hate Crimes in the OSCE Region: *Incidents and Responses*, *Annual Report for 2011*, <http://www.osce.org/ru/odihr/102100>
- Heaven, Patrick és Bucci, Sandra. 2001. „Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and Personality: An Analysis Using the IPIP Measure”. *European Journal of Personality*, 15: 49–56.
- Huizinga, D. (1991). *Assessing violent behavior with self-reports*. In J. S. Milner (Ed.), *Neuropsychology of aggression* (pp. 44–76). Boston: Kluwer Academic.
- Joanne R. Smith and Winnifred R. Louis: *Do as we say and as we do: The interplay of descriptive and injunctive group norms in the attitude–behaviour relationship*, *British Journal of Social Psychology* (2008), 47, 647
- John J. Ray: *Militarism, Authoritarianism, Neuroticism, and Antisocial Behavior*, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Sep., 1972)
- “Julian S. Walker: *The Maudsley Violence Questionnaire: initial validation and reliability* *Personality and Individual Differences* 38 (2005) 187–201”

Lena Roxell: Hate, Threats, and Violence. A Register Study of Persons Suspected of Hate Crime, *Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention* Vol. 12 2011

Making hate crime visible in the European Union: acknowledging victims' rights, 2012, [http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2012\\_hate-crime.pdf](http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2012_hate-crime.pdf)

Marshall H. Medoff: Allocation of Time and Hateful Behavior: A Theoretical and Positive Analysis of Hate and Hate Crimes, *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Oct., 1999)

Neil Chakraborti and Jon Garland: Reconceptualizing hate crime victimization through the lens of vulnerability and 'difference', *Theoretical Criminology* 2012 16

Racist Violence 15 EU Member States, A Comparative Overview of Findings from the RAXEN National Focal Points Reports 2001-2004, April 2005

Raul Caruso, Friedrich Schneider: The socio-economic determinants of terrorism and political violence in Western Europe (1994–2007), *European Journal of Political Economy* 27 (2011)

Todd I. Herrenkohl, Richard F. Catalano, Sheryl A., Hemphill, John W. Toumbourou: Longitudinal Examination of Physical and Relational Aggression as Precursors to Later Problem Behaviors in Adolescents, *Violence Vict.* 2009 24(1)