



# THE ANGEL LIES IN THE DETAILS

NEW PACT FOR EUROPE – WHAT DO EUROPEAN CITIZENS  
EXPECT FROM THE NEW PARLIAMENT AND THE COMMISSION?

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**POLITICAL CAPITAL**  
POLICY RESEARCH & CONSULTING INSTITUTE



# The Angel lies in the details

*New Pact for Europe – What do European citizens expect from the new Parliament and the Commission?*

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This study is part of the *New Pact for Europe* project.

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## Executive Summary

This study, based on own calculations on Eurobarometer databases, explored attitudes of EU citizens regarding the future of the Europe. The Eurobarometer surveys are used here to examine the ratio of the supporters of different options identified in the New Pact for Europe Project.

### State of the views on the Union

- While the majority of the citizens in the European Union are rather dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the EU, and the trust in EU institutions and their perceived efficiency are notably bad, we cannot see aversion in the public opinion towards policies of more integration. Just the opposite. It seems that the Angel lies in the details, while the Devil lies in the big picture: while European citizens are willing to support policy measures that deepen the integration, they have a negative image on the EU in general. The “Angel” refers to policy options that EU citizens are or would be satisfied with, while the “Devil” refers to the political and policy trends that they dislike.
- There is much stronger support of deeper integration that the common sense and public discourses around the EU would suggest. Policy-wise, EU citizens rather support solutions that point towards greater integration in many fields, including a more coordinated banking supervision, fiscal policy, economic policy and foreign policy.
- While 11% of the respondents would like to leave the EU, and 12% would rather support policies towards less integration, 65% of EU citizens seem to support further integration. 30% of European respondents would cautiously move forward in integration, and 35% of the respondents would leap forward, and deepen the integration in many fields spectacularly.
- How is it possible that most EU citizens are euro-pessimistic in their general attitudes and pro-integrationists in their policy preferences at the same time? How can the Devil and the Angel be so entwined? The explanation might be that while many EU citizens see fundamental problems with the EU, they can easily imagine that the EU should “escape ahead” from the crisis, and that deeper integration can cure some of the problems.

### What should be done?

- The task of the new and previous European and national leaders after the formation of the next European Parliament and the Commission is twofold:
  - Promoting the Angel. Endorse the policies of deeper integration, without fear of the negative reaction of the citizens, and hope that the policies themselves can help to “sell” the EU project as well.
  - Defeating the Devil. Work more intensely on improving the image of the European Union by redefining the European idea and trying to make it attractive for the European citizens. Framing is crucially important here: the major problem of the discourse on the EU is the framing of deeper integration as the “death of the nation states”, which can also potentially shift the attitudes of the originally pro-European voters to the idea of less integration.

- Education seems to be a crucial factor in making EU citizens more receptive to the ideas of further integration, therefore more investment in Education – especially in terms of guaranteeing wide access to higher levels of education – might be a key element to provide the necessary social and political support for the continuation of the integration project.
- More than one-fifth of EU citizens seem to be hesitant whether they want to see their respective countries in the EU in the future or not. Even among those supporting Option 4 (Leaping forward) their ratio is 19%, rising to 26% and 25% among those opting for option 3 and 2, respectively. 45% of the ones who support Option 1 (less EU) tend to agree that being outside the EU would be better than inside. This is a primary goal of the decision-makers to persuade these rather hesitant and disillusioned EU citizens that the EU has more advantages than disadvantages.

## Background

### About this study

The aim of the study is to help evidence-based policymaking by giving a detailed picture on EU citizens' needs regarding the direction the EU should go to. To meet this goal, Political Capital Institute (PCI), at the request for the King Baudouin Foundation, have prepared a study on the attitudes of European citizens towards EU policy options. In this study we estimate social support for different strategic options identified beforehand in the New Pact for Europe project, both on the level of the EU and of the Member States, based on PCI's own calculations on the Standard Eurobarometer surveys in May 2013, November 2013 and March 2014. The study gives an overview of the opinions and demands of the European citizens before the European Parliament (EP) elections, after the most turbulent period of the euro-crisis.

### Challenges ahead – need for the in-depth understanding of citizens' needs

During the EP Elections, voters sent an important message to the European political elites- but no irreversible damage was done at the EU. Despite anti-European parties becoming stronger than before, more than 70% of MEPs elected are committed to the European project. There are only two radical, rather anti-EU groups in the EP: Nigel Farage's EFDD and Alexis Tsipras's GUE-NGL. While the ratio of the non-affiliated radical MEPs notably increased, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders failed to form an even more radical EU-reject caucus (they might be able to do it in the rest of the EP term, though), therefore their influence can be smaller than expected by many. The election of the 'spitzenkandidat' Jean-Claude Juncker, as president of the European Commission (EC), even if it does not increase the trust in the EP and EC, can go some way to discredit eurosceptic arguments around democratic legitimacy.

Of course, the EU faces further challenges – all of them were listed in the first report of the New Pact for Europe project.<sup>1</sup> In this paper we would like to examine the views of the citizens of the EU on further European integration, going beyond the common sense that there is widespread rejection of such integration. Whilst not drawing premature conclusions, it can be said that early indications do not support such pessimistic statements. This study rather suggests the opposite: most EU citizens think further integration could solve most of the problems in the EU.

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<sup>1</sup><http://www.newpactforeurope.eu/news/2013/first-report-new-pact-for-europe.php>



## About the project: New Pact for Europe – Promoting the European Debate

This project aims to promote a Europe-wide debate on reform proposals addressing three fundamental questions:

- What is at stake if, Europe' cannot tackle the various challenges we face? (What do we need the EU for?)
- What kind of collaboration is needed at European level to respond to the crisis? (What needs to be done?)
- How can the answers to these two questions be translated into action to make the EU more effective and to command broader-based public support? (How should it be done?)

A Reflection Group and an Advisory Group provides input to, and inspiration for, the elaboration of a New Pact between policy-makers and European citizens and between Member States:

- The Reflection Group includes top opinion-makers from different EU Member States, who have a genuine interest in the success of European integration, are realistic and pragmatic but at the same time able to think, out of the box', and ready and able to communicate through the media.
- The Advisory Group brings together high-ranking policy-makers, academics, NGO representatives and other stakeholders – a mixture of past and current national and European leaders from different sectors and backgrounds.

The first report<sup>2</sup> of the New Pact for Europe project – published on December 9, 2013 – reflects the work and discussions of the Reflection Group including EU experts from different Member States, analyses the 'state of the Union', describes the key challenges Europe faces and presents the following five potential strategic options for the future of European integration:

- (1) going back to the basics (undoing the mistakes of the past);
- (2) consolidating past achievements (If it ain't broke, don't fix it);
- (3) moving ahead ambitiously (doing more and doing it better);
- (4) leaping forward (economic and political union is the only answer); and
- (5) changing the 'more/less Europe' logic (a fundamental rethink is needed).

## Short methodological remarks and notes on the terminology

With our methodology we can examine which alternatives are the most and the least popular in the EU and specific Member States, and also check the socio-demographic and attitudinal profile of supporters of different options.

The study is based on calculations relying on the Eurobarometer 79.3 (2013), database.<sup>3</sup> Most of the results published below are drawn from this survey, but we have used results from two additional Eurobarometer surveys. In every case weighted samples are used to take into consideration the size of the different countries – which means, as it is the case in the EP-elections, responses from larger states influences the results more.

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<sup>2</sup> <http://www.newpactforeurope.eu/news/2013/first-report-new-pact-for-europe.php>

<sup>3</sup> European Commission, Brussels (2013): Eurobarometer 79.3 (2013). TNS Opinion, Brussels [producer]. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne. ZA5689 Data file Version 1.0.0, doi:10.4232/1.11781

In presenting these findings, terms such as 'Europeans', 'European citizens' and EU28 are used as synonyms. Almost 30 variables overall have been used to examine the opinions of the EU citizens' opinions on EU. For identifying the different options, a combination of 15 questions from the Eurobarometer survey have been used. Based on the responses to these questions, respondents have been placed in one of the six following categories:

- **Option 0 – 'Finish' the European project.** They would support their country leaving the EU. This category includes respondents in complete agreement with the following statement: „Our country could better face the future outside the EU“. Below, we shall refer to them as 'quitters'.
- **Option 1 - Going back to the basics.** Supporters of this option argue that the events of recent years have shown that European integration has gone too far and that the EU should abandon moves towards an „ever closer union“. For them performing a U-turn and undoing mistakes of the past is the most promising way forward to rescue the most worthwhile result of European integration: the Single Market. Dismantling the euro in its current form would according to advocates of this option – not lead to a collapse of the Union, but rather herald the start of a more pragmatic, effective approach to European integration
- **Option 2 – Consolidating past achievements:** Proponents of this option argue that the EU has already introduced most of the reforms needed to overcome the euro crisis and these should be given time to work. There is a need to be realistic and accept that Member States are not willing to go further and pool sovereignty in key areas. The EU should, at this difficult moment, steer clear of overambitious attempts to deepen integration, which could backfire given the negative political and public attitudes in many countries towards the EU and euro.
- **Option 3 – Moving ahead ambitiously:** Those supporting this option argue that simply consolidating past achievements will not be enough: further integration, including measures to further deepen integration in the Economic and Monetary Union and boost the Union's democratic legitimacy in the public's eyes, and an honest public debate about the EU's future are vital not only to overcome the crisis but also to prepare for future challenges. All this will require significant changes to the EU Treaties. But reforms will have to be done jointly and cautiously, step by step, to avoid creating new dividing lines between EU countries.
- **Option 4 – Leaping forward:** Advocates of this option say that recent experience has provided ample proof that the EU is insufficiently equipped to face current and future challenges, and that there is a need to take a major qualitative leap towards a fully-fledged economic, fiscal, financial, social and political union, with a strong European executive ('European government') and legislature (parliament) able to take autonomous decisions reflecting genuine European interests. Potential opposition from some countries should not prevent the 'willing and able' from making a major leap forward, even if this leads to a 'core Europe' including only those countries ready to deepen integration significantly.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>In the original study there was a fifth option as well that we could not identify based on the existing Eurobarometer survey questions: Option 5 – Changing the 'more/less Europe' logic. Supporters of this option believe that the traditional debate about European integration along the lines of more or less Europe has been exhausted and the EU and its members should concentrate on efforts aiming to make the Union more accountable to the public for its actions, find new ways to involve the public in policy-making, and boost the EU's capacity to safeguard the fundamental rights of its citizens and guarantee their basic social rights by strengthening the Union's caring dimension.

- **Undecided.** The sixth category includes respondents giving too many incomplete or 'I don't know' answers, whom we were unable to classify along specific strategic Options. They will be referred to as 'undecided' or 'with no opinion'.

**There were no questions in the dataset which would have enable us to identify supporters of Option 5 (changing the 'more/less Europe' logic - a fundamental rethink is needed) as it was defined in the original New Pact for Europe study, therefore we left this option out of our quantitative analysis.**

Categories 2 - 5 have been reserved for those whose opinion, based on their responses to the questions, was found to be the closest to strategic Options 1, 2, 3 or 4. In the future these will be referred to as 'supporters' or 'backers of', or 'closest to the given Option or alternative'.

Therefore, these are the groups that we use in our study:

- Supporter of leaving the EU;
- Opt #1 - Going back to the basics;
- Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements;
- Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously;
- Opt #4 - Leaping forward;
- Undecided.

Find a more detailed description of the methodology at the end of the study.



## Introducing the Devil: widespread discontent in the EU

Looking at the general attitudes regarding the European Union, a rather negative picture emerges. This may not be that surprising after the turbulent crisis in 2008-2009. A substantial number of Europeans living in the 28 Member States held a negative image of the European Union in the last Eurobarometer surveys. For the calculations below, we use the 2013 May EB survey, as it contains all the questions needed for identifying supporters of different options.

**European citizens see the current state of the EU economy rather gloomy.** Due to the crisis a number of member states were forced to introduce austerity measures, affecting adversely a large part of the population. The rising Euro-pessimism is well illustrated by the fact that 63% of Europeans agreed with the statement 'the EU is responsible for the austerity in Europe', according to the latest Eurobarometer survey published in December, 2014 (EB82). In May 2013, 72% of the European citizens had a negative view on the economy (*very bad*:19%; *bad*: 53%). The negative perception decreased notably in the last period, though: by 2014 Spring, the negative views reduced to 56%. But this is still much higher than in the pre-crisis period: Back in October 2007, the overall proportion of those who saw the economy negatively was only 27%.


**European citizens are not satisfied with the institutions:** Half of the EU citizens *tend not to trust* the EU (while we can see a decline here: the ratio was 60% in 2013 May, 56% in 2014 May, and 50% in 2014 November). But still, the decline of confidence in the EU was dramatic in the last 10 years. In spring 2007, before the crisis, a majority (57%) of the EU citizens trusted the EU, while twenty percent less (37%) does it now. Most think the word *Efficient* describes the idea they have on the EU *fairly badly* (42%) or *very badly* (17%). 80% of the Europeans agree that the EU needs a clearer message. Only a minority of the citizens of the EU (30% in 2013 Spring, 35% in 2014 Spring and 39% in 2014 Autumn) says that the EU has a positive image. When citizens were asked what the EU means for them, frequent associations were bureaucracy and waste of money (26% and 25%).

**European citizens envision a dark future for the EU.** Many more citizens think that the EU is going in the wrong direction (49% in 2013 Spring, 38% in 2014 Spring and 39% in 2014 Autumn) than those who think that the EU is going to the good direction (19%, 23% and 25% respectively). In spring 2013, most EU citizens expected that the economic situation will be worse (32%) or the same (41%) in the next 12 months, and only 18% of Europeans thought that things will get better. In November, 2014 the situation was a bit better: 20% said that the economic situation in the EU will be better in the next 12 months. At the same time 42% expected no change and 24% forecasted deterioration.

Looking at the figures above, it is not surprising that in November 2014, relative majority (48%) of the EU citizens were *against* further enlargement of the EU and only 39% supported it.

# THE ANGEL LIES IN THE DETAILS

**The Devil is strong** - in detail (proportion of answers to some selected questions, EU28 average, Standard Eurobarometer 79.3, May 2013<sup>5</sup>)



<sup>5</sup> Given that the supporters of the different Options below are calculated on the 2013 May Standard Eurobarometer database (because it contains more relevant questions than the latter two databases), we only indicate the figures from this survey.


## Introducing the Angel – demand for deeper integration among EU citizens

### 1. Opinions on the membership – “Option 0”

Looking at the devil (the general euro-pessimism), it might seem surprising that most EU citizens continue to express their willingness to stay in the EU. But this is obviously the case: in Autumn 2014, the majority of Europeans (58%) expressed that their country should remain in the European Union. The ratio of those who want to leave the EU – supporters of “Option Zero” — is close to the third of the citizens (30%). And we could even observe a slight increase in the last one and a half year: in May 2013, the ratio of supporters of membership was 56% and advocates of „exit” was 33%<sup>6</sup>. **Most EU citizens therefore are not opposing the European idea but only have a negative attitude about the current state of affairs and direction of the EU.**

#### Our country could better face the future outside the EU

(%, EU28 average, source: EB79.3 (2013))



Not surprisingly, we can see huge differences in the support of “Option Zero” between Member States. The good news is that there is only one country (United Kingdom) in which those who oppose the membership outnumbered the supporters (53% vs. 36%). In Cyprus and Austria the two camps are almost equal in size (46%/47%, and 44%/47%). At the same time, in five member states more than two-thirds of the population oppose quitting the EU. Four of them are “core” EU-countries (Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Belgium) and one is a newer member state (Estonia). In 13 member states the gap between those in support and those against membership is at least 30% in favour of the supporters.

#### Our country could better face the future outside the EU

(%, country results, source: EB79.3, 2013, in the other of agreement)

	Totally agree	Tend to agree	AGREE	DISAGREE	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	DK
Bulgaria	3%	14%	17	63	35%	28%	20%
Denmark	6%	15%	21	76	36%	41%	3%
Luxembourg	8%	12%	21	75	37%	38%	4%
Estonia	4%	18%	22	71	43%	28%	7%
Malta	4%	17%	22	60	34%	26%	18%

<sup>6</sup>The rest 11% of respondents were unable to take position in this question.

	Totally agree	Tend to agree	AGREE	DISAGREE	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	DK
Ireland	8%	17%	24	66	25%	41%	10%
Lithuania	5%	19%	24	65	37%	28%	11%
The Netherlands	9%	15%	24	71	34%	37%	5%
Spain	10%	15%	26	60	20%	40%	14%
Belgium	7%	22%	29	69	40%	29%	2%
Latvia	9%	20%	29	58	35%	23%	13%
France	10%	20%	30	59	33%	26%	11%
Germany	12%	18%	30	62	31%	31%	8%
Romania	7%	23%	30	56	34%	22%	14%
Slovakia	5%	25%	30	60	37%	23%	10%
Portugal	7%	24%	31	57	38%	19%	12%
Italy	8%	23%	32	54	33%	21%	14%
Hungary	10%	23%	33	57	28%	29%	10%
Greece	10%	26%	36	58	38%	20%	6%
Sweden	13%	26%	39	58	34%	24%	3%
Czech Republic	12%	28%	40	51	37%	14%	9%
Finland	15%	25%	40	56	35%	21%	5%
Poland	7%	33%	40	47	34%	14%	13%
Slovenia	14%	27%	41	53	28%	25%	6%
Croatia	12%	30%	42	50	31%	19%	8%
Austria	15%	28%	44	46	28%	18%	10%
Cyprus	22%	24%	46	47	20%	27%	7%
United Kingdom	25%	28%	53	36	22%	13%	11%

## 2. Opinions on policy directions and measures

**Policy preferences of the European citizens again show a completely different picture than we could assume from the general negative mood in and towards the EU. If we look into the details of the preferred policy directions, we find that most EU citizens seem to support policies that are deepening the integration.**

The majority of policy strategies and measures outlined in the New Pact for Europe strategic options can be described via questions in the Eurobarometer survey. In the 79.3 Eurobarometer survey we identified 14 questions directly linked to the measures described in the strategic Options under the New Pact for Europe. If we look at the specific questions, it is not difficult to find supporters of deeper integration. A few examples are below.

<sup>7</sup> These two issues offer a clear distinction between options 3 and 4. The latter includes the measure of “Deepening integration in foreign, security and defence policy, including the introduction of a European foreign minister and moves towards the creation of a ‘European army’”, a concept not yet part of option 3.

<sup>8</sup> In the NPE study: Option 3, “Creating a ‘Budget Tsar’/‘Super Commissioner’ with the power to reject/veto national budgets” if they do not comply with European rules” and option 4, “Giving Europe the power to veto national budgets that do not meet fiscal commitments”.

- The idea of a Spitzenkandidat seemed to gather the support of the EU citizens: 56% of them agreed before the EP elections that European political parties should present their candidate for the post of European Commission President, and only 22% opposed the idea. Almost three quarters of European citizens (74%) support a common foreign policy and over half (64%) of them support a common defence and security policy for Member States<sup>7</sup>.
- The overwhelming majority of respondents consider measures developed for handling the financial/economic crisis adequate, especially when it comes to economic policy and financial control functions. More than half would support measures that would limit the sovereignty of Member States in crucial fiscal issues, such as the creation of the post of the EU finance minister ("Financial Super Tsar", as many name it<sup>8</sup>) or the preliminary approval of budgets of the Member States by the EU. This latter measure had the lowest support in the United Kingdom, although 'effective/ineffective' responses were only at 40%. We could find the highest ratio of positive responses, close to three quarters in Belgium (72%). Even more important, despite the bad experiences of the eurocrisis, still 51% of the EU citizens are for keeping the euro.

## Agreement with measures pointing towards greater integration, EU28 average

(Standard Eurobarometer 79.3, May 2013)

(What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.)	For	Against
1. A European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro.	51	42
2. A common foreign policy of the 27 Member States of the EU.	64	27
3. A common defense and security policy among EU Member States.	74	19
4. European political parties to present their candidate for the post of European Commission President at the next European Parliament elections.	56	22


Deeper economic integration has widespread support even beyond fiscal policy. When asked which measures can be effective in tackling the crisis, 71% of the respondents said that a more important role for the EU in regulating financial services would help. 76% said that a stronger coordination of economic policy among all the EU Member States is needed and 75% thought that a stronger coordination of economic and financial policies among Eurozone members would be efficient. 71% would support a central supervision of the banking system (e.g. Banking Union). Relative majority, 44% of the respondents think that the introduction of Eurobonds would be an effective measure to tackle the crisis.

## Agreement with measures pointing towards greater integration, EU28 average

(Standard Eurobarometer 79.3, May 2013)

Question (A range of measures to the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not?)	Very effective	Fairly effective	Not very effective	Not at all effective
5. A more important role for the EU in regulating financial services.	25	46	15	4
6. A stronger coordination of economic policy among all the EU Member States.	28	48	12	3
7. A stronger coordination of economic and financial policies among the countries of the euro area.	27	48	12	3
8. The designation of a finance minister for the EU.	15	36	23	11
9. EU approval in advance of EU Member States' government budgets.	17	40	20	8
10. A more accountable governance of the Euro.	31	43	12	4
11. A central supervision of the banking system at EU level (i.e. Banking Union).	31	40	13	5
12. The introduction of Eurobonds (European bonds).	13	31	18	11

When respondents were asked which speed corresponds best to the pace of building Europe only 14% positioned themselves to the "slow" (1-3) side of the scale and 55% on the "quick" side.



Source of image: [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79\\_publ\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb79/eb79_publ_en.pdf) p.81.



## Agreement with measures pointing towards greater integration, EU28 average

(Standard Eurobarometer 79.3, May 2013)

13. Which corresponds best to the speed of building Europe you would like?	
1 Standstill	3
2	3
3	8
4	16
5	28
6	20
7 Runs as fast as possible	17

Contrary to the general assumption, the crisis did not amplify the need for the “individualistic” nationalist approaches against the European level solutions. 82% (!) of the EU citizens agreed that as a consequence of the crisis, EU countries will have to work more closely together.

## Agreement with measures pointing towards greater integration, EU28 average

(Standard Eurobarometer 79.3, May 2013)

14. Please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree with the following statement: as a consequence of the crisis, EU countries will have to work more closely together	
Totally agree	35
Tend to agree	47
Tend to disagree	9
Totally disagree	3

## 3. Which New Pact for Europe strategic Option do Europeans prefer?

Based on the survey dataset, using 15 questions overall (see the Methodology at the end of the study), we identified the attitudinal supporters of the first four Options, as well as the supporters of “Option Zero”, the “eurorejects” – who strongly want to leave the EU anyway.

Based on the EU citizens’ answers to the 15 questions mentioned above (14 policy question + the “in or out” question) we could put every respondents in one of six categories: supporters of Option Zero (eurorejects), supporters of the four policy Options, and the undecided (who had too many missing or “Don’t know” answers). We took into consideration the size of the countries using a population size weighting factor, which guarantees, similarly in the case of the EP elections, that each country are represented in proportion to its population size within the European Union). It means that the results are representative for the overall European Union population: almost 505 million people from 28 member states.

The overall results show:

11% of the respondents would like to leave the EU (Option 0, they are the ones who agreed totally that their country could better face the future outside the EU<sup>9</sup>).


<sup>9</sup> The ones who only „tended to agree” with quitting the EU were not put in Option Zero because we regarded them as citizens who can be – and must be – persuaded on the necessity to stay in the EU with good policies.

12% would rather support policies towards less integration, and are advocates of Option 1 - Back to the basics of the EU. We can say that almost a quarter of European citizens clearly want less or no EU. The 23% support of the first two options seems to be low if we take into consideration that altogether, we can find almost 30% of MEPs in the new European Parliament who oppose the idea of the EU (most of the non-affiliated MEPs, and members the Farage-led EFDD group, and a part of the GUE-NGL group) or want less EU (ECR group). There is a reason to think, that a significant part of the voters who vote for hard or soft Eurosceptic parties are not opposing the European idea as such, but want some change in the EU- which might be more integration as well, if they see it persuasively efficient.

3% of the respondents, concerning of their attitudes, are supporters of the risk-averse Option 2 - Consolidating past achievements. This is easy to explain in the sense that this is an Option that has no "vision" or "direction", and does not promise brighter future. It seems that EU citizens would much more prefer that Europe moves in a definite direction (more or less EU) than to stagnate and only consolidate what it has achieved so far.

Overall, 65% of EU citizens seem to be supporters of further integration. 30% of European respondents support Option 3 – Moving ahead ambitiously the most, which means they would ambitiously move forward in integration. 35% of the respondents on the other hand are supporters of Option 4 — Leaping Forward – which means they would deepen the integration intensively and extensively.

8% of the respondents were categorised as undecided, as they had too many missing answers to be included<sup>10</sup>.




**How is it possible that most EU citizens are euro-pessimistic in their general attitudes and pro-integrationists in their policy preferences at the same time? How can the Devil and the Angel be so strong at the same time? It seems that while a lot of EU citizens see fundamental problems with the EU, they can easily imagine that the EU should "escape ahead" from the crisis, and deeper integration can cure some of its problems.**

<sup>10</sup> We categorized the respondents undecided if they were unable to respond to at least 6 out of the 14 policy-related questions. The typical results that in young democracies (former socialist countries joining the EU in 2004 or after) the number of 'I don't know' or 'I won't say' responses is higher could be found in Eurobarometer surveys as well. In eight member states we found undecided respondents of over 10%, and 7 out of 10 are in the NMS12 category. That ratio is extremely high in Malta, where every fifth (21%) respondent falls into that category. In Lithuania the number of undecided respondents is 7%, in Bulgaria 16% and in Romania 14%. Those without an opinion are the fewest in Belgium (2%), Sweden (2%) and Germany (3%).

# THE ANGEL LIES IN THE DETAILS

Which strategic Option are the opinions of Europeans the closest to? - Results by member states



Looking at the results at the Member State level, we can find significant differences.

## **The ratio of those supporting exit from the EU**

At the other end of the scale, in the European Union as a whole 11% of the respondents agreed with the statement that their country could better face the future outside the European Union. At the Member State level we measured the lowest rates in two countries, in Bulgaria (3%), Estonia (4%) and Malta (4%). Ratios over 20% of “wanna-be outsiders” found in two countries, in the United Kingdom (25%) and Cyprus (22%).

## **Support for Option 1- “Back to the basics”**

Supporters of the otherwise quite unpopular “less EU” concept – the EU should return to its economic fundamentals, especially the free market – reach the highest ratio in Sweden with 30%, more than twice the EU28 average (12%). We can also find above-the-average figures in, not surprisingly, Denmark (24%), the United Kingdom (23%), the Czech Republic (22%).. We can find the least supporters of the “less EU” in Malta (5%), Bulgaria (5%), Belgium (5%) and Luxembourg (6%).

## **Support for Option 4 – Leaping forward**

Over half of Spaniards (53%), Cypriots (52%) and Bulgarians (51%) are advocates of Option 4 – Moving ahead ambitiously. Public support for Option 4 is well above the EU28 average (35%) in Slovenia (47%), Germany (44%), Slovakia (44%), Romania (44%) and Italy (41%). Among these countries we can find post-socialist new Member States and founders of the EU as well, and even countries that have been hit hardest by the crisis. The United Kingdom, Finland, Denmark and Sweden are found at the other end of the scale with not more than 20% of their citizens supporting a federal leap (14%, 18%, 20% and 20% respectively).

## **4. Who are the supporters of EU-integration? Demographic profiles**

There are no stark fundamental differences in the demographic profile of supporters of the different Options, however education seems to be an important determinant.

### **Highest level of education<sup>11</sup>**

**Those with lower education levels** (finished their education under the age of 16) **are more likely to support an exit strategy, and least likely to support the federal leap.** The ones who studied more than 20 years or are still studying, on the other hand, are the most important supporters of further integration. Among the higher educated groups, 37% is supporting a federal leap, while this ratio is only 33% in the least educated group. This difference is much higher regarding support for Option 3: Moving ahead ambitiously (32% and 23% respectively).

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<sup>11</sup> Based on the question, ‘At what age did you finish your studies as a full-time student?’

## Which strategic Option are the opinions of Europeans the closest to? - Results by level of education

	Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	Opt #4 - Leaping forward	Totally agree to exit EU	Too many missing answers
Up to 15	12.6%	2.6%	22.9%	32.8%	15.4%	13.6%
16-19	13.4%	3.3%	30.0%	33.5%	12.3%	7.4%
20+	12.0%	4.4%	34.9%	36.9%	8.2%	3.7%
Still Studying	9.9%	3.6%	32.1%	38.3%	8.8%	7.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>3.5%</b>	<b>30.2%</b>	<b>34.6%</b>	<b>11.4%</b>	<b>7.8%</b>

## Gender

The percentage of the advocates of Option 0- the “wanna-be outsiders” is slightly more among men (11.8%) than women (11.0%)<sup>12</sup> Compared to women, slightly more men advocate Option 1 – Going back to the basics (13.2% to 11.8%) and slightly more advocate option 4- Leaping forward (36.0% to 33.3%). Women tend to be significantly more uncertain in their responses than men.

## Which strategic Option are the opinions of Europeans the closest to? - Results by gender

	Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	Opt #4 - Leaping forward	Totally agree to exit EU	Too many missing answers
Male	13.2%	3.5%	30.3%	36.0%	11.8%	5.2%
Female	11.8%	3.4%	30.2%	33.3%	11.0%	10.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>3.5%</b>	<b>30.2%</b>	<b>34.6%</b>	<b>11.4%</b>	<b>7.8%</b>

## Age

Again, there are no fundamental differences among age groups. When it comes to support for “exit”, there is a slight division line around age 40. Just over one in ten respondents under 35 totally agree that their country would fare better outside the EU, while 12% of those over 45 gives the same response. Youth, aged between 15 and 24 are most likely to support the pro-integrationist Option 3, while the more elderly, 65 or older are the least likely to support Option 3.

## Which strategic Option are the opinions of Europeans the closest to? - Results by age groups

	Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	Opt #4 - Leaping forward	Totally agree to exit EU	Too many missing answers
15 - 24 years	11.0%	3.7%	32.4%	34.4%	9.8%	8.7%
25 - 34 years	12.5%	3.6%	32.0%	35.8%	9.9%	6.4%
35 - 44 years	13.5%	3.7%	30.5%	34.2%	11.2%	6.9%
45 - 54 years	13.0%	4.1%	31.1%	34.4%	12.5%	4.8%
55 - 64 years	13.7%	3.0%	29.8%	35.0%	12.3%	6.3%
65+ years	11.2%	2.8%	26.8%	34.2%	12.3%	12.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>3.5%</b>	<b>30.2%</b>	<b>34.6%</b>	<b>11.4%</b>	<b>7.8%</b>

<sup>12</sup> All differences we mention in the text are significant.

## Type of residence

The size of the residence has no effect at all on respondents' preferences for the various Options. The number of those supporting withdrawal is roughly equal in all three residential categories.

## Which strategic Option are the opinions of Europeans the closest to? - Results by domicile

	Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	Opt #4 - Leaping forward	Totally agree to exit EU	Too many missing answers
Rural area or village	12.4%	3.6%	29.8%	34.8%	11.0%	8.5%
Small/middle town	12.8%	3.6%	30.0%	34.0%	11.5%	8.1%
Large town	12.0%	3.1%	31.2%	35.4%	11.8%	6.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>3.5%</b>	<b>30.2%</b>	<b>34.6%</b>	<b>11.4%</b>	<b>7.8%</b>

## 5. Who are the supporters of EU-integration? Attitudinal profiles

While sociology does not seem to be an important determinant, attitudes clearly seem to be in separating the supporters of different options.

Inside or outside – the hesitants

11% of the Europeans in total, and an additional 22% agree, that their country could better face the future outside the EU. Due to the methodology there are no undecided respondents or those preferring the four alternatives would totally agree with an exit strategy. However, the number of those choosing 'rather agree' can be compared in these categories. Even among those supporting Option 4 their ratio is 19%, rising to 26 and 25% among those opting for alternative 3 and 2, respectively. This group needs special attention from the level of stakeholders.

We can see in the data that supporters of Option 1 are strongly thinking about leaving the EU. 45% of them tend to agree that they would face a better future outside the EU. This is a primary goal of the decision-makers to persuade these rather hesitant but disillusioned EU citizens that the EU has more advantages than disadvantages.

## Our country could better face the future outside the EU. – results by the closest strategic Option

	Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	DK
Totally agree to exit EU	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	0.0%	45.3%	32.2%	13.3%	9.2%
Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	0.0%	24.7%	42.0%	23.6%	9.6%
Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	0.0%	25.6%	43.3%	22.2%	8.9%
Opt #4 - Leaping forward	0.0%	18.6%	30.7%	42.1%	8.6%
Too many missing answers	0.0%	21.8%	18.7%	13.9%	45.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>11.4%</b>	<b>22.4%</b>	<b>30.6%</b>	<b>24.9%</b>	<b>10.7%</b>



## Trust in the European Union

In the spring of 2013, 60% of European citizens had no trust in the European Union. At the time, significant differences were found among those having preferences for specific strategic Options. As expected, the highest level of trust (41%) was measured among those closest to strategic Option 4. However, the ratio of untrusting citizens is higher in this group as well than of those having trust in the EU. Moving toward more careful Options, we see mistrust rising steadily jumping to 81% among those with a preference for the 'Going back to the basics' alternative. It is interesting to note that such a high ratio was not measured even among those preferring an exit, although their 80% also indicates an almost complete lack of trust. 30% of undecided respondents were unable to develop a position on this issue.

## How much trust do you have in the EU? – results by the closest strategic Option

	Tend to trust	Tend not to trust	DK
Totally agree to exit EU	14.2%	79.8%	6.0%
Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	13.2%	80.9%	5.9%
Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	19.3%	71.8%	8.9%
Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	36.3%	55.5%	8.2%
Opt #4 - Leaping forward	41.5%	50.0%	8.5%
Too many missing answers	17.5%	52.4%	30.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>30.6%</b>	<b>59.9%</b>	<b>9.5%</b>

## Directions, things are going in the EU

Regarding attitudes about the direction of developments in the EU we are seeing similar differences along the strategic Options as in respect to trust towards the EU. In other words, those closest to Option 4 had the most favorable opinion, while among those preferring alternative 1 67% believed that things are heading in the wrong direction, as opposed to 11% taking the opposite view. At this question as well the position of those preferring an exit was slightly stronger than of those supporting Option 1.

## In general, are things going in the right direction or in the wrong direction in the EU? – results by the closest strategic Option

	in the right direction	in the wrong direction	Neither the one nor the other	DK
Totally agree to exit EU	14.3%	67.9%	11.2%	6.6%
Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	11.3%	66.6%	16.0%	6.1%
Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	16.1%	56.7%	20.7%	6.5%
Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	28.1%	45.2%	20.1%	6.5%
Opt #4 - Leaping forward	30.2%	41.8%	20.6%	7.4%
Too many missing answers	9.9%	34.3%	19.0%	36.9%
<b>Total</b>	<b>23.3%</b>	<b>48.8%</b>	<b>18.7%</b>	<b>9.2%</b>

## Expectations for the future

In respect to future outlook, close to half of those totally agreeing with an exit strategy (48%) believed the economy would decline in the next 12 months. Among all the groups this is the highest value, exceeding the 32% EU28 average by a wide margin. The fewest pessimists found among those preferring Option 4 or 26% (not counting the undecided respondents where over one third were unable to take a position, i.e., it makes no sense to compare their valid responses directly). The ratio of those expecting to see an improvement (23%) is the highest in this group.

### What are your expectations for the next twelve months when it comes to the economic situation in the EU? – results by the closest strategic Option

	Better	Worse	Same	DK
Totally agree to exit EU	12.4%	48.1%	32.6%	6.9%
Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	10.1%	44.0%	40.3%	5.6%
Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	13.2%	42.5%	38.6%	5.6%
Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	19.4%	29.7%	43.4%	7.5%
Opt #4 - Leaping forward	23.4%	26.1%	43.4%	7.1%
Too many missing answers	10.9%	20.9%	34.4%	33.8%
<b>Total</b>	<b>18.0%</b>	<b>32.1%</b>	<b>40.9%</b>	<b>9.1%</b>

## Future of the EU

In respect to the future of the EU 49% of European citizens were rather optimistic, although the number of pessimists was not far behind at 46%. In the case of those looking for an exit and those preferring Option 1, the balance tipped sharply in the direction of pessimism. In both cases 74% were rather or very pessimistic. As expected, of those supporting Option 4 64% are optimistic, well above the average. At the same time, even among them the ratio of extremely optimistic responses reaches 8%, suggesting that their conviction is not that firm.

### Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the EU? – results by the closest strategic Option

	Very optimistic	Fairly optimistic	Fairly pessimistic	Very pessimistic	DK
Totally agree to exit EU	4.2%	19.1%	35.1%	38.6%	3.0%
Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	1.0%	21.4%	53.0%	20.7%	4.0%
Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	1.7%	37.4%	44.3%	13.1%	3.5%
Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	2.7%	55.3%	34.1%	3.7%	4.2%
Opt #4 - Leaping forward	8.1%	56.0%	27.3%	5.0%	3.6%
Too many missing answers	3.7%	27.5%	35.6%	10.8%	22.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>4.6%</b>	<b>44.4%</b>	<b>34.7%</b>	<b>11.1%</b>	<b>5.2%</b>

## Image of the EU

Among the respondents, the European Union conjures up an image in the following ratio: positive (30%), negative (29%) and neutral (39%). In other words, there is a strong split of opinions on this issue. Among those supporting an exit the focus has shifted in a negative direction: 63% chose the 'rather' or 'very negative' response Option and only 11% had a positive view. The image of the EU is the most positive among those supporting alternative 4. However, a little more than 40% giving a positive or neutral response, close to 20% (18%) have a negative view of the EU.

## Does the EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image? – results by the closest strategic Option

	Very positive	Fairly positive	Neutral	Fairly negative	Very negative	DK
Totally agree to exit EU	2.0%	8.5%	24.9%	34.6%	28.4%	1.5%
Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	1.9%	13.3%	35.9%	36.1%	12.1%	.8%
Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	1.3%	22.3%	42.0%	26.9%	6.5%	1.1%
Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	2.2%	31.5%	44.4%	18.7%	2.0%	1.2%
Opt #4 - Leaping forward	5.3%	37.1%	38.6%	15.1%	3.0%	.9%
Too many missing answers	1.7%	15.7%	48.5%	18.2%	5.2%	10.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>3.2%</b>	<b>27.0%</b>	<b>39.3%</b>	<b>21.7%</b>	<b>7.0%</b>	<b>1.8%</b>

## Further enlargement of the EU

In May 2013 a slim majority of those interviewed (53%) opposed the further expansion of the EU. The rate of opponents is the highest among those favouring exit, three out of four rejecting the idea. While the rate of opponents gradually declines with specific strategic Options, 61% of those supporting alternative 2 ('Consolidating past achievements') share that opinion. The real fault line is seen at Option 3. Compared to the responses for Option 2, the rate of supporters increased significantly from 28% to 43% while that of its opponents dropped from 61% to 48%.

## Are you for or against the further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years? – results by the closest strategic option

	For	Against	DK
Totally agree to exit EU	20.1%	74.4%	5.4%
Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	21.1%	71.4%	7.5%
Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	28.1%	60.9%	10.9%
Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	43.3%	48.2%	8.5%
Opt #4 - Leaping forward	46.9%	45.1%	8.0%
Too many missing answers	23.7%	37.7%	38.6%
<b>Total</b>	<b>37.1%</b>	<b>52.6%</b>	<b>10.3%</b>

## Satisfaction with democracy

Just under half of Europeans asked are not satisfied with the operation of democracy in the EU (46% versus 43%). Although the ratio of totally dissatisfied respondents was the highest among those looking for an exit (36%), if one aggregates 'rather' and 'totally' dissatisfied responses the same ratio (68%) is found among those supporting strategic Option 1, while only 23 % were satisfied. The majority of those closest to Option 4 (54%) were satisfied with the working of democracy. However, a 38% rate of dissatisfaction suggests there is room for improvement even within that group.

## Satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU – results by the closest strategic Option

	Very satisfied	Fairly satisfied	Not very satisfied	Not at all satisfied	DK
Totally agree to exit EU	3.6%	20.0%	32.2%	35.6%	8.7%
Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	1.9%	21.5%	45.5%	22.3%	8.9%
Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	2.4%	34.0%	43.3%	12.5%	7.8%
Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	3.5%	49.4%	33.6%	5.7%	7.8%
Opt #4 - Leaping forward	6.1%	48.0%	29.4%	8.5%	8.0%
Too many missing answers	1.4%	21.2%	21.8%	10.7%	45.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>4.0%</b>	<b>39.4%</b>	<b>32.9%</b>	<b>12.8%</b>	<b>11.0%</b>

## EU responsibility for austerity in Europe

In the total sample 64% agreed with the statement that the EU is responsible for austerity in Europe. It may come as a surprise that in all the groups in our model, aside from those supporting an exit (65%), the agreement was very high (71%) among those showing preference for Option 4, and the lowest (54%) among those supporting Option 2. This may be explained by the fact that those looking for an exit blame the EU for austerity, while those supporting stronger integration look at austerity measures as a necessary evil.

## Is the EU responsible for austerity in Europe? – results by the closest strategic Option

	Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	DK
Totally agree to exit EU	35.8%	29.0%	16.7%	11.8%	6.6%
Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	15.8%	38.5%	28.2%	11.3%	6.2%
Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	14.0%	39.9%	30.5%	9.8%	5.9%
Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	14.3%	53.1%	22.3%	3.5%	6.8%
Opt #4 - Leaping forward	26.0%	44.7%	18.0%	5.1%	6.1%
Too many missing answers	10.8%	28.6%	12.5%	4.4%	43.8%
<b>Total</b>	<b>20.7%</b>	<b>43.2%</b>	<b>20.4%</b>	<b>6.3%</b>	<b>9.3%</b>

## The idea of the EU - EFFICIENT

In connection to the operation of the EU the criticism of inefficiency is often raised. This is reflected in the opinion of most Europeans with close to 60% believing that the EU is not efficient. This view is shared by 76% of those looking for an exit and 79% of those supporting alternative 1. Even 52% of those taking the closest position to the least critical Option 4 say that the EU is inefficient. This is an important reminder for decision-makers, signalling the urgent need for improved efficiency and the perception of efficient operation.

## How does the word **Efficient** describe the idea you might have of the EU? – results by the closest strategic Option

	Describes very well	Describes fairly well	Describes fairly badly	Describes very badly	DK
Totally agree to exit EU	4.5%	13.4%	36.4%	39.9%	5.9%
Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	1.7%	16.3%	47.4%	31.3%	3.4%
Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	1.4%	20.5%	45.1%	27.3%	5.6%
Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	2.5%	35.4%	46.7%	8.8%	6.6%
Opt #4 - Leaping forward	6.2%	35.2%	39.7%	12.4%	6.6%
Too many missing answers	2.1%	17.9%	27.1%	13.5%	39.4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>3.8%</b>	<b>28.5%</b>	<b>41.6%</b>	<b>17.4%</b>	<b>8.6%</b>

## Meaning of the EU – WASTE OF MONEY

The other typical criticism is that the EU's operation is too costly. The survey uses a stronger expression, 'a waste of money', and 27% of the respondents signalled their agreement with the statement. Of all the groups in our model – not counting undecided respondents – this variable shows a wide spread. The expression was the least used by those supporting Option 4 (21%) and most often by those looking for an exit (52%). In all likelihood the latter respondents believe that their country would fare better outside the EU because they are convinced they are on the losing end of EU subsidies.

## What does the EU mean to you personally? - Waste of money – results by the closest strategic Option

	Not mentioned	Mentioned
Totally agree to exit EU	48.2%	51.8%
Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	63.8%	36.2%
Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	68.9%	31.1%
Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	78.3%	21.7%
Opt #4 - Leaping forward	79.0%	21.0%
Too many missing answers	82.8%	17.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>73.3%</b>	<b>26.7%</b>

## A clearer message of the EU

The fact that the majority of Europeans (80%) believes that the EU's mission needs a much clearer definition sends a strong message. We have seen high ratios for this in all groups. However, the strongest consensus (86%) was found among those supporting Option 4. In other words, the strongest supporters of closer integration are the most vocal in demanding a clearer definition of European Union objectives.

## The EU needs a clearer message. – results by the closest strategic Option

	Totally agree	Tend to agree	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	DK
Totally agree to exit EU	57.9%	23.5%	6.7%	5.7%	6.2%
Opt #1 - Going back to the basics	38.0%	35.4%	16.2%	6.5%	3.9%
Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements	36.0%	37.1%	16.8%	5.8%	4.2%
Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously	31.5%	51.9%	9.7%	1.3%	5.5%
Opt #4 - Leaping forward	48.4%	37.8%	6.6%	2.0%	5.2%
Too many missing answers	21.9%	29.3%	6.0%	2.4%	40.4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>40.6%</b>	<b>39.5%</b>	<b>9.1%</b>	<b>2.9%</b>	<b>8.0%</b>

## How has the opinion of Europeans changed in the year before the European elections

The current study is based on the database of the Eurobarometer survey (EB79) conducted in May 2013, processing its relevant questions. Since then two additional surveys were conducted in November 2013 and March 2014. While a research data file is not yet available from these studies, the distribution of some of the questions asked is already known at the member-state level. As a general trend we can say that the attitudes towards the EU have rather improved, but not drastically.

In the 10-month period between May 2013 and March 2014 in the EU28 as a whole the ratio of those agreeing that their country could face the future better outside the EU declined slightly. However, in some member states significant shifts have been found in both directions. The ratio of those totally agreeing with an exit strategy increased by the largest margin in Cyprus (+8 percentage points), Denmark (+5), Bulgaria (+5) and Greece (+4). At the same time, the largest rate of decrease took place in Finland (-6), the United Kingdom (-5) and Germany (-3). The two countries whose citizens would rather leave the EU remain Cyprus and the United Kingdom.

### Our country could better face the future outside the EU

(%, country results, source: EB81.2 (2014) and difference from EB79.3 (2013))

	Totally agree	Tend to agree	AGREE TOTAL	DISAGREE TOTAL	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	DK
EU28	10 (-1)	22 (0)	<b>32 (-2)</b>	<b>58 (+2)</b>	33 (+2)	25 (0)	10 (-1)
Denmark	11 (+5)	13 (-2)	<b>24 (+3)</b>	<b>73 (-3)</b>	35 (-1)	38 (-3)	3 (0)
Luxembourg	11 (+3)	11 (-1)	<b>22 (+1)</b>	<b>77 (+2)</b>	35 (-2)	42 (+4)	1 (-3)
The Netherlands	7 (-2)	14 (-1)	<b>21 (-3)</b>	<b>73 (+2)</b>	34 (0)	39 (+2)	6 (+1)
Estonia	7 (+3)	14 (-4)	<b>21 (-1)</b>	<b>74 (+3)</b>	38 (-5)	36 (+8)	5 (-2)
Belgium	7 (0)	21 (-1)	<b>28 (-1)</b>	<b>70 (+1)</b>	38 (-2)	32 (+3)	2 (0)
Ireland	10 (+2)	16 (-1)	<b>26 (+2)</b>	<b>65 (-1)</b>	25 (0)	40 (-1)	9 (-1)
Lithuania	6 (+1)	16 (-3)	<b>22 (-2)</b>	<b>71 (+6)</b>	38 (+1)	33 (+5)	7 (-4)
Bulgaria	8 (+5)	14 (0)	<b>22 (+5)</b>	<b>62 (-1)</b>	34 (-1)	28 (0)	16 (-4)
Germany	9 (-3)	17 (-1)	<b>26 (-4)</b>	<b>70 (+8)</b>	33 (+2)	37 (+6)	4 (-4)
Spain	8 (-2)	17 (+2)	<b>25 (-1)</b>	<b>60 (0)</b>	30 (+10)	30 (-10)	15 (+1)
Malta	7 (+3)	17 (0)	<b>24 (+2)</b>	<b>63 (+3)</b>	33 (-1)	30 (+4)	13 (-5)
Slovakia	7 (+2)	21 (-4)	<b>28 (-2)</b>	<b>64 (+4)</b>	46 (+9)	18 (-5)	8 (-2)
France	10 (0)	20 (0)	<b>30 (0)</b>	<b>60 (+1)</b>	34 (+1)	26 (0)	10 (-1)
Sweden	11 (-2)	24 (-2)	<b>35 (-4)</b>	<b>62 (+4)</b>	35 (+1)	27 (+3)	3 (0)
Greece	14 (+4)	26 (0)	<b>40 (+4)</b>	<b>55 (-3)</b>	36 (0)	19 (-1)	5 (-1)
Latvia	12 (+3)	20 (0)	<b>32 (+3)</b>	<b>53 (-5)</b>	35 (0)	18 (-5)	15 (+2)
Hungary	8 (-2)	25 (+2)	<b>33 (0)</b>	<b>58 (+1)</b>	34 (+6)	24 (-5)	9 (-1)
Portugal	8 (+1)	29 (+5)	<b>37 (+6)</b>	<b>52 (-5)</b>	35 (-3)	17 (-2)	11 (-1)
Romania	7 (0)	19 (-5)	<b>26 (-4)</b>	<b>62 (+6)</b>	31 (-3)	31 (+9)	12 (-2)
Finland	9 (-6)	20 (-5)	<b>29 (-11)</b>	<b>67 (+11)</b>	39 (+4)	28 (+7)	4 (-1)
Italy	11 (+3)	27 (+4)	<b>38 (+6)</b>	<b>46 (-8)</b>	30 (-3)	16 (-5)	16 (+2)
Slovenia	15 (+1)	27 (0)	<b>42 (+1)</b>	<b>48 (-5)</b>	30 (+2)	18 (-7)	10 (+4)
Czech Republic	12 (0)	30 (+2)	<b>42 (+2)</b>	<b>49 (-2)</b>	35 (-2)	14 (0)	9 (0)



	Totally agree	Tend to agree	AGREE TOTAL	DISAGREE TOTAL	Tend to disagree	Totally disagree	DK
Croatia	11 (-1)	28 (-2)	<b>39 (-3)</b>	<b>49 (-1)</b>	31 (0)	18 (-1)	12 (+4)
Poland	6 (-1)	29 (-4)	<b>35 (-5)</b>	<b>55 (+8)</b>	38 (+4)	17 (+3)	10 (-3)
Cyprus	30 (+8)	21 (-3)	<b>51 (+5)</b>	<b>43 (-4)</b>	21 (+1)	22 (-5)	6 (-1)
Austria	16 (+1)	24 (-4)	<b>40 (-4)</b>	<b>50 (+4)</b>	30 (+2)	20 (+2)	10 (0)
United Kingdom	20 (-5)	27 (-1)	<b>47 (-6)</b>	<b>41 (+5)</b>	29 (+7)	12 (-1)	12 (+1)


Of the 14 questions calculating closeness to specific strategic Options to were included in the latest survey. Support for a monetary union and a common currency declined by 1% from 51 to 50%. 51% of the respondents supported the idea that European political parties present their candidates for European Commission President prior to the upcoming European parliamentary election. This represents a 5% drop since the 2013 survey.

Question (What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.)	For	Against
1. A European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro.	50 (-1)	43 (+1)
4. European political parties to present their candidate for the post of European Commission President at the next European Parliament elections.	51 (-5)	26 (+4)

For the first time since 1984, the survey conducted in the spring of 2014 asked Europeans about the idea of a United States of Europe. The exact wording of the question went as follows: *Some people talk of the idea of forming a "United States of Europe" putting together the Member States of the EU. This means a kind of political union like there is between the states of the USA or the provinces that form Canada. Does this idea of forming a "United States of Europe" someday, including your country, seem a good or a bad idea to you?*

Currently the majority of EU citizens believe that talk of a United States of Europe is a bad idea (40% of the respondents taking this position), while one third of the respondents are in favour. This latter figure is almost the same from what we found above as supporters of Option 4 (the federalist option-35%).

## Opinions on the idea of forming a United States of Europe (EB 81.2, March 2014)



A closer comparison of member states shows significant differences in 2014 attitudes. At one end of the spectrum one finds Finland, Denmark and Sweden where the idea is supported well below the average (11% in Finland, 16% in Denmark and Sweden). This also means that the concept is firmly rejected by a rather high majority (around 75%) in all three countries. Aside from the Scandinavian countries, the 40% average rejection rate is well exceeded in the United Kingdom (63%), Holland (60%) and Luxembourg (52%) as well. In contrast, in Romania supporters of the idea of the United States of Europe reached an absolute majority in 2014. 53% express that opinion, while only 20% are opposed. Support above the average is seen primarily in East-Central European countries, including Hungary where the concept is supported by 44% of the respondents, while the rejection rate is also rather high at 38%. Similar and roughly even distribution of the two positions is seen in the Czech Republic, Croatia, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.

## What conclusions can be drawn?

- The task of the new and previous European and national leaders after the formation of the next European Parliament and the Commission is twofold:
  - Promoting the Angel. Endorse the policies of deeper integration, not being afraid of the negative reaction of the citizens, and hoping that the policies themselves can help to “sell” the EU project as well.
  - Defeating the Devil – changing the big picture: to work more intensely on improving the image of the European Union with redefining the European idea and trying to make it attractive for the European citizens. Framing is crucially important here: the major problem of the discourse over the EU is that deeper integration framed as the “death of the nation states”, and it can shift the attitudes of the originally pro-European voters as well to the idea of less integration.
- The task of the European and national leaders after the formation of the next European Parliament and the Commission is twofold:
  - Promoting the Angel. Endorse the policies of deeper integration, without fear of the negative reaction of the citizens, and hope that the policies themselves can help to “sell” the EU project as well.
  - Defeating the Devil. Work more intensely on improving the image of the European Union by redefining the European idea and trying to make it attractive for the European citizens. Framing is crucially important here: the major problem of the discourse on the EU is the framing of deeper integration as the “death of the nation states”, which can also potentially shift the attitudes of the originally pro-European voters to the idea of less integration.
- Education seems to be a crucial factor in making EU citizens more receptive to the ideas of further integration, therefore more investment in education in terms of guaranteeing wide access to higher levels of education might be a key element to provide the necessary social and political support for the continuation of the integration project.
- More than one-fifth of EU citizens seem to be hesitant whether they want to see their respective countries in the EU in the future or not. Even among those supporting Option 4 (Leaping forward) their ratio is 19%, rising to 26 and 25% among those opting for option 3 and 2, respectively. 45% of the ones who support Option 1 (less EU) tend to agree that being outside the EU would be better than inside. This is a primary goal of the decision-makers to persuade these rather hesitant and disillusioned EU citizens that the EU has more advantages than disadvantages.

## Detailed Methodology

The study is based on calculations relying on the Eurobarometer 79.3 (2013) database. Data for the public-opinion survey was collected between May 10 and 26, 2013. The sample has been limited to the 28 EU Member States with a sample size of 27,605.


We set the objective of giving an estimate of Europeans supporting the strategic alternatives proposed by the New Pact for Europe.

As a first step, of all the topics included in the research we selected the ones with some bearing on the measures and directives listed under the New Pact for Europe strategic options. On the whole, we identified 14 issues, suitable in our opinion, to determine how close or far the attitude of respondents is in respect to specific strategic options. We supplemented these 14 questions with one more, the level of agreement with the statement *“Our country could better face the future outside the EU”*. This item was used as a starting premise before processing the above mentioned 14 questions.

As a result, our model integrated 15 questions. Based on the responses given, we ranked all respondents participating in the survey in the following six categories:

1. Supporter of leaving the EU;
2. Opt #1 - Going back to the basics;
3. Opt #2 - Consolidating past achievements;
4. Opt #3 - Moving ahead ambitiously;
5. Opt #4 - Leaping forward;
6. Undecided.

### Flow-chart illustrating the methodology



The process of classification by category into categories followed these steps:

Step 1. Respondents who totally agree that their country would face the future better outside the EU were selected and assigned to the pro-exit group.

Step 2. Subsequently we classified the respondents opting for one of the following questions (tend to agree, tend to disagree, totally dis answering 'I don't know'.

Step 3. Those declining to respond to six or more questions related to the 14 strategic options or gave the 'I don't know' answer were put in the 'Undecided' group.

Step 4. Thereafter we classified those not in favour of an exit strategy on the one hand, and failing to give at least five valid answers.

Step 5. The topics in the 14 questions were correlated with issues in the strategic options and based on that four integers between 1 and 5, so-called closeness values, were assigned to each response option. These indicate the relative closeness of the given response option to the first four strategic options. Number '5' indicates in very close and number '1' a very distant position. The fifth alternative of the New Pact for Europe - Changing the 'more/less Europe' logic (a fundamental rethink is needed) – was left out our model because we were unable to establish a correspondence between the available questions and the established objectives and measures.

Example: Those respondents, who think that the appointment of a finance minister for the EU would be very *effective*, prefer Option 4 - Leaping forward, so they get the closeness value of 5. They are less close to Option 3 (closeness value is 4), and this opinion is very far from Options 2 and 1 (closeness value is 1 for both cases).

Closeness values assigned to response Options are itemized in the Appendix.

Step 6. In the case of each respondent we calculated the average of closeness values tied to the four strategic options and given in response to the 14 questions. Here we took into account questions where valid answers were provided (maximum 5 out of 14 questions could be left unanswered). As a result, four numbers between 1-5 were assigned to everyone. These show the closeness of the respondent's opinion to strategic options 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Step 7. For each respondent we established the highest closeness value, i.e., to see to which strategic option the respondents' opinion comes the closest based on their response. Subsequently we assigned them to one of the following categories: Option 1 - Going back to the basics; Option 2 - Consolidating past achievements; Option 3 - Moving ahead ambitiously; Option 4 - Leaping forward.

When two closeness values turned out to be equal, the respondent was classified in the option with a lower index.

As a result, each respondent participating in the survey has been classified in the six categories established by us.

## Comments to the methodology

### **The reason we don't examine the opinion of those who totally agree with the statement that their country would fare better outside the EU.**

Comparing the group of respondents in complete agreement with an exit strategy with those giving different but valid responses to the question, two significant conclusions can be made.

(1) One finds a significant difference between those for and those against withdrawal. Significantly more citizens supporting withdrawal from the Union object to a joint European Union foreign and security policy, the common currency and the enlargement of the EU. Also, in the first group significantly fewer respondents would say that the proposed crisis management measures are efficient. In respect to the Union's preferred integration rate 11% of pro-exit respondents prefer to maintain the status quo, compared to only 1.6% among those wishing to stay in the EU. On the whole, based on the survey questions the strong anti-integration attitude of those completely against EU membership is clearly evident.

(2) Regarding the percentage of "Don't know" responses to questions in our model there is no significant difference between those for and those against EU membership. In fact, we found a slightly smaller percentage among those supporting withdrawal. This may further reinforce the conclusion that this cohort doesn't necessarily oppose integration due to apathy or a wish to hide its opinion, and instead only takes a firm position against the announced measures and proposals.

While the reconsideration of membership is not explicitly spelled out in strategic Options, we feel justified in treating those firmly agreeing to withdrawal separately, and look at the degrees of affinity to specific strategic Options only among other respondents. When a respondent completely agrees with the statement that his/her country would fare better outside the EU, one cannot claim that his/her opinion is close to any one of the four strategic Options.

### **The reason we dropped Option #5 - changing the 'more/less Europe' logic**

The last Option (changing the 'more/less Europe' logic) stands for a fundamental rethinking of European cooperation. The Eurobarometer questions used in our study do not offer sufficient grounds for us to correlate opinions to this alternative.

In respect of the future, we believe that following political consultations guidelines for a New Pact for Europe should be fine-tuned and given more detail, along with further clarification of policy and institutional criteria. Subsequently, the public should be polled about these guidelines in a Special Eurobarometer survey.

### **On dichotomous items**

Within the selected set of questions there are several items where respondents have to choose one out of two answers to indicate whether they agree or disagree with the offered statement.

While in the case of other items arranged along a 4-5 scale they have the opportunity to take more nuanced positions, when it comes to these questions they have to state a firm position. This category includes questions on the euro, on a joint EU foreign policy, a joint defence and security policy, further enlargement and the issue of fielding candidates for the post of European Commission President.

When eliciting responses on strategic Options dichotomous items offer the opportunity of drawing clear lines of demarcation. On the other hand, there is the drawback that for all practical purposes closeness values can take on only very close (5) or very distant (1) values, i.e., there is no information on the degree of support and rejection.

## Appendix – the distribution of responses given to questions in the model (%)

		FR	BE	NL	DE	IT	LU	DK	IE	GB	GR	ES	PT	FI	SE	AT	CY	CZ	EE	HU	LV	LT	MT	PL	SK	SI	BG	RO	HR
1	A European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro. (qa20_1)																												
For	51	62	76	68	66	59	77	32	69	15	60	52	52	75	20	65	47	25	73	50	43	40	68	29	77	77	44	56	61
Against	42	33	23	29	29	31	21	66	23	79	36	37	37	23	79	29	47	71	22	40	51	52	25	63	19	21	39	32	34
2	A common foreign policy of the 27 Member States of the EU. (qa20_2)																												
For	64	61	72	53	75	66	70	44	54	42	70	72	61	44	41	61	64	57	73	71	74	74	41	73	77	68	76	70	76
Against	27	30	25	41	19	22	25	53	31	45	28	16	25	50	56	32	28	39	20	21	18	14	39	18	18	28	12	17	19
3	A common defense and security policy among EU Member States. (qa20_4)																												
For	74	78	82	75	79	72	85	70	53	56	76	76	66	56	58	60	79	79	86	74	83	84	60	82	86	78	85	78	81
Against	19	16	16	21	15	20	11	27	34	34	22	15	23	40	39	33	16	18	8	20	9	7	19	11	10	20	6	11	14
4	European political parties to present their candidate for the post of European Commission President at the next European Parliament elections. (qa20_5)																												
For	56	46	62	60	71	52	63	68	55	47	69	43	54	53	72	54	63	57	53	78	59	48	63	64	67	59	55	56	64
Against	22	34	30	24	9	28	24	19	19	29	19	25	20	27	15	29	15	27	19	11	17	19	8	18	15	26	5	16	22
5	A more important role for the EU in regulating financial services. (qc5_1)																												
Very effective	25	24	26	17	32	30	19	10	31	11	23	46	22	15	11	21	44	19	8	18	13	15	24	14	23	36	23	24	20
Fairly effective	46	52	56	50	43	41	56	49	44	42	47	32	57	48	47	48	33	51	50	46	49	48	48	55	54	41	51	52	53
Not very effective	15	8	13	21	13	15	15	28	13	24	17	7	10	23	30	21	10	21	21	23	19	15	7	14	12	14	7	9	14
Not at all effective	4	3	1	5	4	5	2	4	5	10	8	3	2	6	6	5	6	4	3	6	3	2	1	3	2	4	1	2	2
6	A stronger coordination of economic policy among all the EU Member States (qc5_2)																												
Very effective	28	25	26	22	39	32	28	20	27	12	30	45	26	20	15	24	56	22	13	19	16	14	32	17	25	41	37	35	23
Fairly effective	48	55	62	59	45	44	57	56	49	46	49	36	55	46	51	49	34	49	55	47	52	54	45	58	59	39	44	44	53
Not very effective	12	7	10	12	10	13	10	15	11	19	13	7	9	22	24	17	6	20	17	23	17	11	4	11	8	14	7	11	12
Not at all effective	3	3	0	3	2	5	1	4	3	6	6	3	2	5	6	3	2	3	2	6	3	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	2
7	A stronger coordination of economic and financial policies among the countries of the euro area (qc5_3)																												
Very effective	27	23	27	20	40	31	27	18	27	13	29	44	27	20	16	22	57	20	15	16	19	15	31	15	25	41	36	30	22
Fairly effective	48	54	60	60	44	43	60	54	50	44	48	36	54	50	52	47	32	50	54	48	52	51	44	60	58	42	43	45	54



# THE ANGEL LIES IN THE DETAILS

		FR	BE	NL	DE	IT	LU	DK	IE	GB	GR	ES	PT	FI	SE	AT	CY	CZ	EE	HU	LV	LT	MT	PL	SK	SI	BG	RO	HR
Not very effective	12	9	10	12	9	13	7	19	12	20	14	6	10	19	22	19	7	21	15	24	15	12	5	11	9	11	6	10	10
Not at all effective	3	3	1	3	2	5	2	2	3	6	5	3	2	5	4	5	2	2	3	6	3	2	2	2	1	2	1	2	3
8	<i>The designation of a finance minister for the EU (qc5_4)</i>																												
Very effective	15	13	15	17	19	22	17	8	19	9	15	21	13	12	7	14	33	8	7	13	10	10	23	11	8	21	19	19	15
Fairly effective	36	41	46	41	33	37	48	32	37	32	33	28	42	33	26	35	25	31	36	39	34	38	37	45	44	32	34	34	45
Not very effective	23	19	28	24	25	19	22	37	20	27	28	17	21	36	37	31	18	34	29	24	28	17	9	21	24	26	10	17	20
Not at all effective	11	12	6	11	13	6	7	19	11	13	17	15	6	11	24	12	11	17	8	9	8	6	3	4	10	11	3	6	6
9	<i>EU approval in advance of EU Member States' governments budgets (qc5_5)</i>																												
Very effective	17	11	17	15	21	26	13	10	21	7	16	27	15	19	18	15	33	16	9	14	13	12	22	12	19	26	26	19	16
Fairly effective	40	43	55	41	38	41	52	43	43	33	43	30	47	38	40	39	28	44	43	43	42	44	37	54	51	36	36	35	49
Not very effective	20	20	21	29	21	15	23	28	18	26	23	16	16	27	25	28	17	25	25	25	23	17	7	15	18	22	11	17	19
Not at all effective	8	9	2	10	9	5	5	12	8	14	11	10	4	11	13	7	12	7	8	9	7	4	6	4	3	6	4	8	4
10	<i>A more accountable governance of the Euro (qc5_6)</i>																												
Very effective	31	21	28	28	38	40	29	23	32	16	24	55	31	22	25	35	40	27	21	19	16	18	37	21	39	55	41	37	28
Fairly effective	43	51	56	48	40	40	50	49	42	41	44	31	53	51	44	47	31	41	51	43	52	48	40	52	50	32	37	40	49
Not very effective	12	10	11	11	12	12	13	17	12	18	16	4	7	17	19	10	11	18	14	22	15	12	4	13	6	8	5	9	12
Not at all effective	4	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	5	6	9	3	2	5	4	4	8	5	2	5	2	1	0	2	1	2	2	3	3
11	<i>A central supervision of the banking system at EU level (i.e. Banking Union) (qc5_8)</i>																												
Very effective	31	26	33	38	48	33	30	30	40	13	24	49	27	25	23	34	52	28	15	18	25	16	31	16	29	44	34	28	23
Fairly effective	40	47	51	44	35	40	48	48	38	36	42	29	52	47	45	42	29	46	48	42	47	46	39	49	51	35	40	36	49
Not very effective	13	10	12	10	8	13	13	14	12	24	17	7	9	17	20	15	7	17	18	24	13	14	4	17	10	12	4	11	13
Not at all effective	5	5	2	4	4	4	5	2	3	10	9	4	2	6	7	5	6	4	3	6	3	4	1	3	2	3	2	4	4
12	<i>The introduction of Eurobonds (European bonds) (qc6_4)</i>																												
Strongly in favor	13	13	18	6	7	20	13	7	24	5	23	17	18	7	4	13	22	14	5	18	7	7	11	10	12	19	19	20	21
Fairly in favor	31	35	53	31	19	36	42	43	32	30	39	24	39	31	35	26	16	35	32	37	28	32	31	41	41	28	25	27	42
Fairly opposed	18	14	19	23	27	17	23	23	9	18	15	11	10	26	27	29	14	25	28	19	23	17	11	18	21	19	9	13	15
Strongly opposed	11	6	5	12	27	6	4	10	5	9	6	10	2	17	18	20	27	11	14	7	17	11	4	6	9	21	5	8	6
13	<i>Which corresponds best to the speed of building Europe you would like? (qa25_b)</i>																												
1 Standstill	3	4	1	3	3	1	3	1	2	8	0	1	2	2	3	5	2	2	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	2
2	3	3	3	4	6	4	5	3	2	4	1	1	2	5	7	5	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	3	1	2	2

# THE ANGEL LIES IN THE DETAILS

		FR	BE	NL	DE	IT	LU	DK	IE	GB	GR	ES	PT	FI	SE	AT	CY	CZ	EE	HU	LV	LT	MT	PL	SK	SI	BG	RO	HR
3	8	7	8	9	14	10	9	12	6	11	2	4	4	13	11	9	9	7	10	3	7	5	4	3	5	6	2	3	5
4	16	16	20	22	23	13	17	21	15	19	10	10	8	23	22	18	15	21	27	11	16	18	13	11	13	13	7	8	15
5	28	33	36	34	30	26	31	33	26	21	25	29	21	34	29	30	21	33	32	30	29	27	20	30	27	25	19	18	27
6	20	19	20	17	13	25	16	19	23	13	30	21	25	15	14	21	16	19	15	27	15	22	16	29	25	22	31	24	20
7 Runs as fast as possible	17	13	11	8	8	15	17	8	18	16	29	29	28	6	10	8	27	13	7	24	22	18	18	22	25	22	28	31	23
14	As a consequence of the crisis, EU countries will have to work more closely together (qc4a_8)																												
Totally agree	35	33	32	30	51	34	37	32	29	19	38	52	30	36	43	26	72	32	31	36	29	26	35	25	33	59	38	38	-
Tend to agree	47	52	58	55	40	45	55	57	50	56	48	38	52	48	45	48	22	50	56	52	56	56	47	56	54	35	48	40	-
Tend to disagree	9	6	7	10	5	14	5	8	11	12	9	5	10	9	8	15	3	12	7	7	8	9	5	10	6	4	5	9	-
Totally disagree	3	2	2	4	2	4	1	2	3	6	3	2	2	4	2	6	2	3	2	2	2	3	0	2	3	1	1	3	-

## Questions and closeness values

	<b>1. going back to the basics</b> (undoing the mistakes of the past)	<b>2. consolidating past achievements</b> (If it ain't broke, don't fix it)	<b>3. moving ahead ambitiously</b> (doing more and doing it better)	<b>4. leaping forward</b> (economic and political union is the only answer)
Question 01: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. <i>A European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro.</i> (qa20_1)1				
For	3	15	15	15
Against	15	3	3	3
Question 02: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. <i>A common foreign policy of the 27 Member States of the EU.</i> (qa20_2)				
For	2	3	4	5
Against	4	3	2	1
Question 03: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. <i>A common defense and security policy among EU Member States.</i> (qa20_4)				
For	2	3	4	5
Against	4	3	2	1

# THE ANGEL LIES IN THE DETAILS

	<b>1. going back to the basics</b> (undoing the mistakes of the past)	<b>2. consolidating past achievements</b> (If it ain't broke, don't fix it)	<b>3. moving ahead ambitiously</b> (doing more and doing it better)	<b>4. leaping forward</b> (economic and political union is the only answer)
Question 04: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. <i>European political parties to present their candidate for the post of European Commission President at the next European Parliament elections.</i> (qa20_5)				
For	1	2	5	5
Against	5	4	1	1
Question 05: A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? <i>A more important role for the EU in regulating financial services.</i> (qc5_1)				
Very effective	1	2	4	5
Fairly effective	2	3	5	4
Not very effective	4	5	3	2
Not at all effective	5	4	2	1
Question 06: A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? <i>A stronger coordination of economic policy among all the EU Member States</i> (qc5_2)				
Very effective	1	2	4	5
Fairly effective	2	3	3	4
Not very effective	4	3	3	2
Not at all effective	5	2	2	1
Question 07: A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? <i>A stronger coordination of economic and financial policies among the countries of the euro area</i> (qc5_3)				
Very effective	1	4	5	5
Fairly effective	2	3	4	4
Not very effective	3	2	2	2
Not at all effective	4	1	1	1
Question 08: A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? <i>The designation of a finance minister for the EU</i> (qc5_4)				
Very effective	1	1	4	5
Fairly effective	2	2	3	4
Not very effective	4	4	3	2
Not at all effective	5	5	2	1
Question 09: A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? <i>EU approval in advance of EU Member States' governments budgets</i> (qc5_5)				
Very effective	1	2	4	5
Fairly effective	2	3	5	4
Not very effective	4	5	3	2
Not at all effective	5	4	2	1

# THE ANGEL LIES IN THE DETAILS

	<b>1. going back to the basics</b> (undoing the mistakes of the past)	<b>2. consolidating past achievements</b> (If it ain't broke, don't fix it)	<b>3. moving ahead ambitiously</b> (doing more and doing it better)	<b>4. leaping forward</b> (economic and political union is the only answer)
Question 10: A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? <i>A more accountable governance of the Euro</i> (qc5_6)				
Very effective	1	2	4	5
Fairly effective	2	3	5	4
Not very effective	4	5	3	2
Not at all effective	5	4	2	1
Question 11: A range of measures to tackle the current financial and economic crisis is being discussed in the European institutions. For each, could you tell me whether you think it would be effective or not? <i>A central supervision of the banking system at EU level (i.e. Banking Union)</i> (qc5_8)				
Very effective	1	3	4	5
Fairly effective	2	4	4	4
Not very effective	4	3	2	2
Not at all effective	5	2	1	1
Question 12: Thinking about reform global financial markets, please tell me whether you are in favor or opposed to the following measures to be taken by the EU. <i>The introduction of Eurobonds (European bonds)</i> (qc6_4)				
Strongly in favor	1	1	5	5
Fairly in favor	1	1	4	4
Fairly opposed	4	4	2	2
Strongly opposed	5	5	1	1
Question 13: <i>Which corresponds best to the speed of building Europe you would like?</i> (qa25_b)				
1	5	2	1	1
2	4	2	1	1
3	3	3	1	1
4	3	4	2	1
5	1	3	4	2
6	1	2	5	4
7 Runs as fast as possible	1	1	3	5
Question 14: For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree. <i>As a consequence of the crisis, EU countries will have to work more closely together</i> (qc4a_8)				
Totally agree	1	2	4	5
Tend to agree	2	3	5	4
Tend to disagree	4	5	3	2
Totally disagree	5	4	2	1